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2/26/79

To:

Clerk

From:

L. F. P. , ,Jr •

O~te:

February 26, 1Q79

No. 77-1844 Mobile v. Bold~n
No. 78-357 wi1Iiams v. Brown

These are companion cases, the first involvinq the
city qovernment of

Mobil~,

and the seconn

th~

composition of

the school board (Boarn of School Commissioners) for MobileCounty.
Althouqh the Solicitor GenerAl has filed a single
amicus brief dealinq with the two cases (99 oaqes long!),
the cases involve separate •grants• and a number of
different considerations.
ThPse cases will be argued in March, and
are three weeks •off•.
importance,
I

will need

memo.

I

th~r~fore

But in view of their complexity and

I

write this memorandum at this time to say that

~

bench memo on each of them or a consolidated

have not yet done more than tak0 a most preliminary

look at the briefs, although 1 recall fairly clearly thP.
central issuPS.

I

will not get into these now

b~yond

some

preliminary observations.
T.n the City of Mobile

cas~

(77-1844), the federal

courts not only invalidated the Commission form of

goveFnment, but the district court - in an unprecedented
action so far as I know - devised and ordered effective an
new form of government for the city.

The new city

judicially imposed, appears in the appendix to the
itaternent (7d) and ts roughly 50 pages lonq,
a detai1ed new " form of qovernment for the city.
three commissioners, under the old form of
government, were afforded the "opportunity" to recommend a
new form of government, they declined to do so.

Thus,

unle's s the judgments below are reversed, the second largest
city in Alabama will have had imposed upon it a form of
government never considered by any

~lected

of the people, and only by federal judqes.
ne~

representatives
Moreover, the

form of government is totally different from the

commission form that Mobile had adopted in 1911, and with
amendments immaterial to this controversy, had remained in
effect over the intervening 60-odd years.
Under the commission form of government, there
were three commissioners
nonpartisan vote.

electe~

at large, by majority,

Each, however, was elected to a "slot"

with responsibility for particular governmental functions.
The population of Mobile is roughly two-thirds white and onethird Negro.

No Negro has ever been elected a commissioner,

and the district court - with obvious enthusiasm - made just
every finding of discrimination against the Negro

...

3.

As th e court of appeal

minority that could be imagined.

'

apparently accepted these findings without question (and
without any serious review), we are bound by those
findings of fact as distinguished from conclusions.
We took the case, as I understand it, to determine
whether maintaining the commission form of government
constit uted purposeful discrimination within the meaning of
Davis and Arlington Heights.

Both the district court and

the court of appeals had no difficulty in finding purposeful
or intentional discrimination.

But they did so on a theory

that as articulated by CA 5, is novel - so far as I can
That court said:

~
'·~

"Under our holding today in Nevett II, these
findings also compel the inference tfiat the
system [i.e. the commission form of government]
has been maintained with the purpose of diluting
the black vote, thus supplying the element of
intent necessary to establish a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."

•

*

"The city ardently asserts that since the 1911
plan was enacted under 'race proof' circumstances,
it is immune from constitutional attack.

*

* '

•

"The city would have us inter pret Davis and
Arlington Heights to require a show1nq of
intentional discrimination in the enactment of the
plan. We squarely rejected this contention in
Nevett II, as it was rejected by the en bane court
1n Klrksey.
[In that case we] held that an
innocently formulated plan that perpetuates past
intentional discrimination is unconstitutional.
In Nevett II, we noted that a plan neutral at its

. ~:".

':.

11. ·.

'i.\

~

inception may nevertheless become unconstitutional
when it is maintained for the purpose of devaluing
the votes of blacks."
[We] conclude that 'th~ re is a current
condition of dilution of the black vote resulting
from the intentional state leqislative inaction
which is as effective as • • • intentional state
action." (Emphasis supplied by CA 5).

The

l ~ st s~ntence

is particularly notable.

It

there may be "state action" when in fact there
action, a contradiction in terms that is more
than curious in a judicial opinion.
I do suppose that if there were proof that the
commission form of qovernment was purposefully retained
primarily to discriminate against negroes, this would
pres,ent a arguable but. difficult question.

The commission

government per se has never been viewed, so far as I
know, as a more effective means of deprivinq neqroes of
equal voting opportunities than any other form of
government.

Although discrimination certainly was a way of

life
' in every southern community until 1954, and continued
wit~ '1 respect to votinq until well into the 1960s, I doubt

that anyone thought of the commission form of government or any other particular form of qovernment - as a means of
effectuating discriminatory intent.

The government

obviously had been satisfactory to the people of Mobile for
more than half a century, in all probability quite without

..: '

5.

regard to discrimination.

I therefore question whether the

rationale of CA 5 is sound.
The only discriminatory effect found by the courts
below was that the election at large,

~lus

polarized voting,

precluded the election of a black member to the Board of
Commissioners, and this resulted in minimizing black
participation in all governmental activities.

Thus, in view

of the at large election feature of the commission plan, our
decision in White v. Regester, 412

u.s.

755, is relevant.

In view the "parade of horrors" marshaled in the opinion of
the district court (appearing consciously to "track" the
White v. Regester situation), a decision invalidating at
large elections may have been justified.
content with any such limited remedy.

The DC was not

It concluded that

dividing the city into three districts, one of which would
have assured a negro commissioner, was not desirable, and without affording the state legislature or the existing city
government the opportunity to go through the legislative
process of considering other alternatives, decided that the
appropriate remedy was a judicially devised new form of
government.
If the foregoing preliminary reaction to the case
is generally correct, I suppose we could hold that the
remedy exceeded the violation of constitutional rights.
However, we come out on this case, it will be difficult for

me to approve the creation by a federal judge of an entirely
new form of government.
I should have mentioned above my concern over the
emphasis by the courts below on what they refer to as the
"devaluation [or dilution] of the votes of blacks".

This

reflects the ancient, and often rejected political science
notion of proportional representation:

since one-third of

the population of Mobile is negro, it should have one-third
participation in its government.

By the same logic, every

county, city and state should be governed legislatively (and
perhaps in all administrative agencies and bodies) by a
racial and ethnic mix in direct proportion to the
population.

Since our national population is - as I

understand it - about 12% to 15% negro, the Congress of the
Unit~d

States should have this percentage of negro

f'

representation.

But this simplistic thinking (apart from

its other falacies, historical and practical) does not take
into account the diversity and hetrogeneous nature of the
peoples of this country.

The "whites" are not - and never

have been since the early colonial years - a homogeneous
American population.

One of the unique things about our

country is that it has been a haven for almost every
religious, ethnic and divergent cultural component of the
earth's population.

If we start down the road of

proportional representation for each identifiable segment of

...

'

!'.

~

7.
the population, there would be chaos.
addressed in

B a~ke,

This was n problem I

but without perceotible imnact on the

thinkinq of my Brothers.
Anart from the

for~going,

I think we have said in

Whitcomb (and elsewhere) that no seqment of the population racial or otherwise - is !.!!.!:.itled to any particular
representation in a legislative body .

The assuring of equal

votinq rights for all should be the remedy.

This already is

becoming increasinqly evident, as the negro vote

ex~rcises

the balance of power in a number of the most populous stateR
and cities - PXercisinQ political influence substantially in
excess of its numerical strength .
D~spite

th~

generalized reactions expressPd above ,

I want my clerl<'s independent iurlqment.

As uRual, I also

want recommennations based on princiPles that can be applied
consistently

~nd

th ~ t

will stancl the test of time •

•

•

•

I have not mentioned, in the foreqoing rather
ramblinq discussion,

th~

school board case ( 78-357) .

tt is

a companion case with both similarities and dissimilarities .

I will, of course, want

*

advic~

•

on it also •

8.

As so often happens in these cases, the city and
school board are completely "outgunned" on the briefing.
The city's brief is particularly amateurish, even thouqh the
lawyers - whom I know - are experienced and I would have
thought capable of much higher quality work.

This means we

cannot rely (as we rarely can) on the briefs alone.

L.F.P., Jr.
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To:

Clerk

From:

L.F.P., Jr.

Date:

February 26, 1979

No. 77-1844 Mobile v. Bolden
No. 78-357 W1ll1ams v. Brown

These are companion cases, the first involving the
city government of Mobile, and the second the composition of
the school board (Board of School Commissioners) for Mobile
County.
Although the Solicitor General has filed a single
amicus brief dealing with the two cases (99 pages long!),
the cases involve separate "grants" and a number of
different considerations.
These cases will be argued in March, and therefore
are three weeks "off".

But in view of their complexity and

importance, I write this memorandum at this time to say that
I will need a bench memo on each of them or a consolidated
memo.

I have not yet done more than take a most preliminary

look at the briefs, although I recall fairly clearly the
central issues.

I will not get into these now beyond some

preliminary observations.
In the City of Mobile case (77-1844), the federal
courts not only invalidated the Commission form of

2.
government, but the district court - in an unprecedented
action so far as I know - devised and ordered effective an
entirely new form of government for the city.

The new city

charter, judicially imposed, appears in the appendix to the
jurisdictional statement (7d) and is roughly 50 pages long,
constituting a detailed new form of government for the city.
Although the three commissioners, under the old form of
government, were afforded the "opportunity" to recommend a
new form of government, they declined to do so.

Thus,

unless the judgments below are reversed, the second largest
city in Alabama will have had imposed upon it a form of
government never considered by any elected representatives
of the people, and only by federal judges.

Moreover, the

new form of government is totally different from the
commission form that Mobile had adopted in 1911, and with
amendments immaterial to this controversy, had remained in
effect over the intervening 60-odd years.
Under the commission form of government, there
were three commissioners elected at large, by majority,
nonpartisan vote.

Each, however, was elected to a "slot"

¥-

with responsibility for particular governmental functions.
The population of Mobile is roughly two-thirds white and onethird Negro.

No Negro has ever been elected a commissioner,

and the district court - with obvious enthusiasm - made just
about every finding of discrimination against the Negro

.

'·

3.
minority that could be imagined.

As the court of appeals

apparently accepted these findings without question (and
probably without any serious review), we are bound by those
that are findings of fact as distinguished from conclusions.
We took the case, as I understand it, to determine
whether maintaining the commission form of government
constituted purposeful discrimination within the meaning of
Davis and A,r lington Heigpts.

Both the district court and

the court of appeals had no difficulty in finding purposeful
or intentional discrimination.

But they did so on a theory

that as articulated by CA 5, is novel - so far as I can
recall.

That court said:
"Under our holding today in Nevett II, these
findings also compel the inference tnat the
system [i.e. the commission form of government]
has been maintained with the purpose of diluting
the black vote, thus supplying the element of
intent necessary to establish a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."

*

*

*

"The city ardently asserts that since the 1911
plan was enacted under 'race proof' circumstances,
it is immune from constitutional attack.

*

*

*

"The city would have us interpret Davis and
Arlington Hei~hts to require a show1ng of
intentional d1scrimination in the enactment of the
plan. We squarely rejected this content i on in
Nevett II, as it was rejected by the en bane court
1n K1rksey.
[In that case we] held that an
innocently formulated plan that perpetuates past
intentional discrimination is unconstitutional.
In Nevett II, we noted that a plan neutral at its

4.
inception may nevertheless become unconstitutional
when it is maintained for the purpose of devaluing
the votes of blacks."
[We] conclude that 'there is a current
condition of dilution of the black vote resulting
from the i ~ t~ ntion ~ l state le9 islative inaction
which is as effective as • • • intentional state
action."
(Emphasis supplied by CA 5).

The last sentence is particularly notable.

It

states that there may be "state action" when in fact there
is no state action, a contradiction in terms that is more
than curious in a judicial opinion.
I do suppose that if there were proof that the
commission form of government was purposefully retained
primarily to discriminate against negroes, this would
present a arguable but difficult question.

The commission

form of government per se has never been viewed, so far as I
know, as a more effective means of depriving negroes of
equal voting opportunities than any other form of
government.

Although discrimination certainly was a way of

life in every southern community until 1954, and continued
with respect to voting until well into the 1960s, I doubt
that anyone thought of the commission form of government or any other particular form of government - as a means of
effectuating discriminatory intent.

The government

obviously had been satisfactory to the people of Mobile for
more than half a century, in all probability quite without

'

.

5.
regard to discrimination.

I therefore question whether the

rationale of CA 5 is sound.
The only discriminatory effect found by the courts
below was that the election at large, plus polarized voting,
precluded the election of a black member to the Board of
Commissioners, and this resulted in minimizing black
participation in all governmental activities.

Thus, in view

of the at large election feature of the commission plan, our
decision in White v. Regester, 412

u.s.

755, is relevant.

In view the "parade of horrors" marshaled in the opinion of
the district court (appearing consciously to "track" the
White v. Regester situation), a decision invalidating at
large elections may have been justified.
content with any such limited remedy.

The DC was not

It concluded that

dividing the city into three districts, one of which would
have assured a negro commissioner, was not desirable, and without affording the state legislature or the existing city
government the opportunity to go through the legislative
process of considering other alternatives, decided that the
appropriate remedy was a judicially devised new form of
government.
If the foregoing preliminary reaction to the case
is generally correct, I suppose we could hold that the
remedy exceeded the violation of constitutional rights.
However, we come out on this case, it will be difficult for

·'·

6.
me to approve the creation by a federal judge of an entirely
new form of government.
I should have mentioned above my concern over the
emphasis by the courts below on what they refer to as the
"devaluation [or dilution] of the votes of blacks".

This

reflects the ancient, and often rejected political science
notion of proportional representation:

since one-third of

the population of Mobile is negro, it should have one-third
participation in its government.

By the same logic, every

county, city and state should be governed legislatively (and
perhaps in all administrative agencies and bodies) by a
racial and ethnic mix in direct proportion to the
population.

Since our national population is - as I

understand it - about 12% to 15% negro, the Congress of the
United States should have this percentage of negro
representation.

But this simplistic thinking (apart from

its other falacies, historical and practical) does not take
into account the diversity and hetrogeneous nature of the
peoples of this country.

The "whites" are not - and never

have been since the early colonial years - a homogeneous
American population.

One of the unique things about our

country is that it has been a haven for almost every
religious, ethnic and divergent cultural component of the
earth's population.

If we start down the road of

proportional representation for each identifiable segment of

7.
the population, there would be chaos.

This was a problem I

addressed in Bakke, but without perceptible impact on the
thinking of my Brothers.
Apart from the foregoing, I think we have said in
Whitcomb (and elsewhere) that no segment of the population racial or otherwise - is entitled to any particular
representation in a legislative body.

The assuring of equal

voting rights for all should be the remedy.

This already is

becoming increasingly evident, as the negro vote exercises
the balance of power in a number of the most populous states
and cities - exercising political influence substantially in
excess of its numerical strength.
Despite the generalized reactions expressed above,
I want my clerk's independent judgment.

As usual, I also

want recommendations based on principles that can be applied
consistently and that will stand the test of time.

*

*

*

I have not mentioned, in the foregoing rather
rambling discussion, the school board case (78-357).

It is

a companion case with both similarities and dissimilarities.
I will, of course, want advice on it also.

*

*

*

8.

As so often happens in these cases, the city and
school board are completely "outgunned" on the briefing.
The city's brief is particularly amateurish, even though the
lawyers - whom I know - are experienced and I would have
thought capable of much higher quality work.

This means we

cannot rely (as we rarely can) on the briefs alone.
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Wisdom, speciallyconcurring)
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CITY OF HOBILE,

.~: ~ .~ ~~

ALAB~~

/ ~ ~ ~ JM.,r;ccJ.,;;f

~~4 ~y. ~ ....:t,t,.,..._~~
(voti~- k tf!~~<Je:l~ ~ T~

SUMMARY:

This suit was- b~g ht ~ a~~ cl~ action under the

~ ~~-'~1

f4J

411(, /

S"-

a..,.., ~'"~ . ~ ·

Civil Rights Act of 1871 (-r~U?s.c. §1983, the Voting Rights Act

of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments, as an anti-dilution voting rights case.
Principally relying on White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), aff'd
sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636
(1976), the district court held that the system of electing City

- 2 -

/

Commissioners of Mobile, Alabama at large unconstitutionally impairs
and dilutes the voting rights of black citizens of Mobile.
remedy,

As a

the ~
urt disestablished Mobile's commission form of govern___.

ment elected at large and ordered that a strong mayor-council form
of local government be created with the council members to be elected
from single-member districts.

The district court set November 21, 1978

as the date for the election of members of the new city government,
but the order provides that the election shall be stayed if this Court
grants review before that date.

Petitioner seeks review of the court

of appeals's affirmance of the district court's findings and remedy.
FACTS:

Mobile, the second largest city in Alabama, has a

population of 190,026, 35.4% of which is black.

Pursuant to a state

statute [hence, this is an appeal], the city is governed by three
~

commissioners, each assigned specific functions by statute and

--------

elected at-large.

The elections are non-partisan, and there is no

requirement that commissioners reside in specific subdistricts of
the city or be elected therefrom.
After applying Zimmer's multifactor circumstantial evidence test,
Chief Judge Pittman (S.D. Ala.) found that the at-large election
system worked an unconstitutional dilution of black voting strength.
Of the Zimmer "primary" factors, the district court found

(1)

that

blacks were effectively denied access to the political process because
of racially polarized voting patterns that eliminated any reasonable
expectation of a black candidate succeeding in a citywide election;
(2) that the at-large elected commissioners have not been responsive
to the needs of black citizens;

(3) that state policy waa neutral

with respect to the at-large election of commissioners; and (4) that

-

3 -

longstanding past discrimination against black voters helped to

,~

preclude the effective participation of blacks in present at-large
elections of commissioners.

The following factors served to enhance

the dilution of black voting strength
the above "primary" factors:

(1)

-

deduce~

from consideration of

Nobile was a large city of 142

square miles with a population of 190,026;

(2) the election of

commissioners at large requires a majority vote;

{3) there is no

anti-single-shot provision but the candidates run for positions by
number;

(4) commissioners did not run from geographical subdistricts

and no subdistrict residency requirements were imposed.

These Zimme r-

criteria conclusions were found not to be clearly erroneous by the
court of appeals.

The district court further found that, although

the at-large elected commissioner form of government was racially
neutral in its inception in 1911, the present dilution of black votin g
l \

I(

t?

strength was a "natural and forseeable consequence'' of the at-large
election system imposed in 1911.

Moreover, the current condition
, t

of dilution resulted from "intentional state legislative inaction

"'

which is as effective as the intentional state action referred to in
Keyes."

(emphasis in original).

This was sufficient, in the district

court's view, to support a finding of unconstitutionality under
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
HOLDING BELOW:

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit panel adopted the

district court's findings of fact as not clearly erroneous and held
that the lower court had sensitively and correctly applied the
"primary" and "enhancing" factors of Zimmer to the facts as found
· in reaching the conclusion that the voting rights of black citizens
of Mobile were in fact diluted as a consequence of the at-large
election system employed pursuant to statute.

- 4 The court then turned its attention to the question of whether

.(

there was suffici e nt evidence of discriminatory purpos e or intent
to make out a constitutional violation under Washington and Arlington
Heights.

As the district court had, the court of appeals rejected

virtually out of hand the contention that the at-large election system
was immune from constitutional attack under
not enacted initially with a

Wa ~· hington

because it was

racially discriminatory purpose in mind.

The court found that the at-large scheme at issue is "archetypal of
the intentionally maintained plan we

cont~mplated

in Ne vett II,"

a

contemporaneous decision in which the same panel h e ld (1) that a plan
neutral in its inception may become unconstitutional when it is
maintained for the purpose of devaluing the votes of blacks, and (2)
that an inference that the plan is being maintained for such a purpose
(

may be drawn when the aggregate of the evidence under the Zimme r
criteria indicates dilution.

See 571 F.2d 209, 217-25.

The court

held that the district court's finding that the current condition of
dilution of black votes resulted from intentional state legislative
inaction was sufficient to support a finding of

uncons ~ tituti Q n~lly

discriminatory purpose, especially when conjoined with the inference
of purpose arising out of the diluting effect found by application of
the Zimmer criteria.
Judge Wisdom, adopting his comments in Nevett II, 571
231-38 (5th Cir. 1978), specially concurred.

F.2c

209,

He found t h e majority's

approach to the discriminatory-purpose issue incons iste nt with wa shingt o n
v. Dayis and Arlington Heights.
'

Though agreeing that inferring a racia l l y

discriminatory purpose from the invidious effects of at-large voting
schemes was acceptable in some cases, he did not believe that such an
inference would be sufficient to support a finding of discriminatory

- 5 -

,r

purpose in cases where, as in Bolton, the voting scheme was racially
neutral or even benign when initiated.

Nor, in such cases, could

discriminatory purpose be found in maintaining the voting plan, that
is, in taking no affirmative action to cure the discriminatory effects
of the plan.

This view of inaction, he said, was inconsistent with

Washington v. Davis.
Nevertheless, Judge Wisdom concurred in the result reached by

------

the majority by adopting the view of the United States as amicus curiae
that proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose was not required
in voting dilution cases.

-Washington

After all, reasoned Judge Wisdom, neither

v. Davis nor Arlington Heights were voting dilution cases,

and the Supreme Court had not required proof of a legislative intent
to discriminate in White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and Witcomb
/

v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), the leading voting dilution cases
involving multi-member districts.
racially discriminatory purpose, he

With respect to the need to prove

would ~istinguish

voting dilution

cases from all other types of equal protection cases because the right
to vote is preservative of all other rights.

Moreover, voting dilution

cases involved the Fifteenth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, and

------------------

there was nothing in prior precedent or the language and history of
the Fifteenth Amendment requiring proof of discriminatory purpose or
intent in voting cases to which that amendment was limited by its own
terms.

Finally, Judge Wisdom observed that, even if an intent require-

ment were read into the Fifteenth Amendment, the Bolton plaintiffs

~

could still make out a cas·e under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§

1973, solely on the basis of proof of discriminatory effects.
CONTENTIONS:

Although taking issue with the finding that the

proof of discriminatory effects had been sufficient to make out a case

- 6 of voting dilution under the Zimmer criteria, appellants' principal
contention is that the court of appeals erred in holding that
discriminatory purpose could be found through a "tort" standard of
intent and legislative inaction.

Appellants argue that the "natural

and probable consequences" test of intent approved by the majority
is inconsistent with Washington v. Davis, and that discriminatory
purpose cannot be inferred merely from maintenance of the status quo.
In this respect, appellants adopt the reasoning of Judge Wisdom's
concurring opinion.

Finally, appellants claim . the remedy ordered by

the district court was unauthorized by the constitution, though they
offer no clear legal argument in support of this claim.
Appellees contend that the district court's finding that the
Mobile at-large voting scheme had the effect of disenfranchising
black voters is supported by the overwhelming weight of the evidence,
and that the "two court" rule immunizes the district court's findings
from review here.
275 (1961).

E.g., Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271,

Appellees also deny that the lower courts adopted any

"tort'' standard of intent, for the decisions below rested on a finding
that the at-large voting scheme had been deliberately maintained for
racially discriminatory purposes.

Pointing to the testimony of Alabama

legislators that the legislature would not pass any redistricting plan
that would benefit black voters in Mobile, the appellees contend the
courts below were well justified in concluding that the maintenance
of at-large voting in this case was racially motivated in fact.
Moreover, appellees claim, no proof of racially discriminatory intent
was required in this voting dilution case for the reasons noted by
~

Judge Wisdom.

Finally, appellees argue that appellants are estopped

from challenging the remedy ordered by the district court because they

- 7 stubbornly refused to offer the court any alternative plan.
ANALYSIS:
federal

I believe this appeal raises substantial questions of

constitut~ al

should make

law warranting review by this Court.

clea~ether

The Court

proof of discriminatory intent is required

in voting dilution cases based on the Fifteenth, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Moreover, it is

questionab~ether

the majority

view of legislative inaction as sufficient to support a finding of discriminatory purpose is consistent with Washington v. Davis and Arlingto n
Heights, though those cases might be distinguishable because there is
some direct testimony concerning racially
here that was not present in those cases.
by the district court is, indeed, a

discri ~ory

motivation

Final ~he remedy ordered

sweepin~

one that not only altered

the manner of electing local governmental officials, but also the
entire structure of the local government itself.

Arguably, a colorab le ,

though not necessarily persuasive, Tenth Amendment attack on the distri c
court's remedy might be maintainable in light of

Usery~

The Court may wish to call for the views of the Solicitor General
before making any decision as to whether or not to note probable
jurisdiction.
There is a response.
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QUESTIONS ·PRESENTED: {
1)

Does

f trP-ti. ~~)

the

intent

requirement

of Arlington

Heights

and

Washington v. Davis apply to cases involving vote-dilution under the
Fourteenth Amendment?
2)

Should ·

Fifteenth Amendment?

vote-dilution

cases

be

decided

under

the

Would the legal standard under that provision

vary from that under the Fourteenth,

especially with regard to the

intent requirement?
3)

Is

invidious

intent demonstrated by maintenance of an

t

electoral structure that is neutral on its face, but that in pracice
~

~

results in white dominance of all elected offices?
4)

Did the DC overstep its remedial powers in No.

77-1844

when it imposed a new form of government and a new city charter on
Mobile?

2.
I.

BACKGROUND
These cases

involve challenges by black voters to the at-

th~obile

large election of

t~obile

City Commission and

Board of School Commissioners.

County

The complaints alleged that although

blacks make up 35 per cent of the 190,000 city residents, and 32 per
cent of the 337,000 county residents, a black has never been elected
to either body because votes
Mobile,

and

candidates.

the

white

are cast strictly on
invariably

majority

racial

swamps

lines

any

in

black

In the context of the long history Of discrimination in

Mobile and the unresponsiveness to black needs of the City Commission
and the School Board, the plaintiffs argued that the at-large system
violates their constitutional right to participate in the political
The District

process.
cases.

Under

replaced

a

in

Charter

favor of

that

he

but

elections

board

case,

were

the

court

stayed

A.

By

in

both

the

judge

in Mobile with a mayor-

ordered

this

election

appeal.1 / In

of

the

five

the

board

staggered basis from 1978

Two new members, both black, were elected in 1978.
The City Commission:

--

of government in 1911,
reform.

promulgated,

pending

members from single-member districts on a
through 1982.

plaintiffs

He established nine single-member districts for the

----------

school

City

ruled

the commission form of government

council system.
council,

new

Court

electing

Mobile adopted the commission form

in the midst of a national wave of municipal
the

three

commissioners

at-large

in

a

non-

partisan manner, the reformers hoped to end the corruption and "ward• II
h ee 1 1ng

Alabama.

t h at

h ad

The

character 1• zed
State

the

mayor-alderman

governments~
1n

--------'-~-------------~-----of
1901 had disenfranchised

Constitution

blacks, so the city (appellee in this case) argues that in 1911 there
I

~ j

~

4lrru.:t

~.

3.
was no intent to exclude blacks from the city commission.
/l

-

As amended

L \

in 1945, the system provides for election by majority vote of three
commissioners to numbered posts.

If no candidate received a majority

~----

for

a

particular post,

vote-getters.

a

There

runoff would be held between the two top

for
the
no
residency
requiremen.....t
-----~-----------------After election, the commissioners would designate one

commissioners.

was

of their number as mayor, but they jointly exercised all legislative
and administrative power in the city without formal distribution of
specific duties.

A proposal to replace the Commission with a mayor-

council system was defeated in a referendum in 1963.
~

In
authorized

1965,
the

the

state

holding

form of government.

of

another

approved

referendum on

Act

823,

which

the mayor-council

If approved by the voters, the Act provided for

seven at-large councilmen.
legislator,

legislature

According to testimony by a former state

the Act did not propose single-member districts because

such a provision would have been considered an attempt to get blacks
elected to state office.

Brief for amicus United States, at 22.

A

referendum under this statute was defeated in 1973.
Act
responsible

cj) finance
the

823

also

that

one

commissioner

should

be

for each of three administrative areas :d)public safety,

an~ublic

City

designated

submitted

works and services.
Act

823

to

the

After this lawsuit was filed,

Attorney

General

for

clearance

under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1976).
statute.

On
He

March

2,

contended

1976,
that

the
so

Attorney

General

long

each

as

objected

commissioner

to

the

had

a

particular substantive responsibility, single-member districts would
be unconstitutional, since they would permit one section of the city

4.
to control policy in one area but have little voice on other matters.
The

city

has

not

appealed

the

Attorney

General's

ruling

to

the

District Court of the District of Columbia, so commission seats are

Also in 1975, a bill was introduced in the state legislature
to

permit

Mobile

referendum.

to

adopt

The bill,

a

which would have provided

member council districts and

delegation

operates

legislation).

Two

strong-mayor/council

on

two

a

black

council members

sort

of

for

testified

at

by

seven single-

elected

liberum · veto

legislators

government

on

at-large,

all

trial

local

that

the

referendum bill was defeated because it "would allow the possibility
for blacks to hold public office in the City Government."
brief, at 24.
Mobile,

the

whenever

a

Appellees'

Referring to the history of redistricting attempts in
District

Court

redistricting

observed,

"The

evidence

is

clear

that

bill of any type is proposed by a county

delegation member, a major concern has centered around how many,
any, blacks would be elected."
The
Mobile.

DC

found

if

Juris. St. at 30b.

extreme

racial

polarization

in

voting

in

Due to traditional methods of discrimination, blacks never

voted in substantial numbers until after the Voting Rights Act went
into

effect.

Now,

according

the

the

District

unrestricted in their registration and voting.
is
~
li'"P~

Court,

blacks

are

But when a candidate

--~-------------------------------------identified with the black community, "a white backlash occurs

which usually results

in the defeat of the

white candidate identified with the blacks."
black

has

ever

been

elected

to

the

City

black candidate or

the

Juris. St. at 8b.

No

Commission.

Only

three

~~
~~~
blacks

have

run

for

the

City

competed for the post in 1973.
Commission

was

1973,

three

--------------------extremely limited
in

the

black

commissioner who

had

been

defeated

even

for

commission

reelection

in

1972.

and

"young,
Id.

community.

In

white

The DC

unsuccessfully

inexperienced"

campaigns."

identified with

by

all

The only time blacks have run for the

when

"mounted
support

Commission,

also

black

and

a

lost

1969 race

little

incumbent

community
a

bid
for

l~

blacks

received

1969,a white
the

votes,
cited

They

~

was

for

the

the

state

legislature when the county made up one multimember district.

Two

black candidates were well-supported in their own community, but were
defeated.

Similarly, black candidates for the School Commission lost

at-large run-offs

in

1962,

1966,

and

1974,

and

a

white

"moderate"

lost such a run-off in 1970.
There is some dispute about these election statistics.
1969 defeat of Joseph Langan,
was

identified

boycott of

with

the

blacks,

elections by

caused by Hurricane Camille.
was

the

high

point

of

the white
was

incumbent commissioner who

attributed

black militants

by

some

and

this

prediction,

polarization

however,

was

in

Mobile

and

the observation

Plaintiffs,
supporting data is unreliable,
very impressive.

to

to
a

a

partial

low

turnout

And plaintiffs' expert stated that 1969

racism would ebb as a force in political contests.
for

The

and

the

SG,

predicted

that

Part of the basis
that many

black
--=----

argue

that

\~

the

since the black candidates were not

Indeed, there is no recent data on at-large voting

patterns because since 1972 state leg isla tors have been elected
single-member districts in Mobile,
------------~

~

in

after 1976 the only school board

1:::::::

6.
races

have been

in

single-member districts,

and

there was no City

Commission election in 1977 due to this lawsuit.
In

October,

election

of

Following

the

member

1976,

districts

by

Court

found

propose

a

legislative effort to establish single-

authorizing

commissioners,
special

plan

that

but

a

did

agreed

to

committee to advise

referendum on

the

not

include

recommend

subject,

at-large

two

people

election

to

~~ontgo~ry,
~I"' modified

'- " i::'
...v

~ ~~

which

is

ab~e

plan

in

response

the

f1~

on

the

same

to

size

as

solicited

offered

to

on

of
a

The third

The committee

municipal

government
The

Mobile.

comments

segments of the community, and then o_r_d_e_r_e_d___:_h_a_
.....t....__~
the 1977 elections.

serve

the court on redistricting.

~~-.plan

its

the

The city refused

member of the committee was nominated by plaintiffs.

v~~odelled

at-large

discriminatory.

invidiously

be

judge asked the parties to submit remedial plans.
to

the

-------~--------------------------

to

commissioners
failure of a

District

the

from

in

-

court

various

b~ ~l_lo':;!ed in

The DC stayed its injunction pending appeal, and

dissolve

the

injunction

if

the

legislature

adopted

a

constitutional reapportionment scheme.
CA 5 affirmed the DC, and this Court granted cert.
A~

~ _..

l g~"

The case

argued last March, and was then held for reargument.
B.

The

~mmissioners

~~
~ it has
~ ~- there were
~ Candidates

School

Board:

The Mobile County Board of School

was established in 1826.

In all its permutations since

always been elected on an at-large basis.
five

commissioners

elected

by

the

whole

ran for numbered seats on a partisan basis.

ever elected to the at-large board.

After 1919,

Unlike contests

county.

No black was
for

the City

Commission, school board elections are relatively inexpensive, so the

?

7.

black community has produced higher-quality candidates for the board.
From

1962

until

1974,

three

blacks

and

one

white

activist ran for the board in the Democratic primary.

civil-rights
All four made

~f- ~ ~·~

it into the runoff, only to lose.

__________.,...

Before this suit was filed, Sen. Cain Kennedy, a black from
Mobile,

introduced

legislation to establish single-member districts

for the Mobile Board.

Alabama has two kinds of statutes:

like

and

Kennedy's

bill

"general"

laws.

The

local laws

"local"

law

was

advertised in the Mobile newspapers, as required, at which point the
incumbent school board members asked that the implementation dates be
slightly

altered.

legislation

was

Sen.

signed

Kennedy
into

agreed,

law.

and

in October,

Consequently,

the

1975,

the

DC disimissed

this suit without prejudice on November 21, 1975.

In February 1976,

however,

a

the

Board

of

School

Commissioners

won

state

decision

~ dec.__--.:;;=--......-""'"lt,_Kennedy bill unconsti tut · onal because the language of
~

th~

?~~
~e
,tuM~

bill as enacted was different from the language as advertised in
Mobile newspapers.

Of course, the only change in that language

, ~~come at the request of the board itself.

tJ-i

~the suit

the

sheriff,

circuit

clerk

The nominal defendants
and

probate

judge

~
~arcely contested it, and the final judgment came twelve days after

~ ''~e suit was initiated.

~.....sthen

revived this action,

No appeal was taken.

Although appellees

they point out that the delay due to the

Kennedy bill ensured that the 1976 board elections would occur before
the DC could issue a decision in this case.
In

1976

the

board

prepared a

second legislative proposal,

cast as a "general law of local application.

A black legislator from

Mobile refused to sponsor the bill, but Rep. Sonnier, a white, agreed

8.
to present

it.

Counsel

for

the school board

immediately requested

that this litigation be continued pending legislative action on the
-----------------~~
Sonnier bill.
The school board assured the District Court that the
legislation

would

meet

"all

constitutional

District Court denied the continuance.

requirements."

The

During a subsequent exchange

over a 1939 "general" law dealing with the school board, the board's
counsel

insisted

unconstitutional.

that

"general

laws

of

local

application"

were

Judge Pittman asked counsel if the same principle

applied to the Sonnier Bill.

Counsel replied in the affirmative, and

then conceded that the legislation was unconstitutional as drafted.
Appellees' brief at 28-29.
The District
ordered

that

the

Court

School

ruled

in favor of the plaintiffs,

Commissioners

districts on a staggered basis.

be

elected

in

and

single-member

Two districts, which both had black

majorities, were to hold elections in 1978, one in 1980, and the last
two in 19 82.

Due to the residence patterns of the incumbents,

plan resulted in a six-member board between 1978 and 1982.
ordered that one of the

the

The court

incumbents should be designated non-voting

chairman for each year during that period.

After two blacks won the

primaries for the seats that were available in 1978, the incumbents
adopted a rule requiring the assent of at least four commissioners to
every major
held

substantive or

three of

rule,

the

but on Oct.

procedural

Board members
27, 1978, Mr.

in

action.

contempt

The district
for

court

promulgating

the

Justice POWELL stayed the contempt

proceedings and the November elections.

On Halloween, however, Mr.

Justice POWELL vacated his stay of the elections, which took place in
the

first week of November.

The District Court

then enjoined

the

I

~~~~~

z~ v /lfC:J-Gu·~
Board

from

adopting

its

----

new

rules

and

the

District

9.

from voting

to dismiss

the

instant litigation.
CA

5

affirmed

Court's

actions

in

a

two-

paragraph per -curiam opinion that cited only its opinion in the City
Commission case.

II. OPINIONS BELOW
The

District

Court

opinion

in No.

77-1844

served

as

the

framework for its effort in No. 78-357, with only the facts changed.
At the court of appeals, No.

77-1844 received a full airing, while

No.

two

78-357

was

affirmed

in

Accordingly,

paragraphs.

I

will

concentrate in this section on the City Commission case.
A.

District - court:

The DC applied the standards for vote-

dilution cases under the Fourteenth amendment that were articulated

v

by the Fifth Circuit en bane in Zimmer v. McKeithen,
( 197 3),

which was

constitutional

affirmed by

views

this

expressed

by

Court
the

"without approval of
Court

Carroll Parish School · Board v. · Marshall,

485 F.2d 1297

424

of

u.s.

East

Appeals."
636,

638

the

(1976).

The DC found that three of the primary factors identified by

Zimm~r

were satisfied here, and that the fourth was neutral, while several
"enhancing factors" were also present.
opinion

betwee~

Findings of

Fact

Although the DC divided its

and Conclusions of Law,

the

City

argues that many allegedly factual statements are based on inferences
and should be carefully scrutinized by this court.
1)
The DC cited

"Lack of Openness in the Political Process to Blacks" -"mas~ive

official and private discrimination" before the

1965 Voting
Rights Act,
...

> •

'

--

although it also observed that now "blacks

1 0.

Juris.

St.

at 7b.

Despite

this superficial equality of the franchise between black and white,
the

DC

from

felt

that racially polarized voting patterns barred

meaningful

participation

in

the

political

blacks
Judge

process.

Pittman compared black failure at the polls in at-large districts to
the

election

of

blacks

from

single-member

established by court order in 1972.

legislative

districts

He concluded:

Black candidates at this time can only have a
reasonable chance of being elected where they have a
majority or a near majority.
There is no reasonable
expectation that a black candidate could be elected in a
citywide election race because of race polarization.
The
court concludes that an at-large system is an effective
barrier to blacks seeking public life.
2)

"Unresponsiveness of the Elected City Officials to the

Black Minority"

'--"'

official

discrimination,

servants

at

higher

while

the

~black,

~regate).
~ ~ ;irport,

.

including

levels
police

(e.g. ,

15

department

the
of
is

to

numerous

paucity
the

of

black

43 5 city

under

a

examples

public

fireman

court

of

order

are
to

Public facilities like the municipal golf course, the

and public transportation were integrated by court order in

./

~~he

fv~

Judge Pittman pointed

1960s, and city advisory boards are more than 90 per cent white.

The DC also found that the City Commission has provided quicker, more
effective

assistance

to

white

neighborhoods

faced

with

Mobile's

drainage problems than to black areas, and the U.S. Department of the
Treasury found discrimination in the use of revenue-sharing funds for
resurfacing roads.
officials

to

twenty

He also criticized "sluggish" response by public
or

thirty

cross-burnings

in

1976

and

a

mock-

lynching by police officers of a black robbery suspect who was later
released without charge.

11 •

3)

"Pas t--,~

disenfranchisement

Racial

of

Starting

Discrimination"

blacks

in

the

1901

from

Constitution,

the

the

Court

found that the "existence of past discrimination has helped preclude
the effective participation of blacks in the election system today •
II

Juris. St. at 20b.

Pittman

Judge

"State Policy in Favor of At-Large Districts"

4)

concluded

that,

in

view

of

the

municipal government in Alabama, there is

diversity

~o

.

"Enhancing

forms

of

~---

I(

stat~ p~ f

=- .;..::z., ~ "- H ~

.

~~ ~ ~

the Commission system as established 1n Mob1le.
5)

of

The DC said the discriminatory

Factors"

effect of the at-large system was buttressed by the large size of the
district (which means that many people are disenfranchised, I guess),
by

the

rather

requirement
than

that commissioners be elected by majority vote

simple

plurality,

by

the

"place"

system

of

running

candidates for particular seats on the Commission, and by the absense
of

a

requirement

that

each

commissioner

reside

in

a

different

geographicdistrict.
Armed with these findings, Judge Pittman faced the question
of whether
Washington

to
" V.

demonstrated
Amendment.
he

apply

to

· navis,
in

an

this

vote-dilution case

u.s.

426
equal

229

protection

His discussion of the

-

squarely

in

1911 when

concluded

(1976),

that

the

the

requirement of

that invidious intent be

claim

under

the

Fourteenth

issue is somewhat elliptical, but

plaintiffs did

have

to

demonstrate

----------~--~--------------~--~-~~·~---------------------

discriminatory intent. The City Commission, however, was established
blacks did

facially neutral statute,

not

have

the

vote.

Confronted

with

this

the DC decided that discriminatory intent

/ could be inferred from the law's current "disproportionate impact" on

?

- ~,,&~~

l~~~~ ~

~4cA-s--

The

Court

stated

----

that

"It

is

not

a

long

step

from

the

systematic · exclusion of blacks from juries . . • to a present purpose
to dilute the black vote as evidenced in this case."
31b

(emphasis

in

Judge

original).

Pittman

Juris. St. at

then

reached

his

controversial conclusion:
There is a "current" condition of dilution of the
black vote resulting from intent ~on~ l s.tate le~ islativ~
11
inaction '' which is as effective ~ s the intent i onal state
ac tfc3 n ~ ferred to in [Keyes v~ School District No. 1, 413
u.s. 189 (1973)].
Id.

(emphasis

Pittman's
"should
(})

in

earlier

have

original).
assertion

reasonably

disenfranchised,"

"the

This

that

because

expected
present

conclusion

that

the

the

dilution

relies

legislature

blacks

of

on

black

Judge
1911 ~

in

would

not

Mobilians

is

a

natural and foreseeable consequence of the at-large system imposed in
1911." Id.
B.

Court of Appeals:

Judge Tjoflat, writing for himself

and Judge Simpson, affirmed on the basis of the DC's application of
the

Zimmer

factors.

The

panel

incorporated

conclusion in a companion case, Nevett
209

(5th Cir.

same

intent

Washington
the

its

Sides (Nevett II), 571 F.2d

as all other equal protection cases

Davis and Arlington · Heights.

factors,

reference

that a vote dilution case was subject to the

requirement

v~

Zimmer

1978),

v~

by

according

to

after

The findings of the DC on

the panel,

"compel

the

inference

that the system has been maintained with the purpose of diluting the
black

vote,

thus

supplying

the

element

of

intent

establish a violation of the fourteenth amendment.

l

at

12a.

Thus

the

CA

accepted

legislative inaction and intent.
------------~--

..

•

Judge

Pittman's

Id. at 13a.

necessary
"

Juris.

equation

J

to
St.

between

Judge Tjoflat pointed

1 3.

to

Act

823

in

1965,

which

linked

each

commission

seat

to

a

substantive administrative responsibility, as "probative of an intent
to

maintain

the

plan

by

injecting

additional

policy grounds

that

would justify, and perhaps insulate,

the at-large feature of all of

the commission seats."

He also cited the DC's finding

that

all

Id.

redistricting

at 14a.

efforts

are

evaluated

in

the

legislature

according to their racial impact.
The

panel

also

upheld

the

remedial

order

of

the

DC,

emphasizing the temporary nature of the the remedy "until the state
or the city adopts a constitutional replacement."
Tjoflat

also

noted

that

the

city

had

Id. at 17a.

refused

to

Judge

submit

a

reapportionment plan, and argued that "[a] concomitant to the ability
of a court to hear a case is that it be able to decide the case and
remedy a wrong, if found."
Swann

---

Oddly, the opinion then cites language in

........__

v~ - charlotte~Mecklenburg - Board · of · Education,

402

u.s.

1, 15-16

(1971), that "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy."

~

tnLJ .I

As I will argue later, that very principle undermines the

¥-(l~~~p-)..)

DC's remedial order.

In Nevett II and in this case, Judge Wisdom filed a special
concurrence that deserves mention.

He argued that the Zimmer factors

cannot provide the basis for the inference of discriminatory intent:

~

Then,
if invidious effects preponderate, the court by
inference declares that the legislative body which initiated
~~
the plan had a racially discriminatory intent.
If for
historical or other reasons the voting scheme could not
!>
~initially have been motivated by a racially discriminatory
.vi.~_..
intent, • • • then failure of the legislative body to take
u r
affirmative curative action demonstrates, • • • an illegal
intent to maintain diluted voting rights.

~-~

fr
W

'-....--

571 F.2d at 231.

Judge Wisdom found this reasoning inconsistent with

----~--------------~'----------~----

''

!t

-~-·-

7\

,

~~#fe-/ls-~~~~~~
14~
~~ ~ ~ te> ~ ~~u ~ J.ti;;:;_ ,
Washington v.

Davis and Arlington Heights,

court must consider a laundry list, an

and argued that when "a

'aggregate' of factors,

some

pointing one way and others pointing another way, the case turns on
the attitude of the trial judge and the appellate judges toward the
American brand of federalism."

Id. at 233.

~~he ~ch, for Judge
~stinguish voting rights cases from all
}r4

1 i tigat~n,

~ vote,"

~

in view of the

In

order

~theory,

he

proposed

J

other

would

equal

be

to

avoid

further

importance of the right

considering

confusion

this

and

of

equal

similar

/

to

Id. at

protection

cases
.

Fifteenth Amendment.

to

protection

which "argues for expansive protection of that right."

234-35.

J L"~

"fundamental

Wisdom,

.
~-

under

the

~~:~~.L

~: ~~--~~I

When a government adopts a system of y6~~-ng that . • • ttt!f.
places black citizens at a disadvantage, the government's ~~~' hreasons are
irrelevant.
The right to vote has been~~
abridged.
W. lAA.
Id.

at

236.

Where

the

equal

protection

clause

statement, without self-evident limits," the Fifteenth
its terms is less expansive."

"broa~~
A•
Amendment "by
is

a

P~

z.......

By actingf. nder that amendment, courtsp~ '-

would not question the validity of other government programs, and the~
provision itself is "limited to racial groups."

Id.

Consequently,

Judge Wisdom would look only to the impact of government policies on
the right to vote of racial minorities.

Because he found

that the

impact of the at-large system in Mobile was to dilute the votes of
blacks, Judge Wisdom concurred in the judgment of the panel.
III.

VOTE~DILUTION

According

to

the

IN

MULTI~MEMBER

1972

DISTRICTS

Municipal ·

Year

· Book,

about

12,000

municipalities and over 1,000 counties use at-large elections, though

..

(

many

may

combine

at-large

Although most

of

have

state

involved

this

seats

court's

decisions

legislatures,

election of local officials.

~ se · v~

~allas · county ·v.

(city council);

some

on multi-member districts
have

involved

the

Lipscomb, 437 U.S.

at-large

535 (1978)

· Reese, 421 u.s. 477 (1975)

(county

commission); Avery v. Midland County, 390 u.s. 475 (1968); Sailors v.
Board · of · Education of ·county · of Kent,
board).

As early as

Reynolds · v~

387 u.s.

105

(county school

-sims, 377 u.s. 533, 579 (1964), the

Court referred to the use of multi-member districts to "achieve some
~

flexibility"
stated

local

government.

And

the

Court

has

repeatedly

that such districts are not per ·· se unconstitutional.

reviewing
/

in

the

examine some

Court's

treatment

of multi-member districts,

After
I

will

issues raised by at-large election of local officials

that the Court has not yet explored.
A.

The ·· Precedents:

The verbal

standard

that has

been applied to

challenges to multimember districts comes from Fortson v. · oorsey, 379
U.S. 433 (1965), involving the Georgia legislature.
It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multimember
constituency
apportionment
scfieme,
under
the
circumstances of a particular case would operate to minim~
or ·· cance. · out · the · voting ·· strengt~ · pf 11 racral ·· or · pol1t1cal
elements ' of tlie · vot1ng population.

.J

Id.

at

439

(emphasis

The

supplied).

underlined

language

in

that

statement is the source of part of the argument that intent is not
relevant to vote-dilution cases.
the

vote-dilution

argument

had

Regardless,
not

really

the

Court

been

certainly was not proved on the record of the case.
Burns ·· v~

Richardson,

multimember districts

384

u.s.

73

in the Hawaii

(1966),

made

that

below

Similarly,

concerning

legislature,

found

the

use

and
in
of

the Court did not

~v~U:.W.(~)-

~

Siii2'

·->'<!-~~

-r v.;t; "A~~~.

~

find that the districting scheme "effects an invidious result."
Again,

at 88.

the Court's phrase suggested that

16

.

Id.

intent was not an

element of a vote-dilution case.
The

most

. V Wh.1tcom b
1n

came

thorough
v~

consideration

.
·· Ch
· av1s,

403

upheld multimember districts for

u.s.

of

1 24

multimember

( 19 Z.l ) , where

the Indiana legislature,

districts
the

Court
a.---

and White

v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), a Texas case and the only instance ~~
where

the

Court

--------

redistricting.
use

of

a

has

found

sufficient

vote-dilution

to

order

In Whitcomb, blacks and poor people claimed that the

county-wide

district

invariably voted Republican,

in

Indianapolis,

which

almost

denied them effective participation in

the political process.

A three-judge court ruled in their favor, but

this

Mr.

Court

reversed.

Justice

WHITE's

opinion

for

the

Court

reflected great unease with the idea that the courts should intervene
in

an

apparently

open

political

system

to

assist

the

election of

members a particular group in society.
[The District Court's holding] is not easily contained.
It
is expressive of the more general proposition that any group
with
distinctive
interests
must
be
represented
in
legislative halls if it is numerous enough to command at
least one seat and represents a majority living in an area
sufficiently compact to constitute a single-member district.
Id.

at

districts
that

1 56.

have

petrs

Indianapolis.

Mr.

Justice

the

potential

had

not
Because

WHITE
to

"submerge"

demonstrated
the

acknowledged

such

Democratic

that

minorities,
a

state

party

of

multimember
but

argued

events

nominated

in

black

candidates and was responsive to the black community, the Court found
that the political system was not discriminatory:
[T]he failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in
proportion to its population emerges more as a function of

''

~

prp--L--3> [~-~
~~-:,;.~7~~---~

losing elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes .
• • • We have not yet deemed it a denial of equal protection
to deny legislative seats to losing candidates, even in
those so-called 'safe' seats where the same party wins year
after year.
Id. at 153.
The majority opinion in Whitcomb muddied the waters a bit on
the need

to show discriminatory

intent

in vote-dilution cases.

At

one point, the Court seemed not to care about intent, stating that a
plaintiff

must

"carry

the

burden

of

proving

that

multimember

districts unconstitutionally operate to dilute or cancel the voting
strength of

racial

supplied).
the

case

o~ d

or

political

elements."

Id.

at

144

(emphasis

Later on, however, Mr. Justice WHITE framed the issue in
as

whether

as

the

purposeful

discrimination."

Id.

at-large

districting

devices

to

149.

This

conceived

as

at

was

"conceived
racial

further
statement

suggests

that

a

~

districting

scheme

nevertheless

be

representation

not

"purposefully"

to

certain

groups.

a

discriminatory

operated
This

to

idea

device

legislative

deny
might

may

be

especially

relevant to the Mobile cases.
White

· v~

- Regester

focussed

on

multimember

legislative

districts in Dallas County, where blacks claimed they suffered votedilution,

and Bexar County (San Antonio), where the plaintiffs were
The

Mexican-Americans.

portion of

Mr.

Justice

WHITE's

opinion on

multimember districts, which was joined by the whole Court, affirmed
the three-judge court's conclusion that the votes of the minorities
had

been

unconstitutionally

unsatisfactory.

---

~

..........

Its

basic

diluted.

The

opinion,

statement · highlights

the

----------~-

"participation in the political process" by a minority.

however,

is

importance

of

------------

(

1 8.

[I]t is not enough that the racial group allegedly)
discriminated aga~ not had legislative seats in ~
proportion to its voting potential.
The plaintiff's burden 0
is to produce evidence to support findings
that the
political processes leading to nomination and election were
not equally open to participation by the group in question that its members had less opportunity than did other
residents in the district to participate in the political
processes and to elect legislators of their choice.
412

u.s.

at 766.

-

But

county,

when

Mr.

Justice

WHITE

turned

enumerates

ruling:

1)

county;

2)

the

several

history

factors

of

the

supporting

official

facts

in

each

For Dallas County,

his discuss ion was unill uminat ing.

opinion

to

racial

the

lower

the

court's

discrimination

in

the

the requirement of a majority vote in primaries and the

enumeration of specific seats for which candidates competed directly;
3)

only

Dallas

two

blacks

County

had

since

ever been elected

Reconstruction;

4)

to the
the

legislature

role

of

the

from

Dallas

Committee for Responsible Government, a white-dominated organization,
that "slated" candidates for the Democratic primary.
supported

the

permitted

to

DC's
enter

conclusion
into

the

that

blacks

political

These elements

were

process

in

"generally

not

a

and

reliable

meaningful manner."

On Bexar County, Mr. Justice WHITE was even less

helpful.

the

He

noted

history of discrimination

against

Mexican-

Americans in the community, and the "cultural and language barrier"
they face in this country.

The result, he said, was that only five

Mexicam-Americans since 1880 had served in the Texas Legislature from
Bexar

County,

majority

even

of

the

population).

At

though

in

population
this

point,

1971

(but
Mr.

Mexican-Americans

only

a

Justice

minority
WHITE

findings of the District Court deserved deference,

made

of

argued

the

up

a

voting

that

the

"representing as

19.

they do a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the
design and

impact of

the

Bexar County multimember district

in

light of past and present reality, political and otherwise."

the

Id. at

769-770.
find

I

no

strong

rule

in

the

White

opinion.

Past

discrimination is clearly important to any showing of vote dilution.
It might be considered significant as support for an inference that
the dilution is intentional.
of

discrimination

minorities

had

was

been

For the White Court, however, a history

important

excluded

because

from

the

,,

it

established

general

that

political

the

process.

II Access to the political process was certainly the Court's concern
over

the

slating

organization

in Dallas County which provided

the

"something extra" which distinguished Dallas County from Indianapolis
in Whitcomb.

But for Bexar County, the Court pointed to nothing more

than the language and cultural barriers faced by Mexican-Americans.
I would not belittle those barriers, but I
them substantially greater than the

am hard pressed to find

cultural barriers --

including

skin color and a history of slavery -- between black and white.

See

Standards of

} generally, Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote:
\ Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 27-28.
Access

to

Chapman · v. Meier,
redistricting
retained
stated
'-

the

in order

that

process equal

the
to

political

420 U.S.

multimember

that

evidence

of

the

North

Dakota

to win
has

was

also

discussed

in

(1975), where the Court reversed a DC

districts.

group
the

1

process

a

legislature
In

dictum,

vote-dilution

been

denied

because
Mr.

access of other groups."

Justice

suit,

access

the

to

DC

BLACKMUN

"There must
the

had

be

political

But in Chapman the

20.
Court applied

its rule

that redistricting

by courts

is subject to

closer scrutiny for constitutional violations than redistricting by
legislation.

See

Connor

v.

· Finch,

u.s.

431

407

(1977)

(you

~ n~e ft ).

'/~ ~-~n ~ses,
~
~g

~

for

local

the

Court

governments.

ha :- upheld

In v>Dusch

the

v.

use

Davis,

of
387

at-large
U.S.

112

(1967), the Court did not disturb the creation of a city council for

~ ~ginia Beach with four members elected at-large without residency
/

~

requirement an and seven others, also

~~ to
,~-

elected at-large, who each had

live in one of seven residential districts.

1

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS

"The Seven-Four plan seems to reflect a detente
urban

and

rural

communities

that

may

be

important

in

complex problems of the modern megalopolis in relation
to the city, the suburbia, and the rural countryside."

Id. at 117.

vb allas County (Ala.) v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477 (1975), involved at-large
election of county commissioners.

Each of the four commissioners had

to live in one of four districts.

The city of Selma constituted one

district, and thus was entitled to only one commissioner, although it
held half the population of the county.

The Court ruled that "each

commissioner represents

the entire

the

citizens of

merely those of the district in which he resides."
neither

case,

it

should

be

stressed,

was

a

county

and

not

Id. at 477.*

In

convincing

argument

presented to the Court that the votes of a racial group had been ~
-----*In
Abat ~ · v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), the Court did not disturb a
County CommlSSlon made up of one representative from each of the five
towns i~ the county.
Even though the towns varied widely in
population, the Court deemed the scheme adequate because it served
"the pe~uliar needs of the community" by enhancing coordination
betwee~ the county and town governments.

I

21.
diluted.
B.
f

General · Considerations:
local

government

countywide

bod'es

perspective

administrative
legislator.

Several features of at-large elections
deserve

would

some

seem

responsibility

more

for

mention.
valuable

that

A

citywide

to

district

someone
than

or
with

for

See Comment, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1851, 1857 (1974).

a

Like a

mayor, a city commissioner might need that breadth of view in order
to

dis.;harge

parochial

his

duties

pressures.

conscientiously,

At

oral

without

argument

last

being

subject

March,

the

to

bench

indic Ated some interest in this line of reasoning.

This argument was

rejected

475,

because
the

in

Avery · v. · Midland

County,

390

U.S.

(1968),

the County Commission had "general governmental powers over

entire geographic area served

by

the

el~cted

That holding may

body."

have been prompted by the facts of that case:
was

485

the County Commission

at large with one commissioner from a district containing

67,000 people, and three from districts with less than 1,000 people
each.

In Sailors

105

(1967),

"performs

the

· v~

Court

essentially

ruled

that

a

administrative

county

functions;

board

of

education

and while

they

important, they are not legislative in the classical sense."
~mong

110.

the

superintendant,
instruction.

county Board
sizes.

administrative
preparation

Because

administrative

u.s.

Board · of Education ·of ·county of Kent, 387

function,

of

of

duties
the

the

were
budget,

county

the Court approved

from popularly elected

local

the
and

board's
the

selection

are

Id. at
of

oversight

a
of

predominantly

appointment of

the

school boards of varying

These two rulings might yield the tentative rule that a local

body that is primarily administrative must meet a lower standard in

.'

'

22.

response

to a

vote-dilution challenge,

but that a

body with mixed

legislative and administrative responsibilities will be treated like
a legislature.

A

1968
scholarly
article points out
two
significant
~~----------~-----------distinctions between multimember districts for state legislatures and
at-large local elections.

Jewell, Local · systems · of Representation:

Political Consequences and Judicial ·choices,

790 (1968).
create

36 Geo.

Wash.

L.

Rev.

The use of at-large elections for a local body does not

any difference

in representation between

individual voters,

while such differences arise when some state legislators are elected
from

800.

s~ngle-member

districts and some from multimember ones.

Id. at

On the other hand, in legislative elections the majority-sweep

feature

of multimember districts may be offset by

that minorities will win

the

possibility

m~~ (~n single-m~~ '·
~~t)

in other

districts.

-:;::::f

In any single city or county, however, the discrimi(atory
effect of at-large el ctions is @so.J.ute:
there is ~~ way
of balancing out dis riminations against various groups, and ·7
it is possible th t voters who consti~e ,some k!nd of 7
minority ( p,erl;J;sap ~or other) will be unable to elect a
representative of l:heir~n over a period of many years.
that

passage,

Jewell

rather

accurately

described

the

in Mobile.
INTENT
All vote dilution opinions of this Court have focused on the
Although

the

Court is now committed to a requirement that discriminatory intent be
demonstrated

in cases claiming a denial of equal protection,

resps

argue that such intent should not be required for voting cases, since

1

~~~~~~~~

{ ~ ~~~~~~E/J#~
--~~ISH

23.

voting is such a fundamental right.
Wisdom's
should

concurrence

be

the

basis

provision mandates

in

They also argue, following Judge

Nevett · II,

for

the

that

Court's

the

Fifteenth

decision

here

Amendment

because

that

that voting rights shall not be abridged on the
I shall ~eal with

basis of race, regardless of questions of intent.
each Amendment in order.
A.

Fourteenth ·Amendment

argument here derives

As

from language

noted

above,

the

basic

in the earliest cases, Fortson

and Burns, that dilution occurring "designedly or otherwise" could be
unconstitutional.

Neither

Whitcomb

nor

White

really

considered

intent, but rather concentrated on the effects on minority voting of
the

political

This

structure and historical practices of the community.

neglect

of

intent

could

be

seen

as

part

of

the

Court's

uncertainty over the role of intent in equal protection analysis at
that time.

For example, in

Palmer · v~

u.s.

· Thompson, 403

217

(1971),

Mr. Justice BLACK wrote for the Court that intent was irrelevant so
long

as

a

legitimate

governmental action.

nondiscriminatory

See Brest, Palmer v.

reason

existed

Since Washington

9 5.

v~

citizens
issues

that
of

Amendment.
position,

1971

Sup.

Ct.

· navis and Arlington Heights, however,

there has been no such confusion.
by appellees,

a

Thompson: An Approach to

the · problem · of · unconstitutional · Legislative Motive,
Rev.

for

The alternative view, pressed here

is that voting is such a fundamental interest for all
the

intent

Court
into

has

consciously

voting

rights

refrained

cases

under

from
the

injecting
Fourteenth

(Significantly, amicus United States does not argue this
but

concedes

that

discriminatory

intent

must

·~,----_."~--~~~~<7~--·-ce=-~----~¢~--~c>~-~<>~~~-~c=~
=~~--

be

demonstrated in a vote-dilution case.)

=>- r~"C>"~
~~~ ~ ~~
,,~~,,~~~~
~ • /lLe_

~-~

~ ~fn-~. L--u..)~_j..

~9-

c£...&~,f~~~~

~~~~'-·~~ ~~ ~.~2 ~
The treatment of this question in the courts below and in

v

v~

briefs has focussed on Wright

Rockefeller, 376

u.s.

52 (1964),

a gerrymander case concerning congressional districts in Manhattan.
~

claim was

an odd

one

from our

current

perspective:

minority

citizens argued that they had been unconstitutionally lumped into one
district, leaving four districts in the county with white majorities.
In

other

words,

they

urged

that

the

Fourteenth

Amendments required dilution of their votes.

and

Fifteenth

The seven-man majority

of the Court affirmed the DC's finding that appellants had not proved
"that

the

New

York

Legislature

considerations or

was

either

motivated

by

racial

e districts on racial lines."

Id.

~

at 56.

The Court accepted the DC's conclusion "that appellants have

not shown that the challenged
state

contrivance

origin."

segregate

on

the

was

basis of

the product of a
race

or

place of

Id. at 58 (emphasis added).

~he
)

to

[redistricting]

language

of

intent

in

Wright

was

cited

both

in

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240, and Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.
at 265.
that

Because of that,

this

Court meant

to

the Fifth Circuit in Nevett II concluded
extend

the

cases under the Fourteenth Amendment.

intent

requirement

to

voting

Appellees dispute that reading

on the basis of language in Wright discussing discriminatory impact
as well.

Moreover,

they add, Washington and Arlington ·· Heights did

(!.....

not cite any other voting cases.
I
Although
before
/

think

the

Washington

the

particular

Court at
the

Fifth

Circuit's

position

and

Arlington ·Heights

the

time,

only

the discussion

survey of various

~ ';..:.._k...;f ·;..._ ~)
is more accurate. ;J
decided

the

case

in both cases --

areas of equal

protection law

in

I

~r---~

.,...~ -,---:f~

)

z:;c;

oz:rr~ ~ ~~~~

~

~~ ~~ I~!!Z-~, ~~ ftu..t

2s. J

t+c..~ '"""'~

indicated a desire to provide a comprehensive framework for handling
such

cases.

~tation

The

of Wright,

a

case

that

has

had

little

impact in any other respect, betrays a conviction that voting cases
should

I

also

be

subject

to

the

intent

requirement.

Equally,

the

failure of the Washington and Arlington Heights opinions to discuss

White

v~

· Regester

or Whitcomb does

not

seem inadvertent.

Rather,

because the vote-dilution cases had not dealt with intent, they were

not relevant to the Court's new approach.
Justice

I

Stewart's

Williamsburg

~

f3:i
...,., ~
~

v~

statement

in

This view is buttressed by

United

Jewish - organization

of

Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), in which you concurred:

Under the Fourteenth Amendment the question is
the
reapportionment plan represents purposeful
discrimination against white voters.
Washington v~ · Davis,
426 U.S. at 229.
Disproportionate impact may atford some
evidence that an invidious purpose was present. [Arlington
Heights, 429 u.s. at 266.] But the record here does not
support a finding that the redistricting plan undervalued
the political power of white voters relative to their
numbers.

Id. at 179-180.
The case against this approach, as Greg Morgan argued in his

tl-1y
~

If r

~

law review note, Racial ·vote · Dilution ·· in · Multimember Districts: The

Constitutional Standard ·· After ·washington v o

6

(1978),

i ~ d.

The

Davis, 76 Mich o
right

to

Lo

vote

is

Rev o
so

fundamental that the question of legislative or administrative intent

i:

irre'i'"evant so long as discriminatory impact is demonstrated.

vot1ng

rights

are

a

sufficiently

discrete

set

of

And

personal

entitlements that the Court could exclude intent as a consideration
in voting cases without undermining Washington and Arlil'!g_ton Heights
with respect to other equal protection areas.
~

"----'

may be naive.
~

-

I think this argument

By recognizing such a "fundamental interest" exception

to

the

intent

requirement,

the

Court

would

be

inviting

future

Once the Court

litigants to pose their arguments in that language.
I

begins

defining

interests

-----------------'
B.

proposed

as

fundamental

---------·---------------

Fifteenth

using

the

In

Amendment
Fifteenth

and

not-fundamental,

----

'f,d-/ ------

Nevett · II,

Amendment

to

-----

Judge

Wisdom
special

establish

protection for voting cases by looking only to discriminatory impact,
not

intent.

the

voting

danger

That
rights

that

the

constitutional
of

racial

Court's

provision applies specifically

minorities,

ruling

so

would

there

"seep"

would

into

to

be

little

other

equal

protection cases; and by proscribing any abridgment of voting rights,
the Amendment is broad enough to reach the devaluation of the vote
presented by dilution cases.
The major problem

-----

--

with it, however, is the desuetude into which the Fifteenth Amendment

----

has

fallen.

No major case has been decided on the basis of

that

provision since Gomillion v. · Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), and even
then its use was primarily designed to permit Justice Frankfurter to
evade his
328
this

u.s.

"political
549

Court

(1946).
on

the

thicket"

pronouncement in Colegrove v; · Green,

Indeed,

there

Fifteenth

is very 1 it tle precedent

Amendment.

Several

of

the

from
cases

upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965 discuss congressional power
under the Amendment,
( 1966),

but I

e.g~,

South Carolina

could only find

v~

Katzenbach, 383

u.s.

301

three cases in the last fifty years

discussing its direct applicaton.
The plaintiffs in Gomillion challenged the redrawing of the
town boundaries of Tuskegee,

Alabama so as

to exclude every black

27.
family and no whites.

Justice Frankfurter's opinion for

c istinguished

Colegrove

apportionment

(or

as

involving

legislative

the

inaction),

retention

while

the Court

of

unequal

the redefinition of

Tuskegee had just taken place (legislative action).
More direct guidance for the Mobile cases comes from Terry
v~

·Adams,

political

345

U.S.

group,

461

the

1

(1953),

~aybird

involving
\\

Party,

that

the

role

staged

of

a

white

private

primaries

~

before the Democratic primary,

and whose candidates always won the

Democratic primary and general election.
other judges, Mr.

Justice BLACK found that the Jaybird Party "holds

exactly the kind of election that
prevent."

Writing for himself and two

the

Fift ~ nth

Amendment tries to

He added:
It violates the Fifteenth Amendment for a state.
to permit within its borders the use of any device that
produces the equivalent of the prohibited election • • •
The effect of the whole procedure.
is to do
precisely that which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids
strip Negroes of every vestige of [political] influence •

Id. at 469-470.
While Mr. Justice BLACK was willing to impose a duty on the
state

to

rights

prevent
of

the

blacks,

use of

any

device

regardless

of

that

would

Mr.

intent,

FRANKFURTER,needless to say, would not go so far.
th~

abridge

voting
Justice

He concluded that

exlusion of blacks from a meaningful voice in local government

was "not an accidental, unsought consequence of the exercise of civil
rights by voters to make their common viewpoint count.
the design, the very purpose of this arrangment •
76.
\

Mr.

action

~

.. •

lt•.

in

------------------------------------FRANKFURTER rather desperately

Justice
the

Jaybird

primary,

finally

• It was

"

Id. at 475-

searched for

concluding

obscurely

state
that,

28.
"The evil here is that the State, through the action and abdication
of

those

voters

whom

to

go

it

has

clothed

through

devised

primary."

CLARK's

opinion

a

authority,

procedure

Id.

for

with

at

three

477

which

permit ted

white

predetermines

the

legally

supplied).

Mr.

Justice

(emphasis

other

has

justices

simply

argued

that

the

Jaybird Party was a political party "whose activities fall within the
Fifteenth Amendment's self-executing ban," id. at 482, adding, "Quite
ev i

~Pntly,

the

Jaybird

Democratic

Association

auxiliary of the local Democratic Party • •
Clar~

og:rates

" Id. at 483.

a-s

an

Justice

concluded:
[W] hen a state structures its electoral apparatus
in a form which devolves upon a political organization the
uncontested choice of public officials, that organization
itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of
government which draw the Constitution's safeguards into
play.

Id. at 484.

-·

In Lane v.
down an Oklahoma
voted

(which

twelve-day

Wilson,

268

(1939),

this Court struck

requirement that all people who had not previously

included

period.

307 U.S.

all

Noting

blacks
that

in

the

the

state)

register

Fifteenth Amendment

in

one

"nullifies

sophisticated as well as simple-minded" methods of denying the vote
to minorities, the Court rejected the statute because its "practical
effect" was to abridge the right to vote.
L""'

_J

~rr·~
i

..

Jtr/

Both

~

and Terry seem to provide Judge Wisdom with what

u}~e

wants -- an impact-oriented standard for evaluating restrictions

f/LlA"'

voting rights.

t on

In particular,

the discussion in Terry of state

actjon offers several bases for arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment
is violated by state acquiescence in the abridgment of black voting

,,
rights.

behind

The Wisdom approach would represent a major departure from

the

appears
for

,,

Fifteenth

in Brief

Amicus,

c~mmend

at

Amendment.

for Appellees
86-89.)

(Some
in No.

discussion
77-1844,

Nevertheless,

his

of

that

at 87-90,

approach

has

history

and Bri e f
much

to

l t. Where the equal protection clause is obscure and applies

broadly,

the

Fifteenth

Amendment

rights of racial minorities.
most basic right we have,

is

clear

and

specific

to

voting

And the right to vote is arguably the

protected by the provision

in Articles

I

and II for the election of Congress and the President, by the First
Amendment's

attention to

free

speech,

assembly

and

petition of

the

government,

and perhaps even inherent in some notion of societal due

process.

'-.._...r

Dispensing

I

Wisdom's

lead would

with

the

intent

simplify voting

burden on plaintiffs.

requirement
rights

by

following

Judge

litigation and ease

The result could be greater

federal courts into local districting matters.

the

intervention by

That result might not

be so unattractive under a more clear notion of the remedial powers
of the DCs, as I will discuss below, but should be acknowledged as a
possible
Court,

I

drawback.

Realistically,

or a very sizable minority,

I

would

not

-------

-

WAS THERE INTENT - IN THESE CASES?
Jt
~
The most troubling feature of

equation of

l ~gisl ~tive

...

i ~~V

the

whole

to embrace Judge Wisdom's view.

But I would commend it to your careful attention.

IV.

expect

~~ ~

~~

~~~/

tt/J4~

,rtf. a_.,.~....;...

~

~C..•e/--.t~
the opinions below

is

their

with intent to discriminate.

Some

30.
support

for

the

DC'sf pproach

Norwood · v. · Harrison,
strikingly

similar

413

comes

u.s.

sequence

455

of

from

this

(1973),

decision

in

a case which presented a
In

events.

Court's

1940,

Mississippi

had

adopted a program of giving textbooks to students in private schools.
After the state's public schools were desegregated in 1962, however,
hundreds

of

"white

academies"

sprang

up

that benefitted

from

this

policy.

The Supreme Court found a violation of equal protection even

assuming

that the

textbood aid program was not "motivated by other

than a sincere interest in the educational welfare of all Mississippi
children."

Id. at 466.

The program, according to the Court, "has a

significant

tendency

facilitate,

discrimination,"
constitutional

to

and

could

scrutiny

reinforce,
"be

not

discrimination but some higher goal."
this

Court's

discussion

in

White

shielded

its

because

and

support

altogether

from

was

not

ultimate

end

Id. at 466, 467.

v.

Regester

of

private

In addition,

the

position

of

Mexican-Americans in Bexar County and of blacks in Dallas County made
no mention of discriminatory

intent.

I

think

it

is reasonable

to

view both Norwood and White as pre-Washington v. Davis decisions that
could not now be reached without a showing of intent.
I

Nevertheless,

think the decision of the courts below can be supported without

resort to the artless and wide-ranging language they used.

~

The threshhold question is: Whose intent?

The most useful

--.._....-

~~ treatment of this issue, for me, was in Note, Segregative · Intent and

the De · Facto/De · Jure · Distinction:

Reading ·· the ·· Mind ·· of ·· the ·· School

Board, 86 Yale L.J. 317 (1976), arguing that the Court has looked to
"institutional
statements

of

intent."

Rather

particular

actors,

than
the

focus

exclusively

Court will

infer

on

the

segregative

31 •

intent from the pattern of actions taken by an institution , compared
to alternative actions that were open to
course,

the

at-large

state legislature.
controls

all

by
the

in

Id.

at 337-338.

Of

this case were established by the

The DC found, however, that the local delegation

legislation

demonstrated
litigation,

systems

it.

the

that

whirl

delegation

governmental bodies.

effects
of

only

Mobile.

legislation

is responsive

responding

as
to

was
this

to the requests of local

~hink

Consequently, I

And,

this case would focus on \'

1

th~ inte ~action ~

the

M~bile

legislative delegation,

the City Commission, and the Board of School Commissioners.
~-

Second, discrimination need not be the dominant or primary
purpose of
courts.

an

action

in

order

to

trigger

strict

scrutiny

by

the

So long as it is "a" motivating factor, "judicial deference

is no longer justified. " Arlington Heights, 429
The

problem

of

divining

u.s.

at 266.

discriminatory

facially neutral classifications is chronic, and acute.

intent

behind

As you noted

in Arlington Heights:
Determining
whether
invidious
discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available
Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the
effect of the state action • • • . But such cases are rase.
Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo,
impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must Iook
to other evidence.
429

u.s.

at 266.

You listed five sources of "other evidence":

1) an

historical background of discrimination; 2) the "specific sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decisions"; 3) whether there were
departures from normal procedures;
substantive

policy;

and

5)

the

4) whether there were changes in
evidence

of

participants

in

the

32.

decisionmaking process.
Although

Id. at 267.

it might

be argued

that

the

complete

failure of

black candidates to win an at-large election demonstrates the needed
discriminatory intent, I would look to the totality of factors.
The
----------------~
f':_cts of ~ cas:_s provid.:_ ~om.=_ ~asis for finding_ discr.iminatory

---

~

~ i~nt,
~

is a

particularly

long

~ ~iable

~o!rd.~rst,

to the school

history of discrimination against blacks

there

in Mobile,

and

black candidates have repeatedly lost runoffs for the school

~ board. In addition,
/ ~
single-member
~~-

wit~

.

unconstitutional

the board sabotaged the 1975 Kennedy Bill to set
districts,

and

reapportionment

then

;-ponsored

measure,

the

another

Sonnier

Bill.

Following the victories by two blacks in the 1978 primary, the board
enacted

its

transparent
without

the

Concededly,

rule

requiring

attempt

to

support
this

ensure

of

is

four

a

not

votes

that

no

majority

majority of the Alabama Legislature
ro~e

s~r~

major

school

of

legislative

for

the

Board of School Commissioners.

policy
white

intent
agreed

actions

in

could

board

the

in
be

a
set

members.

sense

that

to keep blacks off

a

the

Yet the actions taken by the

reflect both discriminatory intent and bad faith • .
The City Commission presents a closer case, in my view.

~ election

results

are

candidate has run for

----

less

compelling

that office.

because

no

v1ab l e

Ll .

The

..

black

Appellees insist that this has

been due to the expenie of mounting a serious campaign combined with
the

certainty of defeat

for

blacks.

Moreover,

there

has

been

no

demonstration that the Commission has fought single-member districts
tooth-and-nail
District

Court

the

way

found

the

school

that

race

board
was

has.
a

major

Nevertheless,

the

in

all

factor

33.
redistricting
instrumental

proposals,

and

that

racial

in . defeating 1965 and 1975 legislation to authorize a
The DC drew this conclusion

referendum on single-member districts.
on

the

were

considerations

basis of

testimony

of

legislators

which,

although

perhaps

subject to question on the grounds of personal interest, is certainly
more

direct

cases.

evidence

that

ordinarily

arises

in

equal

protection

And there is much in the record -- the mock lynching, cross-

burnings,

and

still

bureaucracy

almost

lily-white

upper

levels

of

the

city

that suggests that discriminatory motivations underlie

many of the Commission's policies.

VI.

~ ~ -

VOTING · RIGHTS · ACT

?-t-<J //. "' ... -i~

~

_..

-~r~~~-~i

Appellees repeat somewhat desultorily their claim that ~
at-large elections in Mobile violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights
<:......

Act

of

1965,

Court's

42

u.s.c.

practice

possible,

before

Strickland, 420

is

1973c

§

to

decide

reaching

u.s.

( 1976),
a

case

on

constitutional

308, 314 (1975).

and

point

out

statutory

issues.

that

this

grounds

E•g • ,

if

Wood · v.

CA 5 decided the case on the

constitutional claim because that point had been fully developed by
the

DC

and

statutory
resources."

because

question]

"to

remand

would

be

Juris. St. at Sa.

this
a

case

[for

purposeless

decision

waste

of

on

judicial

CA 5 also pointed out that no vote-

dilution claim has been sustained under the Voting Rights Act.
Court

has

poted

decision-avoidance

that

in

rule may

some
be

the

circumstances
abused,

the

This

constitutional-

particularly when

there

is

little basis for the statutory claim and the case has been litigated
exclusively on

the

constitutional

issue.

Mayor ·· of · Philadelphia v ~

I

~hj . S~ ~- S"hi?iS"L.-.. Lh,

~

34.

v:-/3~ ~~~1~/-.o~,~fJ.q ,
~ducational · Equality · League,

415 u.s. 605, 629 (1974).I would follow

that theory here.

VII.

THE · REMEDY
The DC's order in the City Commission case is questionable.

This

-

~

Court

has

stated

~--------------------~-------repeatedly

that

court-ordered

in

reapportionments, single-member districts are preferred unless unique
circumstances are present.

E.g., Mahan

Johnson, 402 u.s. 690, 692 (1971).

v~

Howell, supra; Connor

v~

But this Court has also insisted

that the "scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent

~---------------------~~----------------------of the constitutional
violation." Milliken v. · Bradley, 418 u.s. 717
(1974).

Or as you stated in your concurrence

remand of
990,

Austin · Independent · School - oist~ - v~

991

(1976):

disproportionate
beyond

the

Gatreaux,

l

litigation,
Beens,
the

to

remedy
the

confines
425

U.S.

senate,

school

284

187

(1976).

senators from 67 to 35.

is

This

- united -states, 429 U.S.

not

equitable

approach

desegregation
The

the vacation and

has

been

cases.

~~ntrolling

if

it

is

applied
· v~

Hills

case~• for

this

in

The DC in that case had reapportioned
the

process

had

reduced

the

number

of

The Court's per curiam opinion stated that

"a federal reapportionment court should accomodate the relief ordered
to

the

appropriate

provisions

of

state

statutes

relating

to

the

legislature's size insofar as is possible," Id. at 197, and added:
We know of no federal constitutional principle or
requirement that authorizes a federal reapportioning court
to go as far as the District Court did and, thus, to bypass
) the State's formal judgment as to the proper size of its
legislative bodies •

..

t:l.w

-k

is Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v~ ,-G, ... ~

(1972).

and

simply

wrong."

of

in my view,

406 u.s.

state

"A

to

~

~,..,
-r

-~

_, ____..---,....-, ---.. . ------

w

_ . - .,_--......,..

~

~ ~-·~, k;:t-~~~~
In

the

instant

case,

the

DC' s

order drafting

a

new city

charter and imposing a new form of government represents a massive
intrusion on local prerogatives.

It is particularly unacceptable in

view of the availability of intermediate remedial measures that could
~~ve

responded

~~nned

~~

the

to

the

"place"

vote-dilution
requirement

problem.

that

The

DC

establishes

have

head-to-head

elections for each seat on the Commission, and required true at-large

~o~i~g.
and

~y · into

Or the DC could have divided the

imposed

district.

a

requirement

Indeed,

approach

in

his

in

each

the Attorney General had paved the way for

this

1976

that

rejection

a

of

commissioner

three districts

Act

823's

reside

linkage

administrative duties to particular commission seats.

v

could

of

specific

I see no way

The remedy in the school board case was a simple conversion
from multimember districts

~ less

intrusive.

~ederal

Such

to single-member districts,

action

is

clearly within

the

and was far

powers

of

a

court in a vote-dilution case.

M·
VIII.

RECOMMENDATION:
I

would

give

Fifteenth

Amendment

analysis,

I

think

serious

approach.
that

consideration
Under

to

traditional

Washington · v ~ · Davis

Judge
equal

Wisdom's
protection

and Arlington · Heights

require a showing of discriminatory intent.

This means revising the

"participation

standard

Whitcomb.

in

the

political

process"

of

White

and

In view of the obscurity of that standard, though, such a

change would be for the best.
I would find on these facts the requisite intent to support

36.
the vote-dilution claim.
with

respect

to

stronger local

the

As I noted above, the question seems closer

City

Commission,

interest in having

especially

in

view

of

the

the executive branch chosen on a

citywide basis . in order to lessen parochialism.

Some relief could be

granted without imposing a new type of municipal government, however.
More

important,

findings

u.s.

this Court has emphasized

in cases

at 769-770

like

this.

(need for

E.g~,

White

"intensely local

the need
v~

· Regester,

appraisal"

"in the light of past and present reality"); Mayor · of
Educational · Equality League, supra, 415

u.s.

to defer

of

to DC

sup~,

the

412

facts

Philadelphia · v~

at 621 n.20.

I would overturn the remedy ordered in the City Commission
case.

David

78-1844
78-357
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MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The City of Mobile, Ala., has since 1911 been governed by
a City Commission consisting of three members elected by
the voters of the city at-large. The question in this case is
whether this at-large system of municipal elections violates
the rights of Mobile's Negro voters in contrave11tion of federal statutory or constitutional law.
The appellees brought this suit in the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama as a class action
on behalf of all Negro citizens of Mobile.1 Named as defendants were the city and its three incumbent Commissioners, who are the appellants before this Court. The
complaint alleged that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of
Negroes in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965/
of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Fifteenth Amendment. Following a bench trial, the District Court found
that the constitutional rights of the appellees had been violated, entered a judgment in their favor, and ordered that the
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City Comrnission be disestablished and replaced by a municipal government consisting of a Mayor and a City Council
with members elected from single-member districts. 423 F.
Supp. 384. 3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in
its entirety, Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F. 2d 238, agreeing
that Mobile's at-large elections operated to discriminate
against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, 'id., at 245, and finding that the remedy fornlUlated by the District Court was appropriate. An appeal was
taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction, U. S. ~. The case was originally argued in the 1978 Term,
and was reargued in the present Term.
J[

In Alabama, the form of municipal government a city may
ado})t is governed by state law. Until1911 cities not covered
by specific legislation were limited to governing themselves
through a mayor and city counciU In that year, the Alabama Legislature authorized every large municipality to
adopt a commission form of government. 5 Mobile established i~s City Commission in the same year, and has maintained that 'basic system of muuicipal government ever since.
The three Commissioners jointly exercise all legislative,
executive, and admi11istrative power in the municipality.
They are required after election to designate one of their
number as Mayor, a largely ceremonial office, but no formal
provisio11 is made for allocating specific executive or administrative duties among the three. 6 As required by the state
8 The District Court lw; stayed it::; orders pending di::;position of the
present appeal.
4 Alabama Codr, Chapter 11-43 (1975).
"Act. 281, 1911 Alabamn Ads, at 330.
6 In 1965 the Alabama Legi::;lature enacted Aet 82:~. 1965 Alabama.
Act:<, nt. 15:39 , § 2 of which dr,;ignated H]Wcifir admini~lrative ia~k:< to be
performed b~' ench CommiHsioner and provided that the titlr of Mayor be
rotal·ed arp.ong the three. After the prc:>ent lawsuit. wa;; commenced, the-
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law enacted in 1911, each candidate for the Mobile City Commission runs for election in the city at-large for a term of
four years in one of three numbered posts, and may be elected
only by a majority of the total vote. This is the same basic
electoral system that is followed by literally thousands of
municipalities ·and other local governmental units throughout
the Nation.7
II
Although required by general principles of judicial administration to do so, Ash·wander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 347
(Brandeis, J., concurring), neither the District Court nor the
Court of Appeals addrf'SSf'd the complaint's statutory claimthat the MobilE> elf'ctoral system violates § 2 of the Votil)g
Rights Act of 1965. Even a cursory examination of that
claim, however, clearly discloses that it adds nothing to the
appellees' complaint.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:
"No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or
abridge the right of any citizeu of the United States on
account of race or color."
Even assuming, for present purposes. that there exists a private right of action to enforce this statutory provision, a most
city of Mobile belatedly submtttrd Art 23 to the Attorney General of the
United Stairs under § 5 of the Voting Hights Art of 1965. 42 U. S. C.
197ar. 'The Attomry Genrral objrrted to the lrgi;;lation on the ground
that the C'ity had not. o;howu that § 2 of the Art would not have the effect
of abridgin11: the nght of Kegroe~< to vote. No :·mit ha8 been brought in
tho District Court for tlw District of Columbia to s<•t•k ri<•Hrance under
§ 5 of the Voting Hights Art and, accordingly, § 2 of Act 823 i8 in
abeyatwe
7 A('rording to thr 1979 :Municipal Year Book, in addttion to the cities
that have a commi~sion syHtrm of government., 6:3.4% of the citir;.; with ~•
populntion of 25,000 or more persom; that have city councib, eleet all
cottncil member;< tJtrough at-large rlcrtion:s.
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dubious assumption in light of our recent cases, 8 it is apparent
that the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that
of the Fifteenth Amendment,'9 and the sparse legislative history of § 2 1nakes clear that it was int~nded to have an effect
no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.
Section 2 was an uncontroversial ·provision in proposed
legislation whose other provisions engendered protracted dispute. The House Report on the Bill simply recited that §·2
"grants ... a rigl~.t to be free from enactment or enforcement of voting qualifications ... or practices which deny or
abridge the right to vote on account of race or color."
H . R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1965). See
also S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20
(1965). The view that this section simply r('stated the prohibitions already contained in the Fifteenth Amendment was
expressed without contradiction during the Senate hearings.
Senator Dirksen indicated at one point that all States, whether
or ,not covered by the preclearance provisions of § 5 of the
proposed legislation, were prohibited from discriminating
against Negro votBrs by § "2, which he termed "almost a rephrasing of the 15th [A]mendment." Attorney General
Katzenbach agreed. See Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
'2--' s
1st Sess., 208 (1965).
In view of the section's language and its sparse but clear
legislative history, it is ev1dent that this statutory provision
adds nothing to the appellees' Fifteenth Amenoment claim.
turn, thereFore, to a consiiT'eration of' trie validity oCthe
judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the Fifteenth Amendment,

we

8 See Tmnsameri.ca Mortgage Adviser·s, Tnc . v. Lewis, - ; 1'o'Uche-Ross & Co. v. Redington, - U . S . - , - .
9

U. S. - ,

Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides:
"The right of the citizen:s of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United State~:; or by any SttLtc on account of mce., .
color, or previou;:; condition of servitude."

.'
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III
The Court's early decisions under the Fifteenth Amendment established that it imposes but one limitation on the
powers of the States. It forbids them to discriminate against
Negroes in matters having to do wiWvoting. Se~ Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 665; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S.
370, 389-390; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542,
555-556; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 217. The Amend ..
ment's command and effec.t are wholly negative. "The Fifteen'th Amendment does not ·confer the right of suffrage upon
any one," but h~s "invested the citizens of the United States
with a new constitutional right which is within the protecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from
discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous conditions of servitude." !d.,
at 217-218.
Our decisions, moreover, have made clear that action by a
State that is racia.lly neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth
Amendment o.cl;r 1! motivated j>Y a d1scrimmatory purpose.
lri Guinn v. United States, 238 U. ]. 3'47, this Court struck
down a "grandfather" clause in a state constitution exempting
from the requirement that voters be literate any person or
the descendants of any person who had been entitled to vote
before January 1, 1866. It was asserted by way of defense
that the provision was immune from · review, since a law
could not be found unconstitutional either "by attributing to
the legislative authority an occult motive," or "because of
conclusions concerning its operation in practical execution and
resulting discrimination arising . .. from inequalities naturally inhering in those who must come within the standM·d
in order to enjoy the right to vote." ld., at 359. Despite
this argument, the Cour.t did not hesitate to hold the grandfather clause unconstitutional, because it was uot "possible to
discover any basis in reason for the standard thus fixed than
the purpose" to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendinent. !d.,
at 365.

,.

..
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The Court's more recent decisions confirm the principle
that radall discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth menc men . violation. In Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 1T. S. 339, the Court held that allegations of a
racially motivated gerrymander of municipal boundaries
stated a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. · The constitutional iBfirmity of the state law in that case, according
to the allegations of · the complaint, was that in drawing the
municipal boundaries the legislature was "solely ·concerned
with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Neg~;o
citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing
municipal vote." !d. , at 341. ' The Court made clear that in
the absence of such an invidious purpose, a State is constitutionally free to redraw political boundaries in any manner it
chooses. !d. , at 347.
In Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, the Court upheld
by like reasoning a state congressional reapportionment statute agaillst claims that district lines had been racially gerrymandered, because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the legislature "was either motivated by racial considerations or in
fact drew the districts on racial lines" ; or that the statute
"was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the
basis of race or place or origin." 1 d., at 56, 58. See also
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S.
45; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 368, 275-277.
While other of the Court's Fifteenth Arnendment decisions
have dealt with different issues, none has questioned the necessity of showing purposeful disc;imination in oraer to show a
Smitn v. AllFifteenth Amenament violation. The cases
wnght, 321 U. . 49, and Terry v. Adams·, 345 U. S. 461, for
example, dealt with the question whether a State was so involved with racially discriminatory voting practices as to
invoke the Amendment's protection. Although their facts
differed somewhat, the question in both cases was whether the
State was sufficiently implicated in the conduct of racially
exclusionary primary elections to make that discrimination an

-or

/..-1.- ..,<ec e·~ •1.-(

~A.../~4.
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abridgement of the right to vote by a State. Since the Texas
Democratic Party primary in Srnith v. Allwright was regulated
by statute, and only party nominees chosen in a primary were
placed on the ballot for the general election, the Court concluded that the state Democratic Party had become the
agency of the State, and that the State thereby had "endorse[d], adopt[ed], and enforce[d] the discrimination
against Negroes practiced by a party." 321 U. S., at 664.
'Perry v. Adams, supra, posed a more difficult question of
state involvement. The primary election challenged in that
case was conducted by a county political organization, the
Jaybird Association, that was neither ·authorized nor regulated
under state law. The candidates chosen in the Jaybird primary, however, invariably won in the subsequent Democratic
primary and in the general election, and the Court found
that the Fifteenth Amendment had been violated. Although
the several supporting opinions differed in their formulation
Qf this conclusion, there was agreement that the State was
involved in the purposeful exclusion of Negroes from participation in the election process.
The appellees have argued in this Court that Smith v.
Allwright and rPerry v. Adarns support the conclusion that the
at-large system of elections in Mobile is unconstitutional,
reasoning that the effect of racially polarized voting in Mobile is the same as that of a racially exclusionary primary.
The only effect, however, of the exclusionary primaries that
offended the Fifteenth Amendment was that Negroes were not
permitted to vote in them. The difficult question was
whether the "State ha[d] had a hand in" in the patent discrimination practiced by a nominally private organization.
1'erry v. Adarns, 345 U. S., at 473 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
The simple answer to the Fifteenth Amendment reasoning
of the appellees is that. as the District Court expressly found,
the appellees were not denied the i·ight to vote by anyo e.
'l'he
e ng t to have
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Negro candidates elected, and neither Smith v. Allwright ·nor
Terry v. Adams ·contains any implication to the contrary,
That Amendment prohibits only purposefully discriminatory
denial o;- abridgment l')yg'O'Vernme;;t of tEe freNfom to vote
1 'on~ace, cofor ;or prev1ous condition of servitudeo."
Having found that Negroes in ''Mobile "register and vote without hindrance," the District Court ai1d the Court of Appeals
were in error in believing tha~ the appellants invaded the protection of that Amendment in the present case.

IV
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court
that Mobile's at-large electoral system violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourtee1ith Atneridment. ·· There remains for consideration, therefore, the validity of its judgment on that score.
The claim that at-large electoral schemes unconstitutionally
deny to some persons tllC 'Equal Protection · of the· Laws has
been advanced in numerous cases before this Court. · That
contention has been raised most often with regard to multimember constituencies within a state legislative apportionment system. The constitutional objection to multimember
districts is not and cannot be that, as such, they depart from
apportioumeut on a population basis in violation of Reynolds
v. Simms, 377 U. S. 533, and its progeny. Rather the focus in
such cases has beeri on the lack of representatiou multimember districts afford various elements of the voting population
in a system of representative legislative 'democracy. "Criticism .[of multimember districts] is rooted in their winnertake~all aspects; their teiidency to submerge minorities ... '
a general preference for legislatures reflecting community interests as closely as possible and disenchantment with political parties and elections as devices to settle policy differences
between conteHcling interests." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403'

u. s. 124, 158--159.

Despite repeated constitutional attacks upon multimember

~·

LuI
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legislative districts, the Court has consistently held that they
are not unconstitutional per se, e. g., White v. Regester, 412
U. S. 755; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124; Kilgarin v.
Hill, 386 U.S. 120; Burns v. Richar:dson, 384 U.S. 73; Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433. 10 We have recognized, however, that such legislative apportionrMnts coulaviolate-the
Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to
min~t the voting potential of racial or ethnic
minOI'Ihes. "See W1ide v. Regester, supra; Whitcomb v.
Chav'is, supra; Burns v. Richardson, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey,
supra. To prove such a purpose it is not enough to show
that the group allegedly discriminated against has not elected
representatives in proportion to its numbers. White v. Regester, supra, at - ; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at - . A
plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was "conceived
or operated as [a] purposeful device[] to further racial discrimination," Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149. This burden of proof is simply one aspect of the basic principle that.
only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the :Eq~l Protection Clause of the Fourt~h
Amendment. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229; Vil~age of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Ho'using Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252; Personnel Adm'r of Massachusettsv. Feeney,- U. S. - .
In only one case h!.,S the Court sustained a claim that multimember legislative districts uuconstitutionally diluted the
votin strength of a d1screte group. That case was White v.
Regester, supra. 'I ere t 1e Court upheld a constitutionaf
challenge by Negroes and Mexican-Americans to parts of a
10 We have made clear, however, that a court in formulating an apportiomnent plan as im exrrcise of its equit'YPQwers ~;hould, 1.1s <1. geneml
rule, not permit multimember legislative di~trict.~. "[S]ingle-member districts are to be preferred in court-ordered legi:>lative apJ>ortionment plans
unless the eonrt can articulate a 'singular combination of unique factors,..
that jn~tifie~ a differeut result. Mahan v. !lowell, 410 U. S. 315, 333."'
Connor v. Finch, 431 U .. S. 407.,. 415.,

'

'
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legislative reapportionment plan adopted by the State of
Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the multimember districts
for the counties in which they resided minimized the effect of
their votes in violation ~f the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Court held that the pln.intiffs had been able to "produce
evidence to support the finding that the political processes
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the group[s-1 i11 question." 412 U. S., at
766-767. Iu so holding, the Court relied upon evidence in
the record that included a long history of official discrimination against the groups, indifference to their needs and interests on the part of white elected officials, and, in one county,
the effective exclusion of Negroes from the process of slating
candidates for the Democratic Party.
We may assume, for presellt purposes, that an at-large election of city officials with all the legislative, executive and administrative power of the municipal government is constitutionally indistinguishable from the election of a few members
of a state legislative body in multimember districts-although
this may be a r~sh assumption. 11 B~t even making this assumption, it is clear that Uie evidencein the present case fell
farsnort of sliowing thafl the appellants "couceived or operateCI raJ purposeful device [] to further racial discrimination." Whitcomb'V:""C1iams, ~(J'J 0". S., at 149.
"-'1.1le District Court assessed the appellees' claims in light
of the standard that had been articulated by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485
F. 2d 1297. That case, coming before Washington v. Davis,
426 U. S. 229, was quite evidently decided upon the misunder-

u. s_

11 See Wise v_ Lipi!COmb, 435
535, 549, and 550 (concurring
opinion). His noleworth~- that a ::;y:-;tem of at-large city elections in place
of election:; of city official::; by the Yoter::; of ~mall geographic wards was
univer::;ally heralded uot many year:; ago ws a praiseworthy and progressive reform of corrupt municipal governmenL See, e. g., K Banfield and
J. Wilson, City Politics 151 (1963) ; :see ah;o L. Steffens, The Shame of
the Cities (1904) •

..
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~tanding

that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory pur~
pose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause-that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient.
See 485 F. 2d, at 1304-1305, and n. 16.12
In light of the criteria identified in Zimmer, the District
Court based its conclusion of unconstitutionality primarily on
the fact that no Negro had ever been elected to the City
Commission, apparently because of the pervasiveness of racially polarized voting in Mobile. The trial court also found
that city officials had not been as responsive to the interests
of Negroes as to those of white persons. On the basis of
these findings, the court concluded that the political processes in Mobile were not equally open to Negroes, despite its
seemingly inconsistent findings that there were no inhibitions
against Negroes becoming candidates, and that in fact Negroes had registered and voted without hindrance. 423 F ..
Supp., at 387. Finally, with little additional discussion, the
District Court held that Mobile's at-large electoral system
was invidiously discriminating against Negroes in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.13
12

This Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Zimme!' v. McKeithen on grounds other than those relied on by that court
and explicitly "without approval of the constitutional view~ expressed by
the Court of Appeals." Ea.!t Carroll Par~h School Bd. v. Marshall, 424
U. S. 636, 638 (per curiam).
13 The only indication given by the Di~trict Court of an inference that
there existed an invidious purpose was the following statf'ment: "[i]t is
not a long step from the tSystematic rxclusion of black:; from juries which
is itself such an 'unequal application of the law . . . as to show intentional discrimination,' Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 404, .. . to [the]
present purpo~e to dilute the black vote as evicleucf'd in this case. Thereis a 'current' condition of dilution of the black vote resulting from
intentional :state. legislative inaction whirh is as effective as the intentional
state action referred to in Keye11 [v. School District No. 1, Denver Colo,,
413 U.S. 189}."' 423F. Snpp., at 398.
Wfmt the Di~trict Court may have meant by t,his ;;tatement is uncertain.
In any event the analogy to (h(' nwially exclusionary jt~ry ca;;es appears·
Jnista:&:en. l'I10::;e case:; typically Jlave involved a consi:stent pattern of
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In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals ac~
knowledged that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches only purposeful discrimination/•
but held that one way a plaintiff may establish this illicit purpose is by adducing evidence that satisfies the criteria of its
decision in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra. ·Thus, because the
appellees had proved an "aggregate" of the Zimmer factors,
the Court of Appeals concluded that a d~scriminatory purpose
had been proved. That approach, however, is inconsistent
with our decisions in Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arling~
ton Heights, supra. Although 'the presence of the indica
relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discriminatory purpose, satisfaction of-those criteria is not of itself sufficient proof of such a purpose. The so-called Ztmm,er criteria
upon which t~Distrlct Court and ' the Court of Appeals
discrete official actions that demonstrated almost to a mathematical certainty that Negroes wE're being excluded from juriE'S because of their
race. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 1J. S. 482, 495-497, and n. 17; Patton
v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463t 464; Pie1Te v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 359;
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S."587, '591.
If the District Court meant by its statement tlwt the existence oJ the
at-large electoral sy:-;tem was, like the systematic exclusion of N E>groes from
juries, unexplainable on grounds ot.h er than race, its inference is contradicted by the history of the adoption of that system i11 Mobile. Alternatively, if thE' District Court mE>ant that the state legislature may -be
pre;,umed to have "intended" that there would be 110 Negro Commissioners, simply becauHe that was a foreseeable consequence of at-large
voting, it applied an ·incorrect legal standard. " 'Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness
of consequences. . . . It implies that the dE>cisionmaker ... selected or·
reaffirmed a partirular course of action at least in part 'beca use of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects· upon an identifiable group."
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, U. S. - , (footnotes
omitted) .
14 The Court of Appeals expressed the view tha.t the District Court's
finding of discrimination in light of the Zimme1· criteria was "buttreRsed'•·
by the fact that the Attorne~· General had interpo~ed an objection under
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the stnto statute designnting thefunctions of each Commissioner. 571 F. 2d, at 246. See n. 6, supra.
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relied were most assuredly insufficient to prove an unconstitu.
tionally discriminatory purpose in the present case.
First, the two courts found it highly significant that no
Negro had been elected to the Mobile City Commission.
From this fact they concluded that the processes leading to
nomination and election were not open equally to Negroes.
But the District Court's findings of fa.ct, unquestioned on ap·
peal, make clear that Negroes register and vote in Mobile
"without hindrance," aiid that there are no obstacles in the
way of Negroes who wish to become candidates for election
to the Coiiiiillssion.- lnoeed, It was undisputed that tfie only
active "slatmg" organization in the city is comprised of Negroes. It may be that Negro candidates have been defeated,
but that fact alone does not work a constitutional deprivation.
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 160; see Arlington Heights,
supra, at 266, and n. 15. ~
Second, the District Court relied in part on its finding that
the persons who were elected to the Commission discriminated
against Negroes in municipal employment and in dispensing
public services. If that is the case, those discriminated
against may be entitled to relief under the Constitution, albeit
of a sort quite different from that sought iu the present case.
The Equal Protection Clause proscribes purposeful discrimination because of race by any unit of state government, whatever the method of its election. But evidence of discrimination by white officials in Mobile is relevant only as the most
tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the constitutional
invalidity of the electoral system under which they attained
their offices.
Third, the District Court and the Court of Appeals supported their conclusion by drawing upon the substantial his1

'

1

" There have been only three Negro candida.t es for the City Commission, all in 1973. According to the Di~trict Court, the Negro CiLndidates "were young, inexperienced, and mouuted f'xtremcly limited campaigns" and recf'ived only "modest support from the black community, , . ," 423 F. Supp,, at 388.
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tory of official racial discrimination in Alabama. But past (
discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn
governmental action that is not itself unlawful. The ultimate question remains whether a discriminatory intent has
been proved in a given case. More distant instances of official
discrimination in other cas'es are of limited help in resolving
that question.
Finally, the ·District Court and the Court of Appeals
pointed to the mechanics of the at-large electoral system itself as proof that the votes of Negroes were being invidiously
canceled out. But those features of that electoral system,
such as the majority vote requirement, tend naturally to disadvantage any voting minority, as we noted in White v.
Regester, supra. ·They are far 'from proof of a racially discriminatory purpose or intent upon the part of the appellants
in this case. 16
For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further pro~
· ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

J

16 According to the District Court, voters in the city of Mobile are
represented in the state legislature by three state senators, any one of
whom can veto proposed local legislation under the ~xisting courtesy
rule. Likewise, a majority of Mobile's 11-member House delegation can
prevent a bill from reaching the floor for debate. Unanimous approval
of a local measure by the city delegation, on the other hand, virtually
assures passage. 423 F . Supp., at 397.
There was evidence in this case that several proposals that would have
altered the form of Mobile's municipal government have been defeated
in the state legislature, including at least one that would ha.ve permitted
Mobile to govern itself through a mayor and city council with members
elected from individual districts within the city. Whether in this litigation , or in future litigation against other defendants, the appellees may be
able to prove that Mobile's pre:;ent governmental and electoral systern.
has been retained for :a racially discriminatory purpo:;e, we are in .n~
position now to say,
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77-1844 - City of Mobile Alabama v. Bolden
Dear Potter:
As I hope I indicated at Conference, my reasons for
voting to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals are
somewhat different from those set forth in your opinion
for the Court. Even though I will therefore probably
write separately, it may be useful to you to have me
indicate in brief form the points of difference between us.
First, in view of the fact that the Court found an
implied cause of action under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act
in Allen v. State Board of Education, 393 u.s. 544, and in
view of the further fact that none of our recent cases
casts any doubt on the viability of Allen, I do not agree
that the assumption that there is a private right of
action to enforce § 2 is "dubious."
Second, I also disagree with the portion of the
opinion that holds that the Fifteenth Amendment cannot be
violated unless the State action is motivated by
discriminatory purpose.
I do not think the prior cases
compel this result; nor do I think it is necessary to so
decide in this case in order to reverse, even on the
ground that you select in Part III.
Third, I believe the Fifteenth Amendment does place
limitations on a State's ability to draw district
boundaries, and therefore that the simple answer to the
Fifteenth Amendment contention which you give at the

\
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bottom of page 7 and the top of page 8 is insufficient. I
realize that Gomillion can be interpreted as a case
involving a den1al of the right to vote, but I think it
more correct to analyze the case as one striking down an
impermissible gerrymander.
Fourth, although I agree with most of what you say in
Part IV, I believe the so-called "discriminatory purpose"
standard is somewhat confusing and may have different
meanings in a districting case than in various other
contexts such as the employment discrimination involved in
Washington v. Davis.
If "purpose" is the standard, it
may be important to identify the governmental entity whose
purpose is controlling. Is it the City of Mobile, or is
it the Alabama Legislature? If the latter, then almost
all of the evidence of discriminatory purpose on which the
Fifth Circuit relied is quite irrelevant.
Finally, in my own thinking ~ have been assuming that
we are deciding the question that you leave open in the
last sentence of footnote 16. In short, there is no
question about the legitimacy of the Mobile council form
of government at its inception; the question is whether
the retention of that system today can only be explained
as having been based on racial factors or other "grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a valid State
objective." Turner v. Foust, 396 u.s. 346, 362.
Because this is such an important case, I hope you
will bear with me if it takes me longer than usual to put
an opinion together.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

January 11, 1980

Re:

No. 77-1844, City of Mobile v. Bolden

Dear John,
Thank you very much for your letter of January
10. You did make clear at our Conference discussion that
your reasons for voting to reverse the judgment in this case
are somewhat different from those of the rest of us who would
reach the same result, and I appreciate the written summary
of your views as contained in your letter.
It seems to me
that there should be no difficultly in effecting an accommodation of our differences on one of the points you raise, but
I am quite doubtful as to the possibility of an accommodation
on at least some of the others.
The first point of difference you mention -- relating to whe~her there is a private cause of action ·under §
2 of the Voting Rights Act can, I think, be settled very
easily.
Indeed, I have already toned down my original statement in revisions sent to the printer today, and you will see
a modified version in a recirculation early next week.
Our other areas of difference are not so easily
reconcilable. As to the Fifteenth Amendment, I firmly believe, after again reviewing this Court's decisions in the
process of preparing the present opinion, that a violation of
it can be shown only if purposeful state racial discrimination is shown. See,~., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd.
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54. Perhaps more importantly,
I am convinced that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits only
what it purports to prohibit -- the denial or abridgment of
Negroes' freedom to vote. This denial or abridgment could be
effectuated through a purposeful racial gerrymander, as the
Gomillion case held and Wright v. Rockefeller conceded, but
whatever the apparatus utilized, the state must be shown purposefully to have denied or abridged the freedom of Negroes,
as such, to vote, if a Fifteenth Amendment violation is to be
shown.

Whether the Fifteenth Amendment means what I think
it means, or has the somewhat broader meaning that you attribute to it, seems to me, however, ultimately to be of no
great importance.
I say this because I think you will agree
that in the light of the contemporary development of constitutional law under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment
(and the Seventeenth as well), have been embraced by our
present understanding of the constitutional demands of equal
protection under the law. It is perhaps for this reason that
I gather we both think that the present case is really a
Fourteenth Amendment case.
As to the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment, my
impression is that there is an area of agreement between us,
but that we disagree in certain fundamental respects. My own
view is that purposeful discrimination, which is required to
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, has basically the same meaning in any context, whether in employment,
voting, zoning, or whatever. This is a view that I would not
lightly abandon or qualify. On the other hand, I agree with
you that failure to change a system may be purposefully
racially discriminatory, although that system in its inception may have been entirely legitimate.
I had thought that
my proposed opinion recognizes this, and simply holds that
there was a failure of proof of _any such purposeful racially
discriminatory retention of the at-large voting system on the
part of the defendants in the present case.
I fully agree with you that this is an important
case -- involving as it does a constitutional attack on the
at-large system of voting in American cities, a system employed by thousands of cities and local governments and one
that has been hailed as a progressive reform of corrupt municipal government.
It certainly took us "longer than usual
to put an opinion together," and I shall not only gladly bear
with you, but fully understand, if it takes you longer than
usual also.
Sincerely yours,
~I

()

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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MR. Jus'l'ICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The City of Mobile, Ala., has since 1911 been governed by: ~~
a City Commission consisting of three members elected by
the voters of the city at-large. The question in this case is ~ ~ 1«411T
whether this at-large system of municipal elections violates
the rights of Mobile's Negro voters in contravention of federal statutory or constitutional law.
The appellees brought this suit in the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama as a class action
on behalf of all Negro citizens of Mobile. 1 Named as de- f"~ ~
fendants were the city and its three incumbent Commissioners, who are the appellants before this Court. The 1 _r-7~ ~
complaint alleged that the practice of electing the City Com~
missioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of ~as~t:2.41!. 1;
Negroes in violation of ~ 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965/ r
d
of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Fifteenth Amendment. Following a bench trial, the District Court found ~
that the constitutional rights of the appellees had been violated, entered a judgmeut in their favor, and ordered that the
Approximately 35.4% of the re~idenhl of Mobile are Negro.
79 St~lt 4a7 , 42 U. S. C § 197a. The complaint al~o contained claims·
based on the First and ThirtPenth Amendments and on 42 U. S. C. § 1983
and 42 U. S. C. § 1985 (3) . Those claims have not been pre&ied in this:
1
2

Court.
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City Commission be disestablished and replaced by a munic,
ipal government consisting of a Mayor and a City Council
with members elected from single-member districts. 423 F.
Supp. 384. 3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in
its entirety, Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F. 2d 238, agreeing
that Mobile's at-large elections operated to discriminate
against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, id., at 245, and finding that the remedy fornmlated by the District Court was appropriate. An appeal was
taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction, U. S. --. The case was originally argued in the 1978 Term,
and was reargued in the present Term.

I
In Alabama, the form of municipal government a city may
adopt is governed by state law. Until 1911 cities not covered
by specific legislation were limited to governing themselves
through a mayor and city counciJ.4 In that year, the Alabama Legislature authorized every large municipality to
adopt a commission form of government. 5 Mobile established its City Commission in the same year, and has maintained that basw system of municipal government ever since.
The three Commissioners jointly exercise all legislative,
executive, aHd administrative power in the municipality.
They are required after election to designate one of their
number as Mayor, a largely ceremonial office, but no formal
provision is made for allocating specific executive or administrative duties among the t.hree.6 As required by the state
The District Court has stayed itl:s ordt'r:; pending di::;position of the
appeal.
4 Alabama Code, Chapter 11-43 (1975).
o Act 281, 1911 Alabam<t Acts, at 330.
6 In 1965 tht' Alabama Legnslature enactt'd Act 823, 1965 AlaLarna.
Acts, aL 1539, § 2 of which de::;ignated ~>'Pecific administrative task:; to beperformed by each Commissioner and provided that the title of Mayor bel'Otat.€d among tlw tluee. After the pn.o;,;ent law::~uit wa..s commenced, the3

pre~ut
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law enacted in 1911, each candidate for the Mobile City Commission runs for election in the city at-large for a term of
four years in one of three numbered posts, and may be elected
only by a majority of the total vote. This is the same basic
electoral system that is followed by literally thousands of
municipalities ·and other local governmental units throughout
the Nation.7

II
Although required by general principles of judicial adminis-.
tration to do so, Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347
(Brandeis, J'. , concurring), neither the District Court nor the
Court of Appeals addressed the complaint's statutory claimthat the Mobile electoral fSystem violates § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. Even a cursory examination of that
claim, however, clearly discloses that it adds nothing to the
appellees' complaint.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides!
"No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States on
account e>f race or color."
Assuming, for present purposes, that there exists a private
city of Mobile ·belatedly submitted Act 8~3 to the Attorney General of the
United States under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1§65. 42 U. S. e,
§ 1973c. The Attorney General objected to the legislation on the ground
that the city had not shown that § 2 of the Act would not have the effect
of abridging t.he right of Negroes to vote. No suit has been brought in
the District Court for the District of Columbia to seek clearance under
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act and, accordingly, § 2 of Act 823 is in
abeyance.
'7 According to the 1979 Municipal Year Book, most municipalities of
over 25,000 people conducted at-large elections of their city commissioners
or council members as of 1977. ld., at 98-99. lt is reasonable to suppose
th;~m an even larger majority of other municipalities did so.

1
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right of action to enforce this statutory provision, 8 it is apparent
that the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that
of the Fifteenth Amendment,11 and the sparse legislative history of § 2 makes clear that it wa.S intended to have an effect
no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.
Section 2 was a.11 uneontroversial provision in proposed
legislation whose other provisions engendered protracted dispute. The House Report on the Bill simply recited that § 2
"grants ... a right to be free from enactment or enforcement of voting qualifications ... or practices which deny or
abridge the right to vote on account of race or color."
H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1965). See
also S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20
(1965). The view that this section simply restated the prohibitions already contained in the Fifteenth Amendment was
expressed without contradiction during the Senate hearings.
Senator Dirksen indicated at one point that all States, whether
or not covered by the preclearance provisions of § 5 of the
proposed legislation, were prohibited from discriminating
against Negro voters by § 2, which he termed "almost a rephrasing of the 15th [A] mendment." Attorney General
Ratzenbach agreed. See Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., 208 (1965).
In view of the section's language and its sparse but clear
legislative history, it is evident that this statutory provision
adds nothing to the appellees' Fifteenth Amendment claim.
We turn, therefore, to a consideration of the validity of the
8 Cf. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544. But see Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc . v. Lewis, U. S. - , - ; ToucheRoss & Co. v. Redington, - U. S. - , - .
0 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides:
"The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be deuied
or abridged by the United StittRs or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.''
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judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the }i"if..
teenth Amendment.

III
The Court's early decisions under the Fifteenth Amendment established that it imposes but one limitation on the
powers of the States. It forbids them to discriminate against
Negroes ip. matters having to do with voting. See Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 665; Neal v. Dektware, 103 U. S.
370, 389-390; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542,
555-556; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 217. The Amend..
ment's command and effect are wholly negative. "The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon
any one," but has "invested the ·citizens of the United States
with a new constitutional J.Tight which is within the pro ..
tecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from
discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on ac..
count of race, color, or previous conditions of servitude." Id.,
at 217-218.
Our decisions, moreover, have made clear that action by a
State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, this Court struck
down a "grandfather" clause in a state ct5nstitution exempting
from the req4irement that voters be literate any person o:r
the descendants of any person who had been entitled to votl'
before January 1, 1866. It was asserted by way of defense that
the provision was immune from successful challenge, since a law
could not be found unconstitutional either "by attributing to
the legislative authority an occult motive," or 1'because of
conclusions concerning its operation in practical execution and
resulting discrimination ·arising . . . from inequalities naturally inhering in those who must come with~n the standard
in order to enjoy the right to vote." ld., at 359. Despite
this argument, the Court did not hesitate to hold the grandfather clause ur.tconstitutional, because it was not "possible to
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d.iscover any basis in reason for the standard thus fixed than
the purpose" to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment. ld_.,
at 365.
The Court's more recent decisions confirm the· principle·
that racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amenc)Jnent violation. In Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, the Court held that allegations of a
racially motivated gerrymander of municipal boundaries
stated a claim under the Fifteei1th Amendment. '" The con~
stitutioual infirmity of the state law in that case, ·according
to the allegations of the complaint, was that in drawing the·
municipal boundaries the legislature was "solely concerned
with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negto
citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing
municipal vote." ld., at 341. The Court made clear that in
the absence of such an invidious purpose, a State is constitutionally free to redraw political boundaries in any manner it
chooses. ld., at 347.
In Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, the Court ·upheld
by like reasoning a state congressional reapportionment sta~
ute against claims that district lines had been racially gerrymandered, because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the legis.
lature "was either motivated by racial considerations or in
fact drew the districts on racial lines"; or that the statute
"was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the
basis of race or place or origin." !d., at 56, 58. See also
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S.
45; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 368, 275-277.
While other of the Court's Fifteenth Amendment decisions-·
have dealt with different issues, none has questioned the necessity of showing purposeful discrimination in order to show a
Fifteenth Amendment violation. The cases of Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, and Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, for ·
example, dealt with the question whether a State was so in·
volved with racially discriminatory voting practices as toinvoke the Amendment's protection. Although their facts;;
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differed somewhat, the question in both cases was whether the
State was sufficiently implicated in the conduct of racially
exclusionary primary elections to make that discrimination an
abridgement of the right to vote by a State. Since the Texas
Democratic Party primary in Smith v. Allwright was regulated
by statute, and only party nominees chosen in a primary were
placed on the ballot for the general election, the Court concluded that the state Democratic Party had become the
agency of the State, and that the State thereby had "endorse[d] , adopt[ed], and enforce[d] the discrimination
against Negroes practiced by a party." 321 U. S., at 664.
Terry v. Adams, supra, posed a more difficult question of
state involvement. The primary election challenged in that
case was conducted by a county political organization, the
Jaybird Association, that was neither authorized nor regulated
under state law. The candidates chosen in the Jaybird primary, however, invariably won in the subsequent Democratic
primary and in the general election, and the Court found
that the Fifteenth Amendment had been violated. Although
the several supporting opinions differed in their formulation
of this conclusion, there was agreement that the State was
involved in the purposeful exclusion of Negroes from participation in the election process.
The appellees have argued in this Court that Smith v.
Allwright and Terry v. Adams support the conclusion that the
at-large system of elections in Mobile is unconstitutional,
reasoning that the effect of racially polarized voting in :M.obile is the same as that of a racially exclusionary primary.
The ouly effect, however, of the exclusionary primaries that
offended the Fifteenth Amendment was that Negroes were not
permitted to vote in them. The difficult question was"
whether the "State ha[d] had a hal)d in" in the patent discrjmination practiced by a nominally private organization.
Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S., at 473 (Frankfurter, J.,.
concurring).
The auswer to the appellees' argument is that, as the Dis--
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trict Court expressly found, their freedom to vote has not been
denied or abridged by anyone. The Fifteenth Amendment
does not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected, and
neither Smith v. Allwright nor Terry v. Adams contains any
implication to the contrary. That Amendment prohibits only
purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote "on account of race, color, OI"
previous condition of servitude." Having found that Negroes
in Mobile "register and vote without hindrance," the District
Court and Court of Appeals were in error in believing that the
appellants invaded the protection of that Amendment in the
present case.

IV
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court
that Mobile's at-large electoral system violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There remains for consideration, therefore, the validity of its judgment on that score.
The claim that at-large electoral schemes unconstitutionally
deny to some persons the Equal Protection of the Laws has
been advanced in numerous cases before this Court. That
contention has been raised most often with regard to multimember constituencies within a state legislative apportionment system. The constitutional objection to multime.mber
districts is not and cannot be that, as such, they depart from
apportionment on a population basis in violation ofReynolds
v. Simms, 377 U. S. 533, and its progeny. Rather the focus in
such cases has been on the lack of representation multimember districts afford various elements of the voting population
in a system of representative legislative democracy. ''Criticism {of multimember districts] is rooted in their winnertake-all aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities ..• ,
a general preference for legislatures reflecting community interests as closely as possible and disenchantment with political parties and elections as devices to settle policy differences-.

"'
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between contending interests." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
u. s. 124, 158- 159.
Despite repeated constitutional attacks upon multimember
legislative districts, the Court has consistently held that they
are not unconstitutional per se, e. g., White v. Regester, 412
U. S. 755; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124; Kilgarin v.
Hill, 386 U. S. 120; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73; Portson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433. 10 We have recognized, however, that such legislative apportionments could violate the
Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to
minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic
minorities. See ·white v. Regester, supra; Whitcomb v.
Chavis, supra; Burns v. Richardson, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey,
supra. To prove such a purpose it is not enough to show
that the group allegedly discriminated against has not elected
representatives in proportion to its numbers. White v. Regester, supra, at - ; Whitcorri"b v. Chavis, supra, at - . A
plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was "conceived
or operated as [a] :purposeful device[] to further racial discrimination," Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149. ·This burden of proof is simply one aspect of 'the ·basic principle that
only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal ·Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See ·washington v. ·Davis., 426 U. S. 229; Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. ·252; Personnel Adm'r of MassachuseU$
v. Feeney,- U. S. - .
In only one case has the Court sustained a claim that multimember legislative districts unconstitutionally diluted the
10 We have made cleat·, however, that a court in formulating an apportionment plan as an exercise of its equity powers should, as a general
rule, 11ot pennit multimember legislative districts. " [S]ingle~member district<> are to be preferred in court-ordered legii:Jative apportionment plans
unless ·the court can articulate a 'singular combination of unique factors~
that justifies a differe11t result. Mahan , v." Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 333 ~""

' Connor v: Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 415 •.

,
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voting strength of a discrete group. That case was White v.
Regester, supra. There the Court ·upheld a constitutional
challenge by Negroes and Mexican-Americans to parts of a
legislative reapportionment plan · adopkd by the · State of
Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the multimember districts
for the two counties in which they resided minimized the effect
of their votes in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Court held that the plaintiffs had been able to "produce
evidence to support the finding that the political processes
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the group[s] in question." 412 U. S., at
766-767. In so holding, the Court relied upon evidence in the
record that included a 'long history of official discrimination
against minorities as well as indifference to their needs and
interests on the part of white elected officials. ·The Court
also found in each county additional factors that restricted the
access of minority groups to the political process. In one
county, Negroes effectively were excluded from the process
of slating candidates for the Democratic Party, while the
plaintiffs in the other county were Mexican-Americans who
"suffer[ ed] a cultural and language barrier" that made "participation in community processes extremely difficult, particularly ... with respect to the political life" of the county.
Id., at 768 (footnote omitted).
We may assume, for present purposes, that an at-large election of city officials with all the legislative, executive and administrative power of the municipal government is constitutionally indistinguishable Trom the election of a few members
of a state legislative body in multimember districts-although
this may be a rash assumption. 11 But even making this as11 See Wise v. Lipscomb, 435 U. S. 535, 549, and 550 (concurring
opinion) . It is noteworthy that a syl:item of at-large city elections in place
of elections of city officials by the voters of small geographic wardl:i was
univerl:ially heralded not many year::; ago a:; a praiseworthy and progres-

/
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sumption, it is clear that the evidence in the present case fell
far short of showing that the appellants "conceived or operated [a] purposeful device[] to further racial discrimination." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 149.
The District Court assessed the appellees' claims in light
of the standard that had been articulated by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Zirnrner v. McKeithen, 485
F. 2d 1297. That case, coming before Washington v. Davis,
426 U. S. 229, was quite evidently decided upon the misunderstanding that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory purpose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause-that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient.
See 485 F. 2d, at 1304-1305, and n. 16.12
In light of the criteria identified in Zirnrner, the District
Court based its conclusion of unconstitutionality primarily on
the fact that no Negro had ever been elected to the City
Commission, apparently because of the pervasiveness of racially polarized voting in Mobile. The trial court also found
that city officials had not been as responsive to the interests
of Negroes as to those of white persons. On the basis of
these findings, the court concluded that the political processes in Mobile were not equally open to Negroes, despite its
seemingly inconsistent findings that there were no inhibitions
against Negroes becoming candidates, and that in fact Negroes had registered and voted without hindrance. 423 F.
Supp., at 387. Finally, with little additional discussion, the
District Court held that Mobile's at-large electoral system
sive reform of corrupt municipal government. See, e. g,, E. Banfield anq
J. WilHo n. City Politic~ 151 (1968). Compare, M. Seasongood, Local Gov~
ernment (1933): L. Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (1904) .
12 Thi:s Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Zimmer v. McKeithen on grounds other than those relied on by that court
and explicitly "without approval of the constitutional view:s expressed by
the Court of Appeals." East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424·
U.S. 636, 638 (pet• cw·iarn).
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wa!:l invidiously discriminating against Negroes in violation of

the Equal Protection Clause.18
In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals ac~
knowledged that the :Ejqua] Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches only purposeful discrimination,t•
18

The only indication given by the DiiStrict Court of an inference that
there exiiSted an invidious purpol:le was the following ~:;tatement: "[i]t is
not a lm1g step from the systematic exclusion of 'blacks from juries which
is it!>elf such an 'unequal application of the law . . . as to show intentional discrimination,' Akins v. · 'l'exas, 325 U. S. '398, 404, ... to [the]
pre:;ent purpOile to dilute the black vote aiS evidenced in this case. There
is a 'current' condition of dilution of the black vote re:;ulting from
intentional state legisla.t ive inaction wbich is as effective as the intentional
state action referred to in Keyes [v. School District No. 1, Denver Colo.,
413 U. S. 189] ." 423 F . Supp., at 398.
What the Dil;trict Court may have meant by this statement is uncertain.
In any event the analogy to the racially exclusionary jury cases appears
mistaken. Those cases typically 11ave involved a consistent pattern of
discrete official actions that demonstrated alm~-t to a mathematical certainty that Negroes were being excluded from juries because of their
race. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-497, and n. 17; Patton
v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 464; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 359;
No1Tis v. Alabama, 294 1J. S. 587, 591.
If the District Court meant by its statement that the existence of the
at-large electoral system was, like the systematic exclusion of Negroes from
juries, mu•xplainable on grounds other than race, its inference is contradicted by the history of the adoption of that sy~tem in Mobile. Alter·
natively, if the District Court meant that the state legislature may be
pre;umed to have "intended" that there would be no Negro Commie-sioners, simply because that was a foreseeable consequence of at-large
voting, it applied an incorrect legal standard. "'Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness
of consequences. . . . It implies that the decisionmaker . .. selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of 11ction at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effect-s upon an identifiable group."
Personnel Atlrn'r of Mass . v. Feeney, U. S. - , (footnotes
omitted) .
14 The Court of A ppf'al::> expressed the view that the District Court's
finding of discrimination in hght of the Zimmer criteria was "buttressed"
by tbe fact that the Attorney General had interposed an objection under
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but held that one way a plaintiff may establish this illicit pur..
pose is by adducing evidence that satisfies the criteria of its
decision in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra. Thus, because the
appellees had proved an "aggregate" of the Zimmer factors,
the Court of Appeals concluded that a discriminatory purpose
had been proved. That approach, however, is inconsistent
with our decisions in Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arling.
ton Heights, supra. Although the presence of the indicia
relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discrimina..
tory purpose, satisfaction of those criteria is not of itself suffi.,
cient proof of such a purpose. The so-called Zimmer criteria.
upon which the District Court and the Court of Appeals
relied were most assuredly insufficient to prove an unconstitu..
tionally discriminatory purpose in the present case.
First, the two courts found it highly significant that no
Negro had been elected to the Mobile City Commission,
From this fact they concluded that the processes leading to
nomination and election were not open equally to Negroes,
But the District Court's findings of fact, unquestioned on appeal, make clear that Negroes register and vote in Mobile
" without hindrance," and that there are no official obstacles in
the way of Negroes who wish to become candidates for election
to the Commission. Indeed, it was undisputed that the only
active "slating" organization in the city is comprised of Negroes. It may be that Negro candidates have been defeated,
but that fact alone does not work a constitutional deprivation.
Whit comb v. Chavis, supra, at 160; see Arlington Heights,
supra, at 266, and n. 15. 15
Second, the District Court relied in part on its finding that
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the state statute de~:~ignating the
functions of each Commissioner. 571 F. 2d, at 246. See n. 6, :supm.
1
~ There have been only three Negro candidates for the City Com..
tnil:!sion, all in 1973. According to the Di::;trict Court, the Negro candi..
dtttes "were young, inexperienced, and mounted extremely limited cam..
paigns" and received only "modest support from the black com,.
lll~nity. , .•" 423 F. Supp., at 388.
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the persons who were elected to the Commission discriminated
e,gainst Negroes in municipal employment and in dispensing
public services. If , that is the CMe, those discriminated
against may be entitled to relief under the Constitution, albeit
of a sort quite different from that sought in the present case.
The Equal Protection Clause proscribes purposeful discrimination because,of race by any unit of state government, whatever the method of its election. · But evidence of discrimination by white officials in Mobile is relevant only as the most
tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the constitutional
invalidity of the electoral system under which they attained
their offi:ces.
Third, the District Court and the Court of Appeals supported their conclusion by dqtwing upon the substantial history of official racial aiscrimination in Alabama. But past
discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn
governmental action ·that is not itself unlawful. The ultimate question remains · whether a discriminatory intent ha.s
been proved in a given case. More distant instances of official
discrimination in other cases are of limited help ·in resolving
that question.
Finally, the District Court and the Court of Appeals
pointed to the mechanics of the at-large electoral system itself as proof that the votes of Negroes were being invidiously
canceled out. But those features of that electoral system,
such as the majority vote requirement, tend naturally to disadvantage any voting minority, as we noted in White v.
Regester, b'Upra. They are far from proof of a racially discriminatory purpose or intent upon the part of the appellants
in this case.18
16
According to the District Court, voters in the city of Mobile are
represented in the state legi:slature by three state senators, any one of
whom can veto proposed local legislation under the existing courtesy
rule. Likewise, a majority of Mobile's 11-member House delegation can
prevent a local bill fl:om reaching the ffoor for debate. Unanimous
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For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It ·is so ordered.

approval of a lucal mea~ure by the city delegation, on the other hand,
virtually a:iHtlfP:i pa~;sagP . 423 F. Supp., at 397.
'TI'Iere wal:i evidence in tim, ca~c that t;Pveral propo~ul~ that would have
altered the form of Mobile'~; municipal government have bePn defeated
in the :state lPgl~lature, including at least one that would have permitwd
Mobile to govern itself through a mayor and city council with members
t•lec1Pd from individual dllitrict~; within the city. Whether it may be pot;sible ultimately to provP that !VIobile'~ present governmental and electoral
;,;yi-item ha~ been retamPd for a mr~ally discriminatory purpo:::e, we are in 11().
position now to ~ay.
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MR. Jus•rrcE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The City of Mobile, Ala., has since 1911 been governed by:
a City Commission consisting of three members elected by
the voters of the city at-large. The question in this case is
whether this at-large system of municipal elections violates ~
the rights of Mobile's Negro voters in contravention of fedI
eral statutory or constitutional law.
A"£.~_ L-......
The appellees brought this suit in the Federal District~' ~
Court for the Southern District of Alabama as a class ac.tion
~L
on behalf of all Negro citizens of Mobile. 1 Named as de- '-v
I
fendants were the city and its three incumbent Commis/sioners, who are the appellants before this Court. The
~1 .
complaint alleged that the practice of electing the City Com- ~
missioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of
Negroes in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Fifteenth Amendment. Following a bench trial, the District Court found
that the constitutional rights of the appellees had been violated, entered a judgmeut in their favor, and ordered that the

v ...

J-

1

Approximately 35.4% of the re::;idents of Mobile are Negro.
79 St<~t. 4:37, 4~ U. S. C. § 197a. The complaint also contained claims·
based on the First and Thirteenth Amendment::; and on 42 U. S. C. § 1983
and 42 U. S. C. § 1985 (3) . Tho::,-e claims have not been pl'e&ied in this
2

Court.
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City Commission be disestablished and replaced by a munic,
ipal government consisting of a Mayor and a City Council
with members elected from single-member districts. 423 F.
Supp. 384. 3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in
its entirety, Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F. 2d 238, agreeing
that Mobile's at-large elections operated to discriminate
against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, id., at 245, and finding that the remedy forn1Ulated by the District Court was appropriate. An appeal was
taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction, U. S. - . · The case was originally argued in the 1978 Term,
and was reargued in the present Term.
1[

In Alabama, the form of municipal government a city may
adopt is governed by state law. Until 1911 cities not covered
by specific legislation were limited to governing themselves
through a mayor and city counciU In that year, the Alabama Legislature authorized every large municipality to
adopt a commission form of government. 5 Mobile established its City Commission in the same year, and has maintained that basic system of municipal government ever since.
The three Commissioners jointly exercise all 'legislative,
executive, and administrative power in the municipality.
They are required after election to designate one of their
number as Mayor, a largely ceremonial office, but no formal
provision is made for a11ocating specific executive or administrative duties among the three.6 As required by the state
The District Court has st ayed its order~ pending disposition of the
present appeal.
4 Alabama Code , Chapter 11-43 (1975).
5 Act 281 , 1911 Alabama. Acts, at. 330.
6 In 1965 tl1e Alabama Legislature enactpd Act 823, 1965 Alabama
Acts, a.L 1539, § 2 of which d e~igna.ted ,;pecific administrative tasks to be
performed b y each Commissioner and provided tlmt the title of Mayor ·berotated. among the three. After t he pre~ent lawsuit was commenced, the8

·'
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1aw enacted in 1911, each candidate for the Mobile City Com·
mission runs for election in the city at-large for a term of
four years in one of three numbered posts, and may be elected
only by a majority of the total vote. This is the same basic
electoral system that is followed by literally thousands of
municipalities ·a nd other local governmental units throughout
the Nation.7
II
Although required by general principles of judicial admini~
tration to do so, Ashwander v. 1'VA, 297 U. S. 288, 347
(Brandeis, J., concurring) , neither the District Court nor the
Court of Appeals addressed the complaint's statutory claimthat the Mobile elect&a] 15ystem violates § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. Even a cursory examination of that
claim, however, clearly discloses that it adds nothing to the
appellees' complaint.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:
"No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or ap·
plied by any State or political subdivision to deny or
abridge the right of any citiztln of the United States on
account of race or color."
Assuming, for present purposes, that there exists a private
city of Mobile ·belatedly submitted Act 823 to the Attorney General of the
United States under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1§65. 42 U. S. C,
§ 197ac. The Attorney GenPral objected to the lPgislation on the ground
that the clty had not shown ti1at § 2 of the Act, would not have the effect
of abridging t.he right of NPgroet-> to vote . No suit iws been brought in
the District Court for the District of Columbia to seek clearance undeF
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act and, accordingly, § 2 of Act 823 is in
abeyance.
7
According to the 1979 MuniC'ipal Year Book, most municipalities of
over '25,000 people conducted at-largP elections of their city commissioners
or council mPmbers as of 1977. /d., at 98-99. It is rea~;onable to suppose
th~m an even larger majority of other municipalitic~ did so.

\
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right of action to enforce this statutory provision, 8 it is apparent
that the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that
of the Fifteenth Amendment,'0 and the sparse legislative history of § 2 makes clear that it was intended to have an effect
no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.
Section 2 was an uncontroversial provision in proposed
legislation whose other provisions engendered protracted dispute. The House Report on the Bill simply recited that § 2
"grants ... a right to be free from enactment or enforcement of voting qualifications ... or pract.ices which deny or
abridge the right to vote on account of race or color."
H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1965). See
also S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20
(1965). The view that this section simply restated the prohibitions already contained in the Fifteenth Amendment was
expressed without contradiction during the Senate hearings.
Senator Dirksen indicated at one point that all States, whether
or not covered by the preclearance provisions of § 5 of the
proposed legislation, were prohibited from discriminating
against Negro voters by § 2, which he termed "almost a rephrasing of the 15th [A]mendment." Attorney General
Katzenbach agreed. See Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., 208 (1965) .
In view of the section's language and its sparse but clear
legislative history, it is evident that this statutory provision
adds nothing to the appellees' Fifteenth Amendment claim.
We turn, therefore, to a consideration of the validity of the
8 Cf. Alleu v. State Board of Electious, 393 U. S. 544.
But see Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. "· Lewis, - - U. S. - , - ; To·ucheRoss & Co . v. Redington,- 1J. S. - , - .
9 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides:
"The right of the citizen,: of the United State:; to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United State:-; or by any State on account of raoe,
color, or previous condition of serviLude .."
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judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the
teenth Amendment.

5
Fif~

III
The Court's early decisions under the Fifteenth Amendment established that it imposes but one limitation on the
powers of the States. It forbids them to discriminate against
Negroes in matters having to do with voting. See Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 665; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S.
370, 389-390; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542,
555-556; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 217. The Amend ..
ment's command and effect are wholly negative. "The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon
any one," but has "invested the citizens of the United States
with a new constitutional right which is within the pro ..
tecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from
discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on ac..
count of race, color, or previous conditions of servitude." !d.,
at 217-218.
Our decisions, moreover, have made clear that action by a
State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, this Court struck
down a "grandfather" clause in a state c~nstitution exempting
from the requirement that voters be literate any person or
the descendants of any person who had been entiUed to vote
before January 1, 1866. It was asserted by way of defense that
the provision was immune from successful challenge, since a law
could not be found unconstitutional either "by attributing to
the legislative authority an occult motive," or "because of
conclusions concerning its operation in practical execution and
resulting discrimination arising . . . from inequalities naturally inhering in those who must come with~n the standard
in order to enjoy the right to vote." ld., at 359. Despite
this argument, the Court did not hesitate to hold the grandtather clause UllCOnstitutional, because it was not "possible to

,......
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djscover any basis in reason for the standard thus fixed than
the purpose" to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment. !d.,
at 365.
The Court's more recent decisions confirm the principle
that ra;cially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amenc!_ment violation. · In Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, the Court held that allegations of a
racially motivated gerrymander of municipal boundaries
stated a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. 'The constitutional infirmity of the state law in that case, according
to the allegations of the complaint, was that in drawing the·
municipal boundaries the legislature was "solely concerned
with segregating white and colored voters by fencing NegJ;"o
citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing
municipal vote." !d., at 341. . The Court made clear that in
the absence of su~ch an invidious purpose, a State is constitutionally free to redraw political boundaries in any manner it
chooses. ·Td., at 347.
In Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, the Court upheld
by like reasoning a state congressional reapportionment statute against claims that district lines had been racially gerrymandered, because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the legislature "was either motivated by racial considerations or in
fact drew the districts on racial lines"; or that the statute
"was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the
basis of race or place or origin." I d., at 56, 58. See also
. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S.
45; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 368, 275-277.
While other of the Court's Fifteenth Amendment decisions
have dealt with different issues, none has questioned the necessity of showi11g purposeful discrimination in order to show a
Fifteenth Amendment violation. The cases of Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, and Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, for
example, de.a lt with the question whether a State was so involved with racially discriminatory voting practices as toinvoke the Amendment's protection. Although their facts;:
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differed somewhat, the question in both cases was whether the
State was sufficiently implicated in the conduct of racially
exclusionary primary elections to make that discrimination an
abridgement of the right to vote by a State. Since the Texas
Democratic Party primary in Smith v. Allwright was regulated
by statute, and only party nominees chosen in a primary were
placed on the ballot for the general election, the Court concluded that the state Democratic Party had become the
agency of the State, and that the State thereby had "endorse[d], adopt[ed], and enforce[d] the discrimination
against Negroes practiced by a party." 321 U. S., at 664.
Terry v. Adams, supra, posed a more difficult question of
state involvement. The primary election challenged in that
case was conducted by a county political organization, the
Jaybird Association, that was neither authorized nor regulated
under state law. The candidates chosen in the Jaybird primary, however, invariably won in the subsequent Democratic
primary and in the general election, and the Court found
that the Fifteenth Amendment had been violated. Although
the several supporting opinions differed in their formulation
of this conclusion, there was agreement that the State was
involved in the purposeful exclusion of Negroes from participation in the election process.
The appellees have argued in this Court that Smith v.
Allwright and Terry v. Adams support the conclusion that the
at-large system of elections in Mobile is unconstitutional,
reasoning that the effect of ra-cially polarized voting in Mobile is the same as that of a racially exclusionary primary.
The ouly effect, however. of the exclusionary primaries that
offended the Fifteenth Amendment was that Negroes were not
permitted to vote in them. The difficult question was·
whether the "State haldl had a haud in" in the patent discrimination practiced by a nominally private organization.
Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S., at 473 (Frankfurter, J.,..
concurring) .
The answer to the appellees' argument is that, as the Dis-
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trict Court expressly found, their freedom to vote has not been
denied or abridged by anyone. The Fifteenth Amendment
does not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected, and
neither Smith v. Allwright nor 'Terry v. Adams contains any
implication to the contrary. That Amendment prohibits only
purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by govern~
mellt of the freedom to vote "on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." Having found that Negroes
in Mobile "register and vote without hindrance," the District
Court and Court of Appeals were in error in believing that the
appellants invaded the protection of that Amendment in the
present case.

IV
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court
that Mobile's at-large electoral system violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There remains for consideration, therefore, the validity of its judgment on that score.
The claim that at-large electoral schemes unconstitutionally
deny to some persons the Equal Protection of the Laws has
been advanced in numerous cases before this Court. That
contention has been raised most often with regard to multi~
member constituencies within a state legislative apportionment system. The constitutional objection to multimember
districts is not and cannot be that, as such, they depart from
apportionment on a population basis in violation of Reynolds
v. Simms, 377 U. S. 533, and its progeny. Rather the focus in
such cases has been on the lack of representation multimember districts afford various elements of the voting population
in a system of representative legislative democracy. "Criticism [of multimember districts] is rooted in their winnertake-all aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities . . . ,
a general preference for legislatures reflecting community interests as closely as possible and disenchantment with political parties a11d elections as devices to settle policy differences~

;,
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between contending interests." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
u. s. 124, 158-159.
Despite repeated constitutional attacks upon multimember
legislative districts, the Court has consistently held that they
are not unconstitutional per se, e. g., White v. Regester, 412
U. S. 755; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124; Kilgarin v.
Hill, 386 U. S. 120; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73; Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433. 10 We have recognized, however, that such legislative apportionments could violate the
Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to
minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic
minorities. See . White v. Regester, supra; Whitcomb v.
Chavis, supra; Burns v. Richardson, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey,
supra. To prove such a purpose it is not enough to show
that the group allegedly discriminated against has not elected
representatives in proportion to its numbers. White v. Regester, supra, at - ; Whitcorrib v. Chavis, supra, at-. A
plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was "conceived
or operated as [a] -purposeful device[] to further racial discrimination," Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149. This burden of proof is simply one aspect of 'the basic principle that
only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal ·Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See ·washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229; Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252; Personnel Adm'r of Massachusettlt
v. Feeney,- U. S. - .
In only one case has the Court sustained a claim that multimember legislative districts unconstitutionally diluted the
10 We have made cleat•, however, that it court in formulating an apportionment plan as an exerci~e of its equity power:; should, as a general
rule, not permit multimember legdative di~tricts. "[S]ingle-member districts are to be prE:>ferrrd in court-ordered legi;:;lative apportionment plans
unless "the court can articulate a 'singular combination of unique factors'
that jm;tifics a differe11t result. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 333.""
' Co-nnor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 415.
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voting strength of a discrete group. That case was White v.
Regester, supra. There the Court upheld a constitutional
challenge by Negroes and Mexican-Americans to parts of a
legislative reapportionnH:int plan '· adopted by the · State of
Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the multimember districts
for the two counties in which they resided minimized the effect
of their votes in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Court held that the plaintiffs had been able to "produce
evidence to support the finding that the political processes
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the group[s] in · question." 412 U. S., at
766-767. In so holding, the Court relied upon evidence in the
record that included a long history of official discrimination
against minorities as well as indift'erence to their needs and
interests on the part of white elected officials. ·The Court
also found in each county additional factors that restricted the
access of minority groups to the political process. In one
county, Negroes eft'ectively were excluded from the process
of slating candidates for the Democratic Party, while the
plaintiffs in the other county were Mexican-Americans who
"suffer[Pd] a cultural and language barrier" that made "participation in commullity processes extremely difficult, particularly . .. with respect to the political life" of the county.
!d., at 768 (footnote omitted).
We may assume, for present purposes, that an at-large election of city officials with all the legislative, executive and administrative power of the municipal government is constitutionally indistinguishable Irom the election of a few members
of a state legislative body in multimember districts-although
this may be a rash assumption. 11 But even making this as11 See W~e v. L-ipscomb, 435 U. S. 535, 549, and 550 (concurring
opinion) . It is noteworthy that a sy:;tem of at-large city elections in place
of elections of city official~ by the voter::; of small geographic ward:; was
universally heralded not many year:; ago a:; a praiseworthy and progres-

..
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sumption, it is clear that the evidence in the present case fell
far short of showing that the appellants "conceived or operated [a] purposeful device[] to further racial discrimination." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 149.
The District Court assessed the appellees' claims in light
of the standard that had been articulated by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485
F. 2d 1297. That case, coming before Washington v. Davis,
426 U. S. 229, was quite evidently decided upon the misunderstandillg that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory purpose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause-that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient.
See 485 F. 2d, at 1304-1305, and n. 16.12
In light of the criteria identified in Zimmer, the District
Court based its conclusion of unconstitutionality primarily on
the fact that no Negro had ever been elected to the City
Commission, apparently because of the pervasiveness of racially polarized voting in Mobile. The trial court also found
that city officials had not been as responsive to the interests
of Negroes as to those of white persons. On the basis of
these findings, the court concluded that the political processes in Mobile were not equally open to Negroes, despite its
seemingly inconsistent findings that there were no inhibitions
against Negroes becoming candidates, and that in fact N egroes had registered and voted without hindrance. 423 F.
Supp., at 387. Finally, with little additional discussion, the
District Court held that Mobile's at-large electoral system
sive reform of corrupt municipal government. See, e. g,, E. Banfield and
J. Wibon. City Politi(),.; 151 (1968). Compare, M. Srasongood, Lora! Governmrnt (1933): L. Steffen;;, The Shamr of the Citirs (1904).
12 Thi~ Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal::; in Zimme1' v. McKeithen on grounds other than those relied on by that court
and explicitly "without approval of tl1e constitutional view::; expre::;sed by
the Court of Appeals ." East Can·oll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424U. S. 636, 638 (pel' cw'iam) .
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was invidiously discriminating against Negroes in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.13
In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches only purposeful discrimination/4
13 The only indication given by the District Court of an inference that
there existed an invidious purpose was the following statement: "riJt is
not '' long l:ltep from the systematic exclusion of blacks from juries which
is itself such an 'unequal application of the law . . . as to show intentional discrimination,' Akins v. ·Texas. 325 U. S. 398, 404, ... to [tlle]
prese11t purpo::;e to dilute the black vote as evidenced in this case. There
is a 'current' condition of dilution of the black vote re:;ulting from
intentional :;tate legisla.tive inaction which is as effective as the intentional
state action referred to in Keyes [v. School District No . 1, Denver Colo.,
413 U. S. 189] ." 423 F. Supp., at 398.
What the District Court may have meant by this statement is uncertain.
In any event the analogy to the racially exclusionary jury cases appears
mistaken . Those case::; typically have involved a consistent pattern of
discrete official actions that demon:;trated almoot to a mathematical certainty that Negroes were being excluded from juries because of their
race. See Castaneda v. Pa1·tida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-497, and n. 17; Patton
v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 464; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 359;
Nol'l'is v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591.
If the District Court. meant by its statement tl1at the existence of the
at-large electorall:lystem was, like the systematic exclusion of Negroes from
juries, unexplainable on grounds other tl1an race, its inference i::; contradicted by the history of the adoption of that sy::;tem in Mobile. Alternatiwly, if the District. Court meant that the state legislature may be
pr&>"'tnned to have "intended" that there would be no Negro Commissioners, simply because that was a foreseeable consequence of at-large
voting, i~ a.pplied an incorrect legal standard. "'Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness
of conseque"nces. . . . It implies that the decisionmaker . .. selected or
reaffirmed a partirular course of action at least. in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."
Personnel Adrn'1· of Mass . v. J?eeney, U. S. - , (footnotes
omitted) .
14 The Court of Appt>als expre::;sed the view that the Di::;trict Court's
finding of di::;crimination in light of the Zimmer criteria was "buttressed,.
by the fact that the Attorney General had interposed an objection under

..
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but held that one way a plaintiff may establish this illicit pur~
pose is by adducing evidence that satisfies the criteria of its
decision in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra. Thus, because the
appellees had proved an "aggregate" of the Zimmer factors,
the Court of Appeals concluded that a discriminatory purpose
had been proved. That approach, however, is inconsistent
with our decisions in Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arling.
ton Heights, supra. Although the presence of the indicia
relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discrimina~
tory purpose, satisfaction of those criteria is not of itself suffi..
cient proof of such a purpose. The so-called Zimmer criteria
upon which the District Court and the Court of Appeals
relied were most assuredly insufficient to prove an unconstitu~
tionally discriminatory purpose in the present case.
First, the two courts found it highly significant that no
Negro had been elected to the Mobile City Commission.
From this fact they concluded that the processes leading to
nomination and election were not open equally to Negroes,
But the District Court's findings of fact, unquestioned on appeal, make clear that Negroes register and vote in Mobile
"without hindrance," and that there are no official obstacles in
the way of Negroes who wish to become candidates for election
to the Commission. Indeed, it was undisputed that the only
active "slating" organization in the city is comprised of Negroes. It may be that Negro candidates have been defeated,
but that fact alone does not work a constitutional deprivation.
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 160; see Arlington Heights,
supra, at 266, and n. 15. 15
Second, the District Court relied in part on its finding that
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the state statute de;ignating the
functions of each Commissioner. 571 F. 2d, at 246. See n. 6, s'Upra.
15 There have been only three Negro candidates for the City Com ..
mh;sion, all in 1973. According to the Dh;trict Court, the Negro candi..
dates "were young, inexperienced, and mounted extremely limited cam..
paigns" and received only "modest support from the black com..
(Il~n\ty ••.•" 423 F. Supp., at 388.
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the persons who were elected t~ the Commission discriminated
against Negroes in municipal employment and in dispensing
public services. If ' that is the case, those discriminated
against may be entitled to relief under the Constitution, albeit
of a sort quite different from that sought in the present case.
The Equal Protection Clause proscribes purposeful discrimination because.of race by any unit of state government, whatever the method of its election. · But ·evidence of discrimination by white officials it1 Mobile is relevant only as the most
tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the constitutional
invalidity of the electoral system under which they attained
their offices.
Third, the District Court and the Court of Appeals supported their conclusion by drawing upon the substantial history of official racial aiscrirnination in Alabama. But past
discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn
governmental action ·t hat is not itself unlawful. ·The ultimate question remains -whether a discriminatory intent haa
been proved in a given case. More distant instances of official
discrimination in other cases are of limited help in resolving
that question.
Finally, the District Court and the Court of Appeals
pointed to the mechanics of the at-large electoral system itself as proof that the votes of Negroes were being invidiously
canceled out. But those features of that electoral system,
such as the majority vote requirement, tend naturally to disadvantage any voting minority, as we noted in White v.
Regester, b'Upra. ·They are far from proof of a racially discriminatory purpose or intent upon the part of the appellants
in this case.16
10
According to the District Court, voters in the city of Mobile are
represented in the state legislatme by three state senators, any one of
whom can veto propo;;;ed local legislat-ion under the existing courtesy
rule. Likewise, a majority of Mobile't; 11-member House delegation can
prevent . a local biU fr.om reaching the floor for debate. Unanimous .

·.-~
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For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

approval of a local mea~me by the cJty deJrgation, on the other hand,
virtually a,;;;ure~ pao;sage. 423 F. Supp., at 397.
Tlicre wao; evidence in thi::; ca:>e that ~::~eventl propo~::~al:; that would have
altered the form of ::Vlobile'::; municipal government have been defeated
in the ~::~tate legii::ilature, including at lea::;L oue that would have permitted
Mobile to govern ito;elf through a. mayor and city council with members
elrcted from individual di:,;trict,; wit bin the city . Whether it may be po:,;~ihle ultimately to prove that :VIobil<' '~ present ~owrnmental and electoral
:sy~>tem ha::: bern retalnrd for a rarwlly disC'riminator~· purpo,;e, we are in n().
position now to say.
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.. ~

.. •

Supreme Court of the United States

Memorandum

Memorandum

-------------~---------· l9 ____f__o

-------------------------------------· 19--------

/-1 '/ -h ~~
Lvt-l-

1:,

J......~ h-t- L.

;._, ~w-f.-

f/~ #I.

1

#.

v/

~-

t;

}y I

J~ 1-l

~ -t

I

.) J d i -

J//;. .)

'

"'\ ""- •U.h. ;'~ ,·~· 1-:. r'l..,.
../.
':...)

J
f?s,
~ i

t-

-/L~

)L };":!.0~
fL .

J.-t--

/1-

J.-;
. f"

h

~:.

htJ?~~

~~B~.

~1-v~

~~~
---------

IL
.tr-t,r.~~

1 jv-L '.._

~~~
tv-<-

fJ: . . ~ .

'7 L );:._._.;.u_.

/..___

.-..I

~..,

I ••

·~'7

'J~v--

,t. "-ff.

f'- -8""""

!·f.A.t't.~.e{

;§npumr

<qonrt of tfrt ~b ;§tatts

'maslJingittn. ~. <!;.

20?~.;1

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL
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January 17, 1980

No. 77-1844 - City of Mobile v. Bolden
No. 78-357 - Y.lilliams v. Brown

Dear Potter:
In due course I will circulate a dissent
in these cases.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

February 6, 1980

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

/
Re:

No. 77-1844 - City of Mobile v. Bolden

Dear Potter:
I hope you do not mind if, for now, I await the
dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc: The Conference
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RE:
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February 27, 1980

Nos. 77-1844 and 78-357 - City of Mobile, Alabama
v. Bolden and Williams v. Brown, et al.

Dear Thurgood:
I join your dissent except the second paragraph
of Part IV.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference
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I contemplate adding to this opinion ,
in footnote or text and probably in considerably
expanded form, something along the lines of the
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Dear Potter:
Followina our recP.nt telephone talk, I have
discussed Thurqood's rtissent more carefullv with my clerk,
David Stewart.
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,.f

At my request hP. has reduced to a ~emorandum an
elaboration of the ideas suqqested in your draft footnotes,
toaether with some additional thouqhts. Thurqooo's dissent
is vulnerable when our decisions are properlv apolied, but it
is facially imoressive. I think it warrants a full response •
.....i}

Apart from my interest in havinq "mv side" prevail
in a case, I view this case as critical to the successful
governance of our cities. I know from experience that wholly
without reqard to minorities, a ward system is dP.trimental to
qood municipal qovernment. If a decision by this Court
required wards, and that they be shaped to assure
proportional representation of identifiable "POlitical
groupR", our cities could become junqles.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice
lfp/ss
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATm
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No. 77-1844
City of Mobile, Alabama, et al.,
Appellants
On Appeal from the United
v.
'
States ~urt o~ A~peals
.
L B ld
- for the F1fth C1rcmt.
W 11ey . o en et a1.
·[March - , 1980]
MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting.
In White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), this Court unanimously held the use of multimember districts for the election
of state legislators in two counties in Texas violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because,
based on a careful assessment of the totality of the circum-;
stances, they were found to exclude Negroes and MexicanAmericans from effective participation in the political processes in the counties. Without questioning the vitality of
White v. Regester and our other decisions dealing with challenges to multimember districts by racial or ethnic groups, the
Court today inexplicably rejects a similar holding based on
meticulous factual findings and scrupulous application of the
principles of these cases by both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals. The Court's decision is flatly inconsistent
with White v. Regester and it cannot be understood to flow
from our recognition in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229
( 1976), that the Equal Protection Clause forbids only purposeful discrimination. Both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals properly found that an invidious discriminatory purpose could be inferred from the totality of facts
in this case. The Court's cryptic rejection of their conclusions ignores the principles that an invidious discriminatory ~ _;f)~ "·U~
purpose can be inferred from objective factors of the kind
--~
relied on in White v. Regester and that the trial courts are in ~ ~
a special position to 1nake such intensely local appraisals. ,t.;_.,.y ,,., J ~
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Prior to our decision in White v. Reyester, we upheld a
number of multimember districting schemes against constitutional challenges, but we consistently recognized that such
apportionment schemes could constitute invidious discrimination "where the circumstauces of a particular case may
'operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of
racial or political clements of the voti11g population.' "
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 143 (Hl71), quoting from
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965); Burns v. R 'ichardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966). In Whitcomb v. Chavis,
supra, we noted that the fact that the number of mt>mbers of
a particular group who were legislators was 110t in proportion
to the population of the group did not prove invidious discriminatioJJ absent evidence and fi11dings that the members
of the group had less opportunity than did other persons "to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators
of their choice." Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149.
Relying on this principle. in White v. Reyester we unanimously upheld a district court's conclusion that the use of
multimember districts in Dallas and Bexar C'ounties in Texas
violated the Equal Protection Clause in the face of findings
that they excluded Negroes and Mexican-Americans from
effective participa.tion in the political processt>s. With respect
to the exclusion of ~egroes in Dallas County. "the District
Court first referred to the history of official racial discrimination in Texas, which at times touched the right of Negroes
to register and vote and to participate in the democratic
processes." White v. Reyester, 412 U. S., at 766. The District Court also referred to Texas' majority vote requiremeut
aud "place" rule. "11either in themselves improper nor invidious," but which "enhanced the opportunity for racial disflrimina.tion" by reducing legislative elections from the multimember district to "a head-to-head contest for each position.''
lb'id. We deemed more fumlamenta1 the District Court's.
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findings that only two Negro state representatives had been
elected from Dallas County since Reconstruction and that
these were the only two ~egroes ever slated by an organization
that effectively controlled Democratic Party candidate slating.
I d., at 766-767. We also noted the District Court's findings
that the Democratic Party slating organization was insensitive to the 11eeds and aspirations of the Negro community and
that at times it had employed racial campaign tactics to defeat
candidates supported by the black community. Based on this
evidence, the District Court concluded that the black community generally was "uot permitted to enter into the political
process in a reliable and meauingful manner." !d., at 767.
We held that "l t Jhese findings and conclusions are sufficient
to sustain the District Court's judgment with respect to the
Dallas multimember district and, ou this record, we have no
reason to disturb them." Ibid.
With respect to the exclusio11 of Mexican-Americans from
the political process in Bexar County, the District Court
referred to the continuing effects of a long history of invidious
discrimination against Mexican-Americans in education, employment, economics, health, politics, aud other fields. !d.,
at 768. The impact of this discrimination, coupled with a
cultural and language barrier, made Mexican-American participation in the political life of Bexar County extremely difficult. Only five Mexican-Americans had represented Bexar
County in the Texas Legislature since 1880 and the county's
legislative delegation "was insufficiently responsive to Mexican-American interests." I d., at 769. "Based on the totality of the circumstances, the District Court evolved its
ultimate assessment of the multimember district, overlaid,
as it was, 011 the cultural and economic realities of the
Mexican-American community in Bexar County and its relationship with the rest of the county." lb,id. "[F]rom its
own special vantage point" the District Court concluded that
tha multirnember district invidiously excluded Mexican-
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Americans from effective participation in the election of state
representatives. We affirmed, noting that we were "not
inclined to overtum these findings, representillg as they do a
blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the design
aud impact of the Bexar County multimember district in the
light of past and present reality, political and otherwise." !d.,
at 769-770.
II
In the itJStant case the District Court and the Court of
Appeals faithfully applied the principles of White v. Regester
in assessing whether the maintenance of a system of at~large
elections for the selection of Mobile City Commissiollers
deHied Mobile Negroes their Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment rights. Scrupulously adhering to our admonition that "r t] he plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to
support fiudings that the political processes leading to nominatiou and electiou were not equally open to participation by
the group in question." id., at 766, the District Court conducted a detail<:>d factual inquiry into the openness of the
candidate s<:>lection process to blacks. The court noted that
"Mobile blacks ·were subjected to massive official and private
racial discrimillation until the Voting Rights Act of H)65"
and that "r t l he pervasive effects of past discrimination still
substantially affects black political participation." 423 F.
Supp. 384, 387 (SD Ala. 1976). Although the District Court
noted that "[s]ince the Voting Rights Act of 1965. blacks register and vote without hindrance," the court found that "local
political processes are not equally open" to blacks. Despite
the fact that Negroes constitute more than 35%· of the popul~
tion of Mobile, no Negro has ever beell el<'ckd to the Mobile
City Commission. The plaintiffs introduced extensive cvi~
dence of severe racial polari~ation in voting patterns during
the 1960's aud 1970's with "white voting for white and black
for black if a white is opposed to a black" resulting in the
defeat of the black calHlidate or, if two whites are running,.
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the defeat of the white candidate most identified with blacks.

I d., at 388. Regressiou aualyses covering every city commission race in 1965 . 1960, and 1973, both the primary and general election of the county commission in 1968 and 1972,
selected school board races in 1962, 1966, 1970, 1972, and
1974, city referendums in 1963 and 1973. and a countywide
l<'gislative race in 1969 confirmed the existeuce of severe bloc
voting. ld., at 388- 389. Nearly every active candidate for
public office testified that because of racial pola.rization "it is
highly unlikely that anytime in the foreseeable future. under
tlw at-large system. that a black can be elected against a
while." I d., at 388. After single-member districts were
created in Mobil<' County for state legislative elections. "three
blacks of the pr0sent fourteen member Mobile County delegation have been elected." !d., at 389. Based ou the foregoing evidence. the District Court found "that the structure
of the at-large election of city commissioners combined with
strong racial polarization of Mobile's electorate contiu ues to
effectively discourage qualified black citizens from seeking
office or being elected thereby denyiug blacks equal access to
the slating or ca nclida te selection process." Ibid.
The District Court also reviewed extensive evidence that
the city commissioners elected under the at-large system have
not been responsive to the Heeds of the Negro community.
The court found that city officials have been unresponsive to
the interests of Mobile Negroes in municipal employment,
appointnwnts to boards and committees, and the provision of
municipal services in part because of "the political fear of a
white backlash vote when black citizens' needs are at stake."
!d. , at 392. The court also found that there is no clear-cut
state policy preference for at-large elections and that past discrimination affecting the ability of Negroes to register and to
vote "has helped preclude the effective participation of blacks
in the election system today." !d., at 393. The adverse
impact of the at-large election system on minorities was found
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to be enhanced by the large size of the citywide E>lection district. the majority vote requireme11t, the provision that ca11didates run for positions by place or number, and the lack of
any provision for at-large candidates to run from particular
geographical subdistricts.
After concluding its extensive findings of fact. the District
Court auJressE>d the question of the effect of Washington v.
Davis, 423 U. S. 229, on the White v. Regester standards. The
eourt concluded that thr requirement that a facially neutral
statute involve purposeful discrimination befon• a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause can be established was not
inconsistent with White v. Regester in light of the recognition
i11 Washi11gton v. Davis, supra, at 241-242. that the discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts. including the discriminatory impact of the
statutR. 423 F. Supp., at 398. After noting that "whenever
a redistricting bill of any type is proposed by a county delegation member, a major concern has centered around how many,
if any, blacks would be elected." id., at 397, the District Court
eoncludNl that there was "a present purpose to dilute the
black vote . . . resulting from intentional state legislative
inactio?t. . . ." 1d., at 398. Based on an "exhaustive analysis of the evidence in tlw record," the court held that "rt]he
plaintiffs have met the burden cast in White and Whitcomb,"
and that "the multi-mernber at-large election of Mobile City
Commissioners results in an unconstitutional clilutiou of black
voting strength." I d., at 402.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgmrnt in one of four consoliuated "dilution" cases decided on
tlw same day. Bolde·n v. Mob·ile, 571 F. 2d 238 (CA5 1978);
Nevett v. Sides, 571 F. 2d 209 (CA5 1978) (Nevett II);
Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. Shreveport, 571
F. 2<1 248 (C'A5 1978); 'l'homasville Branch of NAACP v.
Thomas County, Georgia, 571 F. 2d 257 (CA5 1978). In the
lead case of 1Vevett v. Sides, supra, the Court of Appeals held
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that under ·washington v. Davis, supra, and Arl·i ngton Heights

v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252
( 1977), "a showing of racially motivated discrimination is a
necC'ssary C'kment" for a successful claim of uncoustitutio11al
voting dilution under either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F. 2d, at 219, 220. The
court concluded that the standanJs for proving unconstitutional voting dilution outlilH'd in WhiteY. Regester were consistent with the requirement that purposeful discrimination be
shown because they focus on factors that go beyond a simple
showing that minorities are not represented in proportion to
their numbers in the general population. !d., at 219-2:20,
11. 13, 222-224.
Tn its decision in the instant case the Court of Appeals
reviewPd the District Court's findings of fact. found them not
to be clearly erroneous and held that they "compel thr inference that rMobile's at-large] system has been maintained
with tlw purpose of diluting the black vote. thus supplying
thP element of intent necessary to establish a violation of the
fourteenth amendment. Village of Arlington Heights Y. N!etropolitan Housing Developrnent Corp., 420 U. S. 2i)2 (1977) ;
lT'ashington v. Davis, 426 F. R. 229 (1976). aud the fifteenth
amendment. Wright Y. Rockefeller, 3761T. R. 52 (1964). " 571
F. 2cl. at 245. The court observed that the District Court's
"finding that the legislature was acutely conscious of the racial
consequences of its districting policies." coupled with the
attempt to assign different functions to each of the threP city
commissioners "to lock in the at-large feature of the scheme"
constituted "direct evidence of the intent behind the maintenancP of the at-large plan." Id., at 246. The Court of
Appeals concluded that "the district court has properly conductrd thr 'spnsitivf' inquiry into such circumstautial and
direct rvidrncc of intent as may be available' that a. court
must undertake in 'rciJetermining whether invidious cliseriminatory purpose \vas a motivating factor ' i11 the main.-
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tenance or enactment of a districting plan." Ib·id., quoting
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S., at 266.

III
The Court today confirms the holdings of the courts below
that maiuteuance of Mobile's at-large system for election of
city commissioners violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments only if it is motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose. The Court also apparently reaffirtHs the vitality of H'hite v. Regester and Whitcomb v. Chavis, which established the standards for determining whether at-large election
systems are unconstitutionally discriminatory. The Court
nonetheless casts aside the meticulous applica.tion of the principles of these cases by both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals in holding that the evidence they relied upon
"fell far short of showing" purposeful discriminatio11.
The Court erroneously suggests that the District Court
erred by considering the factors articulated by the Court of
Appeals in Zimmer Y. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297 (CA5 1973) ,
to determiuf' whether purposeful discrimination has been
shown. This remarkable suggestion ignores the facts that
Zimmer articulated the very factors deemed relevant by White
v. Regester and Whitcotnb v. Chavis-a lack of minority
access to the candidate selection process. unresponsiveness
of elected officials to minority interests, a history of discrimination , majority vote requireme11ts, provisions that candidates
run for positions by place or number, the lack of any provision
for at-large candidates to run from particular geographical
subdistricts-and that both the District Court and the Court
of Appea.Is considered these factors with the recognition that
they are relevant only with respect to the question whether
purposeful discrimination can be inferred.
Although the Court does acknowledge that "the presence
of the indicia relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence:
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of a discriminatory purpose," it holds that the evidence relied
upon by the courts below was "most assuredly insufficient to
prove an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose in the
present case." The Court apparently bases this holding on
the fact that there are no official obstacles barring Xegroes
from registering. voting, and running for office coupled with
its conclusion that none of the factors relied upon by the
courts below would alone be sufficient to support an inference
of purposeful discrimination. The absence of official obstacles
to registration, voting. and running for office heretofore has
never been deemed to insulate an electoral system from attack
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In White
Y. Regester, 412 V. S. 755. there was no evidence that Negroes
faced official obstacles to registration. voting, and running for
office, yet we upheld a finding that they had been excluded
from effective participation in the political process in violation of the Equal Protection Clause because a multimember
districting scheme. in the context of racial voting at the polls,
was being used invidiously to prevent Negroes from being
elected to public office. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S.
339 (1969). and Terry Y. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1~)53), we
invalidated electoral systems under the Fifteenth Amendment not because they erected official obstacles in the path of
Negroes registering, voti11g or running for office, but because
they were used effectively to deprive the Negro vote of any
value. Thus, even though Mobile's Negro community may
register a11d vote without hindrance, the system of at-large
election of city com missioners may violate the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments if it is used purposefully to exclude
~ egroes from the political process.
In conducting "an intensely local appraisal of the design
and imnact" of the at-large election scheme, White v. Regester, 412 U. S .. at 769. the District Court's decision was fully
consistent with our recognition i11 Washington v. Davis, 426
TT. S., at 242, .th~t "an invidious discriminatory purpose may
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often h<' inferr<'cl from the totality of thP relevant facts
including th<' fact. if it is true. that tlw law bPars more heavily
on one race than another." Although the totality of the facts
relied upon by the District Court to support its inference of
purposeful discrimination is even more comj)('lling than that
present in White Y. Regester, the Court today rejects the
inference of purposeful discrimi11ation apparently hecaUS('
each of the factors relied upon by the courts below is alonC'
insufficient to support the infen:'nce. The Court states that
the "fact [that ~egro candidates havC' been defeated] alone
does not work a constitutional deprivation.'' that l'viclCJlCC' of
the unresponsiveness of C'lectecl officials "is relevant only as
the most tenuous a11d circumstantial l'Vidcnce.'' that "tlw substantial history of official racial discrimination . . . ris l of
limited help." and that the fC'atures of the electoral system
that Pnhanc<' tlw disadvantages faced by a voting minority
"are far from proof of a racially discriminatory purpose." By
viewing each of the factors relied upon below in isolation. and
ignoring the fact that racial bloc voting at the polls makes it
impossible to elect a black commissioner under the at-large
system. the Court n'.iects the "totality of the circumstancC's"
approach vvC' endorsed in White v. Reoester, 412 LT. R.. at 7613770. Tr(Lshinglon "· Davis, 426 F. R.. at 241-242. and l 'illage

of Arlington Heir;hts "· Metropolitan Housi'II{J Development
Corp., 429 F. 8 .. at 266. and lC'aves the courts below adrift on
uncharted seas with rPspect to how to proceC'd on remancl.
Because I believe that the findi11gs of the District Court
amply support an inferencE' of purposeful discrimination in
violation of t}w Fourteenth and Fiftpenth Amendments, T
respectfully dissent.
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MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
a. 51~
The City of Mobile, Ala., has since 1911 been governed by
a City Commission consisting of three members elected by
the voters of the city at-large. The question in this case is
whether this at-large system of municipal elections violates
the rights of Mobile's Negro voters in contravention of fed!/'2(),2..1)
eral statutory or constitutional law.
The appellees brought this suit in the Federal District
6
Court for the Southern District of Alabama as a class action
on behalf of all Negro citizens of Mobile. 1 Named as des~f~ ~ fendants were the city and its three incumbent Commissioners, who are the appellants before this Court. The
complaint alleged that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of
Negroes in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965/
of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Fifteenth Amendment. Following a bench trial, the District Court found
that the constitutional rights of the appellees had been violated, entered a judgment in their favor, and ordered that the

~si~t

F~~~
tJ

we~

1

Approximately 35.4% of the residents of Mobile are Negro
79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S. C.§ 1973. The complaint abo contained chums
based on the First and Thirteenth Amendments and on 42 U. S. C. § 1983
and 42 U. S. C. § 1985 (3) . Those claims have not been pressed in this
Court.
'
2

r 4
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City Commission be disestablished and replaced by a municipal government consisting of a Mayor and a City Council
with members elected from single-member districts. 423 F.
Supp. 384. 3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in
its entirety, Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F. 2d 238, agreeing
that Mobile's at-large elections operated to discriminate
against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, id., at 245, and finding that the remedy formulated by the District Court was appropriate. An appeal was
taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction, U. S. - . The case was originally argued in the 1978 Term,
and was reargued in the present Term.

I
In Alabama, the form of municipal government a mty may
adopt is governed by state law. Until 1911 cities not covered
by specific legislation were limited to governing themselves
through a mayor and city counciJ.4 In that year, the Alabama Legislature authorized every large municipality to
adopt a commission form of government. 5 Mobile established its City Commission in the same year, and has maintained that basic system of municipal government ever since.
The three Commissioners jointly exercise all legislative,
executive, and administrative power in the municipality.
They are required after election to designate one of their
number as Mayor, a largely ceremonial office, but no formal
provision is made for allocating specific executive or administrative duties among the three. 6 As required by the state
~--The District Court has stayed its orders pending disposition of the
present appeal.
~Alabama Code, Chapter 11-43 (1975).
fi Act 281, 1911 Alabama Acts, at '330.
6 In 196o tne Alabama Legislature enacted Act
23 , 1965 Alabama
Acts, at 1539, '§ 2 of which designated specific aclminiHtrative ta~k~ to be
performed 'by each Commissioner and provided that the title of Mayor be
rotated among the tbree. After tbe present lawsuit wal:i commenced, tbe:
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law enacted in 1911, each candidate for the Mobile City Commission runs for election in the city at-large for a term of
four years in one of three numbered posts, and may be elected
only by a majority of the total vote. This is the same basic
electoral system that is followed by literally thousands of
municipalities and other local governmental units throughout
the Nation. 7

II
Although required by general principles of judicial administration to do so. Spector Motor Co. v. M cLaughli11, 323
U. R. 101, 105; Ashwander v. '/'VA, 297 U. S. 288, 347
(Brandeis, J., concurring), neither the District Court nor the
Court of Appeals addressed the complaint's statutory claimthat the Mobile electoral system violates § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. Even a cursory examination of that
claim, however, clearly discloses that it adds nothing to the
appellees' complaint.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:
"No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States on
account of race or color."
Assuming, for present purposes, that there exists a private
city of Mobile belatedly submitted Act 823 to the Attorney General of the
United States under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. of 1965. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c. The Attorney General objected to the legioilation on thr ground
that the city had not shown that § 2 of tho Act would not have tho effect
of abridging the right of Negroes to vote. No suit has been brought in
the District Court for the District of Columbia to seek clearance under
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act and, accordingly, § 2 of Act 823 1::, in
abeyance.
7
According to the 1979 :Municipal Year Book , mo ~t munici palities of
over 25,000 people conducted at-largr clrction ~ of their city rommi~><ioners
or council member,; as of 1977. !d., at 98-99. It is rra,;onablc to suppo;,e
than an even larger majority of other municipalitie~ did so.
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right of action to enforce this statutory provision, 8 it is apparent
that the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that
of the Fifteenth Amendment,O and the sparse legislative ·history of § 2 makes clear that it was intended to have an effect
no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.
Section 2 was an uncontroversial provision in proposed
legislation whose other provisions engendered ·protracted dispute. The House Report on the Bill simply recited that § 2
11
grants ... a right to be free from enactment or enforcement of voting qualifications ... or practices which deny or
abridge the right to vote on account of race or color."
H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1965). See
also S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 19- 20
(1965). ·The view that this section simply restated the prohibitions already contained in the Fifteenth Amendment was
expressed without contradiction during the Senate hearings.
Senator Dirksen indicated at one point that all States, whether
Qr not covered by the preclearance provisions of § ·5 of the
proposed legislation, were prohibited from aiscriminating
against Negro voters by § 2, which he termed 11almost a rephrasing of the 15th [A]mendment." Attorney General
Katzen bach agreed. SeeVoting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., 208 (1965).
In view of the section's language and its sparse but clear
legislative history, it is evident that this statutory provision
adds nothing to the appellees' Fifteenth Amendment claim.
We turn, therefore, to a consideration of the validity of the
Cf. Alleu v. State Board of Elect-ions, 393 U. S. 544. But see 'l'ransamerica Mortgag e Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, U. S. - , - ; 'l'ouche,Ross & Co. v. Redington, - U.S.-,-.
9 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides :
"The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account <Of race.
•colo-r, ·o-r previous condition of .servitude:"
8

-.
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judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the Fifteenth Amendment.

III
The Court's early decisions under the Fifteenth Amendment established that it imposes but one limitation on the
powers of the States. It forbids them to discriminate against
Negroes in matters having to do with voting. See Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S.
370, 389-390; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542,
555-556; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214. The Amendment's command and effect are wholly negative. "The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon
any one," but has "invested the citizens of the United States
with a new constitutional right which is within the protecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from
discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." !d.,
at 217-218.
Our decisions, moreover, have made clear that action by a
State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, this Court struck
down "grandfather" clause in a state constitution exempting
from the requirement that voters be literate any person or
the descendants of any person who had been entitled to vote
before January 1, 1866. It was asserted by way of defense that
the provision was immune from successful challenge, since a law
could not be found unconstitutional either "by attributing to
the legislative authority an occult motive," or "because of
conclusions concerning its operation in practical execution and
resulting discrimination arising ... from inequalities naturally inhering in those who must come within the standard
in order to enjoy the right to vote." /d., at 359. Despite
this argument, the Court did not hesitate to hold the grandfather clause unconstitutional, because it was not "possible to

a
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discover any basis in reason for the standard thus fixed than
the purpose" to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment. Id.,
at 365.
The Court's more recent decisions confirm the principle
that racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation. In Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, the Court held that allegations of a
racially motivated gerrymander of municipal boundaries
stated a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. The con~
stitutional infirmity of the state law in that case, according
to the allegations of the complaint, was that in drawing the
municipal boundaries the legislature was "solely concerned
with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro
citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing
municipal vote." Td., at 341. The Court made clear that in
the absence of such an invidious purpose, a State is constitutionally free to redraw political boundaries in any manner it
chooses. !d., at 347. 1 0
In Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, the Court upheld
by like reasoning a state congressional reapportionment statute against claims that district lines had been racially gerrymandered, because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the legislature "was either motivated by racial considerations or in
fact drew the districts on racial lines"; or that the statute
"was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the
basis of race or place or origin." ld., at 56, 58.'' See also
111 The Court. ha!; rr]watedly citrd Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 ll. S. H8,
for the prinriple that. an invidiou~ purpose mu ~t br adducpd to ~upport a
claim of uneon~titutionalit~·. Ser Persounel Adrnin'r of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 442 U. S. 25G, 272; Arlington Heights Y. Metropolitan £lousing
Corp., 420 U. S. 252, 265, 26G ; Washington \' .Davis. 426 11. S. 22D. 240.
11
Ma . .T ut-~TJ CB ::'llAHt;HALL hH H rl~cwhrrr dr::>r ribe>d the fair import of the
Gomillion Hml ·wright ta~r:<: " In the> two Fif'tPenth Amrndmrnt rrdi~tr iC't 
ing ('a::;r:<, Wright v . Rockefe/lel·, a76 11. S. 52 (HHH). and Oomillion \',
Lightfoot, ;3(i:3 l'. S. 14.S (1960), the Court ~uggr~tPd that I Pgi~latiw purJlO~<'" alom• i::; dt'!Prminatin•, although langua gr in both ca:<l'::! may be
i::;olatrcl tlutl Hcrm::; (o approve ;;ome inquiry into Pfi'rct in>'ofar a~ it ehH·i-
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Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S.
45; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 368, 275-277.
While other of the Court's Fifteenth Amendment decisions
have dealt with different issues, none has questioned the necessity of showing purposeful discrimination in order to show a
Fifteenth Amendment violation. The cases of Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, and Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, for
example, dealt with the question whether a State was so involved with racially discriminatory voting practices as to
invoke the Amendment's protection. Although their facts
differed somewhat, the question in both cases was whether the
State was sufficiently implicated in the conduct of racially
exclusionary primary elections to make that discrimination an
abridgement of the right to vote by a State. Since the Texas
Democratic Party primary in Smith v. Allwright was regulated
by statute, and only party nominees chosen in a primary were
placed on the ballot for the general election, the Court concluded that the state Democratic Party had become the
agency of the State, and that the State thereby had "endorse[d] , adopt[ed] , and enforce[d] the discrimination
against Negroes practiced by a party." 321 U. S., at 664.
T erry v. A dams, supra, posed a more difficult question of
state involvement. The primary election challenged in that
case was conducted by a county political organization, the
Jaybird Association. that was neither authorized nor regulated
under state law. The candidates chosen in the Jaybird primary, however, invariably won in the subsequent Democratic
primary and in the general election , and the Court found
that the Fifteenth Amendment had been violated. Although
the several supporting opinions differed in their formulation
of this conclusion, there was agreement that th e State was
dalt>R purpoHe." Beer \'. Uuited States, 425 U. S. 130, 1-!8 (;vi AHHA H LL, J .,
di;-;:;enling.)
The Court in t he ·w right cast' :d,;o rrjrrt<·d claim" ma<lr lll HIP r thP Equal
Protrction Clau:se of the Fourtrenth Amendment Srp p. - , 111jro ..
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involved in the purposeful exclusion of Negroes from par.
ticipation in the election process.
The appellees have argued in this Court that Smith v.
Allwright and Terry v. Adams support the conclusion that the
at-large system of elections in Mobile is unconstitu tiona!,
reasoning that the effect of racially polarized voting in Mobile is the same as that of a racially exclusionary primary.
The only characteristic. however, of the exclusionary primaries
that offended the Fifteenth Amendment was that Negroes were
not permitted to vote in them. The difficult question was
whether the "State ha[d] had a hand in" in the patent discrimination practiced by a nominally private organization.
Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S., at 473 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
The answer to the appellees' argument is that, as the District Court expressly found, their freedom to vote has not been
denied or abridged by anyone. ·· The Fifteenth Amendment
docs not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected, and
neither Smith v. Allwright nor Terry v. Adams contains any
implication to the contrary. That Amenrlment prohibits only
purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote "on account of race, color, or
previous condition of serviturle." Having found that Negroes
in Mobile "register and vote without hindrance," the District
Court and Court of Appeals were in error in believing that the
appellants invaded the protection of that Amendment in the
present case.

IV
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court
that Mobile's at-large electoral system violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There remains for consideration, therefore, the validity of its judgment on that score.
A
·-The claim that at-large electoral schemes unconstitutionally
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deny to some persons the Equal Protection of the Laws has
been advanced in numerous cases before this Court. That
contention has been raised most often with regard to multimember constituencies within a state legislative apportionment system. The constitutional objection to multimember
districts is not and cannot be that, as such, they depart from
appor·tionment on a population basis in violation of Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533. and its progeny. Rather the focus in
such cases has been on the lack of representation multimember districts afford various elements of the voting population
in a systeln of representative legislative democracy. "Criticism [of multimember districts] is rooted in their winnertake-all aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities . .. ,
a general preference for legislatures reflecting community interests as closely as possible and disenchantment with political parties and elections as devices to settle policy differences
between contending interests." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
u. s. 124, 158- 159.
Despite repeated constitutional attacks upon multimember
legislative districts, the Court has consistently held that they
are not unconstitutional per se, e. g., White v. Regester, 412
U. S. 755; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124; Kilgarin v.
Hill, 386 U.S. 120; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73; Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433. 1 ~ We have recogui2ed, however, that such legislative apportionments could violate the
Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to
minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic
minorities. See White v. Regester, supra; Whitcomb v.
Chavis, supra; Burns v. Richardson, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey,
1

~ vYo hnve made <·]par, howcv<·r, that a CO lll'l in formu .latmg an apportionment plan as an exercise of its equity powers should, as a general
rule, not permit multimember legislative districts. "[S]ingle-member districts are to be preferred in court-ordered legislative apportionment plaus
unless the court can articulate a 'singular combination of unique factors'
that jul:ltifies a different result. Mahan v. Ilowell, 410 U. S. ·315, 333.'''
Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S, 407, 415.
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supra. To prove such a purpose it is not enough to show
that the group allegedly discriminated against has not elected
representatives in proportion to its numbers. White v. Regester, supra, at - ; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at - . A
plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was "conceived
or operated as [a] purposeful device[ l to further racial discrimination," Whitcomb v. Chav'is, supra, at 149.
This burden of proof is simply one aspect of the basic principle that only if there is purposeful discrimination can there
be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229; Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252; Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts
v. Feeney, 442 r. fl. 256. The Court <·xplicitly indicated in
Washingto11 v. Davis that this principle appli<'s to claims of
racial discrimination affecting voting just as it does to other
claims of racial discrimination. Indeed, the Court's opinion
in that case viC'wed Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, as an apt
illustration of the principle that an illicit purpose must be
proved before a constitutional violation can be found. The
Court said:
"The rule is the same in other contexts. Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), upheld a ~ew York
congressional apportionment statute against claims that
district lines had been racial1y gerrymandered. The
challenged districts were made up predominantly of
whites or of minority races, and their boundaries were
irregularly drawn. The challengers did 110t prevail because they failed to prove that the ~ew York Legislature
'was either motivated by racial considerations or in fact
drew the districts on racial lines'; the plain tiffs had not
shown that the statute 'was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the basis of rae<' or place of
origin.' !d. , at 56, 58. The dissenters were i11 agreement that the issue was whetlwr the 'bou ndaries .. ,
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were purposefully drawn on racial lines.' !d. , at 67.' '
Washington 'i'. Davis, supra, at 240.
More recently, in Arlington I!eights v. M etropolitan Hous·ing
Corp., supra, the Court again relied on Wright v. Rockefeller
to illustrate the principle that "[p] roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose' is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protectio11 Clause." 429 U. S., at 252. Although dicta
may be drawn froln a few of the Court's earlier opinions suggestillg that disproportionate effects alone may establish a
claim of uncoHstitutional racial vote dilution. the fact is that
such a view is not supported by any decision of this Court. 13
More importantly. such a view is not consistent with the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as it has been understood in a variety of other contexts involving alleged racial
discrimination . Washinyton v. Davis, supra (employment) ;
Arlinyton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., supra
(zoning); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413
U. S. 189, 208 (public schools); Akins v. 'l'e::ras, 325 U. S. 398,
4:03-404 (jury selecti011).
t a The di~srnting opinion of MR. JuwrrcE MAHHHALL rc•acb: tht> Court!,;
opinion in Fort~>oll v. Dor~>e!J. :~79 U. S. 43a, to ;;ay that 11 claim of votl'
dilution undt>r tlw Equal ProtPction Clau~e could rr~t on rithpr di~crimi
uatory purpo~r or effect. !Jost. at. 5. In fac·t, tlw Court c•xpltcitly rrserved thit:' que:-;tion and rxprr~~ed no view eonrrrning it. That ea:;e involvrd :;olrly a claim, which t.IH• Court r!;'jeetPd, that a :-:tate lrgi;:;lativl'
apport ionmrn1 stat utr ereating :-;omr multimNnber di:;trict:-; wa,; con:;titutionall~· infirm on its facr . Although the Court. rrcognized tll<lt " dr~ig nedly
or otherwio;P," multimrmbC'r di~trirting ~chrmPs might, undPr tlw circums tance~ of n partiC'ular ca:;c', minimizP tlw voting strrngth of a raeial group,
an i~~nr a~ to tlw ronstitutionalit~· of :;uch an arraugl'ltll'Jit '' I w Ia,; uot
prr:-;entrd b~· thP record," and "our holding ha I cl] no ])('a ring 011 that
wholly :;C'pnmte quP:.:tion. " ld., al 439.
ThP phra:;p "d!;'t~ignPdly or otherwise" in which thi,.: di~t~l'ltt ing opinion
place::: so mueh :::tuck, wa::; rPpPatrd, abo in dictum , in Bums v. R.ichardsou,
3R4 U. S. n, 8R. But. the· ('Oilt\1 itutional challenge to the multimPmbrr
constituenrir:; f:nlecl in that c·a...:r becau~c' tlw plaintiff,; dPmon~tratrd
neither lli~>criminatory purpo~r nor effrct. ld ., at 88-~)0, and llll . 15 iUltL

115.
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In only one case has the Court sustained a claim that multi~
member legislative districts unconstitutionally diluted the
voting strength of a discrete group. That case was White v.
Regester, supra. There the Court upheld a constitutional
challenge by Negroes and Mexican-Americans to parts of a
legislative reapportionment plan adopted by the State of
Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the multimember districts
for the two counties in which they resided minimized the effect
of their votes in violation of the Fourtee11th Amendment, and
the Court held that the plaintiffs had been able to "produce
evidence to support the finding that the political processes
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the group [s] in question." 412 U. S., at
766-767. In so holding, the Court relied upon evidence in the
record that included a long history of official discrimination
against minorities as well as indifference to their needs and
interests on the part of white elected officials. The Court
also found in each county additional factors that restricted the
access of minority groups to the political process. ln one
county, ~egroes effectively were excluded from the process
of slating candidates for the Democratic Party, while the
plaintiffs in the other county were Mexican-Americans who
"suffer[ed] a cultural and language barrier" that made "participation in community processes extremely difficult, particularly . . . with respect to the political life., of the county.
Id., at 768 (footnote omitted).
White v. Regester is thus consistent with "the basic equal
prott>ction principle~ that the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.'' Washington v.
Davis, 426 F. S., at 240. The Court stated the constitutional question in White to be whether the "multimember
districts [ wPre I being 1tsed invidiously to minimi:w or cancel
out the voting strength of racial groups." White v. Ueyester,
81tpm, at 765 (emphasis added), strongly indicating that only
a purposeful dilution of the plaintiffs' vote would offPnd the

\

77-1844-0PINION

MOBILE v. BOLDEN

13

Equal Protection Clausc. 14 Moreover, much of the evidence
on which the Court relied in that case was relevant only for
the reason that "official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate
impact." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,
429 U. S., at 264--265. Of course, "[t]he impact of the official action-whether it 'bears more heavily on one race than
another,' Washington v. Davis, supra, at :242-may provide
au important starting point." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., supra, at 266. But where the character of a law is readily explainable on groumls apart from
race, as would nearly always be true where , as here, an entire
system of local governance is brought into question, disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and courts must
look to other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory
purpose. See ibid.; Washington v. Davis, supra, at 242.
We may assume, for present purposes, that an at-large election of city officials with all the legislative, executive and administrative power of the municipal government is constitutionally indistinguishable from the election of a few members
14 In C:ajlle!J v. G-ummi11g, 412 U. S. 735, a. eu;;e drcidrd t hP :same day as
'White v. Regester, 41:2 lT. 8. 755, tlw Court int(•rprPted both lfhite unci
the earlier vote dilu t.iou ca...;(•::; as turning on the rxi~knce of di,crimmatory

pllf]lOHC:

"Stale lrgisbt ive cli;;tricts ma~· be equal or Hubstantially equal in population and ,-;till IX' vuhwrable under the Fourteenth Amendment. A di~;
tricting statute ot.Iwrwi~c arerpt<tblr, may b(1 invalid bPeau~o it ['(•nc·p,.; out
a racial group ~o a.s to deprive them of their pn•-exiHti11g municipal vote.
Gomillion v. L~ghtfoot. 36..J. U. S. :339 (1960). A di~t riding plan may
crr:t((' mult im<·mhN diHI riel~ prrkctl~· aecl'ptablr undl'r <·qual population
stamlard::~, but invidiou~<ly di;;criminator~· b('c·nusP tl1('y an• employed "to
minimize or ratwel out tlw \·oting ~tr<•ngtb of racial or political eiPmPnts of
the voting population ." Fort:;on v. Dorsey, :~79 F S. 433, -l:{V (]965).
SE'e White v. Ilege:;ter, post, p. 755; Whitcomb r. ('havi8. -!.0;3 l '. S. l:24
( 1971) ; Abate v. Mundt, 403 U. 8., at 184, n. 2; B'Unt8 v. Rirhanl:;on,
38..J. U. S., at 88-89." Gnfney v. Cummings, supra, at 751 (rmplw~<i:s
added) .
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of a state legislative body in multimember districts-although
this may be a rash assumption. 1 5 But even making this assumption, it is clear that the evidence in the present case fell
far short of showing that the appellants "conceived or operated [a] purposeful device [] to further racial discrimination." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 149.
The District Court assessed the appellees' claims in light
of the standard that had been articulated by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485
F. 2d 1297. That case, coming before Washington v. Davis,
426 U. S. 229, was quite evidently decided upon the misunderstanding that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory purpose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause-that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient.
See 485 F. 2cl, at 1304-1305. and n. 16.1 "
In light of the criteria identified in Zimmer, the District
Court based its conclusion of unconstitutionality primarily on
the fact that no Negro had ever been elected to the City
Commission, apparently because of the pervasiveness of racially polarized voting in Mobile. The trial court also found
that city officials had not been as responsive to the interests
of Negroes as to those of white persons. On the basis of
these findings, the court concluded that the political processes in Mobile were not equally open to Negroes, despite its
15 See Wise v. Lipscomb, 435 U. S. 535, 549, and 550 (conC' urriug
opinion). It is noteworthy that a system of at-large city elections in place
of elections of city officials by the voters of small geograpl1ic wards was
univer ally heralded not many years ago as a praiseworthy and progressive reform of corrupt municipal government. See, e. g., E. Banfield and
J. Wibon, City Politics 151 (1963). Compare, M. Srasongood, Local GovifllmPnt (19:3;3); L. StPffcn~, The ShamE' of the Citie.:l (1904).
1 " Th::; Comt. affirmed the judgment of the Court of Apjw: tl~ iu Zimmer v. McKeithen on grounds other than those relied on by that court
and explicitly "without approval of the constitutional view::; exp r e~sed by
the Court of Appeals." East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. M ar8hall, 424.
U.S. 636, 638 (per curiam).

77-1844-0PINION
MOBILE v. BOLDEN

15

seemingly inconsistent findings that there were no inhibitions
against Negroes becoming candidates, and that in fact Negroes had registered and voted without hindrance. 423 F.
Supp., at 387. Finally, with little additional discussion, the
District Court held that Mobile's at-large electoral system
was invidiously discriminating against Negroes in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. 17
17

The only indication given by the DiHtriet Court or Ull infrrcnce that
there existed an invidious purpose was the following statement: "riJ t is
not a long step from the systematic exclusion of blacks from juries which
is itself such an 'unequal application of the law . . . as to show intentional discrimination ,' Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 404, . .. to [the]
prrsent purpose to dilute the black vote as evidenced in this case. There
is a 'current' condition of dilution of the black vote resulting from
intentional sta te legislative inaction which is as effective as the intentional
state action referred to in Keyes [v. School District No.1, Denvet Colo.,
413 U. S. 189] ." 423 F. Supp., at 398.
What the District Court may have meant by this sta tement is uncertain.
In any event the analogy to the racially exclusionary jury cases appears
mistaken. Those cases typically have involved a consistent pattern of
discrete official actions that demonstrated almost to a mathematical certainty that Negroes were being excluded from juries because of their
race. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-497, and n. 17 ; Patton
v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 464; Piette v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 359;
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591.
If the District Court meant by its statement that the existence of the
at-large electoral system was, like the systematic exclusion of Negroes from
juries, unexplainable on grounds other than race, its inference is contradicted by the history of the adoption of that system in Mobile. Alternatively, if the District Court meant that the state legislature may be
presumed to have "intended" that there would be no Negro Commissioners, simply because that was a foreseeable consequence of at-large
voting, it applied an incorrect legal standard. "'Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness
of consequences. . . . It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."
Personnel Adtn'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 (footnotes
omitted).
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In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches only purposeful discrirnination/ 8
but held that one way a plaintiff may establish this illicit purpose is by adducing evidence that satisfies the criteria of its
decision in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra. Thus, because· the
appellees had proved an "aggregate" of the Zimmer factors,
the Court of Appeals concluded that a discriminatory purpose
had been proved. That approach, however, is inconsistent
with our decisions in Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arlington Heights, supra. Although the presence of the indicia
relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discriminatory purpose, satisfaction of those criteria is not of itself sufficient proof of such a purpose. The so-called Zimmer criteria
upon which the District Court and the Court of Appeals
relied were most assuredly insufficient to prove an UJJconstitutionally discriminatory purpose in the present case.
First, the two courts found it highly significant that no
Negro had been elected to the Mobile City Commission.
From this fact they concluded that the processes leading to
nomination aud election were not open equally to Negroes.
But the District Court's findings of fact, unquestioned on appeal, make clear that Negroes register and vote in Mobile
"without hindrance," and that there are no official obstacles in
the way of Negroes who wish to become candidates for election
to the Commission. Indeed, it was undisputed that the only
active "slating" organization in the city is comprised of Negroes. It may be that Negro candidates have been defeated,
but that fact alone does not work a constitutional deprivation.
1 ~'fhc Court of Appeal,; expn•,;,;ed the view thai
tiH' Ditriet C'ourl'::;
finding of discrimination in light of the Zimmer criteria was "buttressed"
by the fact that the Attorney General had interposed an objection under
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the state statute designating the
functions of each Commissioner. 571 F . 2d, at 246. See n . 6, supra
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Whitcomb v. Chavis, supm, at 160; see Arlington Heights,
supra, at 266, and n. 15.10
Second, the District Court relied in part on its finding that
the persons who were elected to the Commission discriminated
against Negroes in municipal employment and in dispensing
public services. If that is the case, those discriminated
against may be entitled to relief under the Constitution, albeit
of a sort quite different from that sought in the present case.
The Equal Protection Clause proscribes purposeful discrimination because of race by any unit of state government, whatever the method of its election. But evidence of discrimination by white officials in Mobile is relevant only as the most
tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the constitutional
invalidity of the electoral system under which they attained
their offices.~ 0
Third, the District Court and the Court of Appeals supported their conclusion by drawing upon the substantial history of official racial discrimination in Alabama. But past
discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn
governmental action that is not itself unlawful. The ultimate question remains whether a discriminatory intent has
been proved in a given case. More distant instances of official
discrimination in other cases are of limited help in resolving
that question.
Finally, the District Court and the Court of Appeals
There> haVP bee>n on!~· thrPe Nrgro candidate~ for thr City Comall in 197:3. According to thr Di~trict Court, the Negro candidatrs
"were> young, iu<•xperiPnccd, and mounted extremely limitrd campaign~"
and rcrei,·ed only "mocle~t ~upport from the I.Jlack community... .' ' 423
F. Supp., at 388.
0
" Among tlw difticulti!'>. with tlw District Court.'~< vit•w of the Pvidence
Wal< it~< failure to identify tlw ,.:tate ofliciab who:;e intrnt it con~idrrrd relPvant in assr,;,.~ing the invidiou:<JH'"" of lVIobile's sy:;;trm of g;ovrrnmt•nt. To
the extent. that the> inquiry ,.;hould properly focus on tlw ~tatl' lqz;i~lature,
Etee n. 21 , iujro, the a<·tiou,.: of unre>lrtted govcmmental oJ!ieiab would be
of cotn"He, of quc~tionablc rdevance..
10

mis~iOll,
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pointed to the mechanics of the at-large electoral system itas proof that the votes of Negroes were being invidiously
canceled out. But those features of that electoral system,
such as the majority vote requirement, tend naturally to disadvantage any voting minority, as we noted in White v.
Regester, supra. They are far from proof of a racially discriminatory purpose or intent upon the part of the appellants
in this case. 21
B
We turn finally to the arguments advanced in Part I of
MR. JusTiCE MAR~HALL's dissenting opinion. Tlw theory of
this dissenting opinion-a theory much more extreme than
that espoused by the' District Court or the Court of Appealsappears to be that every "political group, " or at least every
such group that is in the minority, has a federal constitutional right to elect caudidates in proportion to its numbers.
Moreover, a political group's "right'' to have its candidates
elected is said to be a "fundamental interest.' ' the iJlfringement of which may be established without proof that a State
has acted with the purpose of impairing anybody's access to
the political process. This dissenting opinion finds the
~;elf

21 Accord in~< to i hr Di~t rieL Court, voters in tlw C'il~· of \lohile arc
represented in the state legislature by three state senators, any one of
whom can veto proposed local legislation under the existing courtesy
rule. Likewise, a majority of Mobile's 11-member House delegation can
prevent a local bill from reaching the floor for debate. Unanimous
approval of a local meusure by the city delegation, on the other hand,
virtually a~sures pa ~sagc. 423 F . Supp., at 397.
There was evidence in this case that several proposals that would have
altered the form of Mobile's municipal government have been defeated
in the state legislature, including at least one that would ha.ve permitted
Mobile to govern itself iluough a mayor and city council with members
elected from individual districtf' within the c·ity. Whrther it may be possible ultimately to prove that Mobile's present governmental and electoral
system has been retained for a racially discriminatory purpose, we are in no.
position now to say.
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"right'' infringed in the present case because no Negro has
been elected to the Mobile City Commission.
Whatever appeal the dissenting opinion's view may have
as a matter of political theory, it is not the law. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment docs not
require proportional reprt>sen tation as an imperative of political organization. The entitlement that the dissenting opinion assumes to exist simply is not to be found in the Coustitution of the United States.
It is of course true that a law that impinges upon a fundamental right t>xplicitly or implicitly secmt>d by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional. See Shapiro v.
Thompson, 3~)4 U. S. 618, 634, 638; id., at 642-644 (concurring opinion). See also San A11tonio Ind. School D'islr'ict v.
Rodriyuez, 411 U. S. 1, 17. 30-32. But plainly "li] t is not
the province of this Court to create substantive coustitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws," id., at 33. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74;
Da11dridye Y. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485. Accordingly,
where a state law does not impair a right or liberty protected
by the Constitution, there is no occasion to depart from "the
settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislat [iou j . , .
involving questions of economic and social policy." San Antonio Ind. School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 33. 22
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL's dissenting opinion would discard
these fixed principles in favor of a judicial inventiveness that
would go "far toward making this Court a 'super-legislature.' "
Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 655, 661. We arc not free to
do so.
Almost a hundred years ago the Court unanimously held
22 Tlw pn•:-<umption of eon~titutional validity that nndnli<'" tlw sl'ltled
mode of n·viPwing lt-gi"lation disapprars, of cour:-;r, if the law tiiHl<·r eonsideration rreutr..- rlas:<<'~ that, in u constitutiollal s<>nse, an• inh('l'l'lltly
"HUSJH:'Ct.' '
Srr Stmuder \', West Viroinia, 100 n. S. :m~ ; t-IP(:' also Lockport v. C'itizens fo1' ('ommunity Action , 430 U. H. 2.'il:l ; MfLaughlin v.

Flor1:da, 879 U. S. 184.
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that "the Constitution of the United States does not confer
the right of suffrage upon any o11e . . . . " .Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178. See Lassiter v. Northampton County
Bd. of Elections, 360 "C. S. 45. 50-51. It is for the States "to
determine the conditio11s under which the right of suffrage
may be exercised . . . , absent of course tlw discrimination
which the Constitution condemns." ibid. It is true, as the
dissenting opinion states. that the Equal Protection Clause
confers a substantive right to participate i11 elections on an
equal basis with other qualified voters. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330. 336; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 F. S. 533, 576.
But this right to equal participation in the electoral process
does not protect any "political group,'' however defined , from
electoral defPat. ~a
The dissenting opinion erroneously discowrs the asserted
entitlement to group representation within the "one personone vote" principle of Reynolds v. Sims, supra, and its pro2 " The bn:<ir fallacy in thl' di~~ent ing opinion'~ t bear~· i" illu~t rat rd by
analogy to n defendant':< right under the Sixth and Fourte(•nth Amt'ndment:; to :t trial b~· a. jur~· of hi~ JWrr;; in a criminal ra . ,r. St·r Du11ran v.
Louisiana, :~01 P . S. 1-!5. That. right, rxpre"',;l~ · ('Onfrrrrd b~· thl' Constitution, is c<·rtainly '·fundamrntnl" 11-'i that word i" ll~<·d in tlw clil:'~Pnting
opinion . l\forrowr, undrr t]l(' Eqwtl Protretion C'lausP. :t dl'fendant has
fl right. to rrquire that the Stat.r not rxcluclr from tlw jm~· mrtnb(·r~ of his
race. Srr Ca~taneda Y. Partida, 4:~0 U. S. 4112, 49:3. But "I fjainH'"" in
Sl'leetion ha:-; nevrr bem hrld to require proportional rrpr<'~Pntntion of
mc<'s upon a jury," Akins "· Texas. :325 U . S. 39R, 40:3; nor ha,; the defendanL m•~· " right. to clPill:tllcl that nwmbPr~ of hi.- r:.t<'(' be included;"
Alexander Y. Lo'Uisiana. 405 U. S. 625, ()2~-G29. The ab~<t'IH'P from a. jury
of prr::<onH ])('longing to racial or otlwr cognizable groups oftpnd~< thl' Constitution only '·if it rrsult~ from purpo~rful cli;;crimiuat iou." Castaneda v.
Partida , supra. :1t 493. S<'P Alexander \', Lousiana. supm; ~<<'<' al~<o Washington \' . Davis, -l2(i C S. 229. :289-240. Thu,;, lh<' fact that then' i"' a
con::<tit.utional right. to a sy"'trm of jury Rdection that i:s not purpo~rfully
exclusionar~· tlop,; not rntail a right. to a jury of an.v partirnlar ra<·ial
composition. Likewit<P, thr fart that thr Equal Protection Clau:-;p <'onft•r;;
a right. to participalr in elect ion · on an equal ba~i~< with other qualifird
voters doc~ noL entail LL right to haw one';; candidate;; Jll'<'Yail.

'.
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geny. 2 ' Those cases established that the Equal Protection
Claus(\ guarantees the right of each voter to "have his vote
weighted equally with those of all other citizens." /d., at
576. The Court recognized that a voter's right to "have an
equally effective voice" in the election of representatives is
impaired where representation is not apportioned substantially on a population basis. In such cases. the votes of persons in more populous districts carry less weight than do
those of persons in smaller districts. There can be, of course,
no claim that the "one person-one vote'' principle has been
violated in this case, because the city of Mobile is a unitary
electoral district and the Commission elections are CO!l(lucted
at-large. It is therefore obvious that nobody's vote has been
"diluted'' in the sense in which that word was used in the
Rey11olds case.
The dissen tillg opinion places an extraordinary interpretation on these decisions, au interpretation not justified by Reynolds v. Sims itself or by auy other decision of this Court. It
is, of course, true that the right of a person to vote on an
21 Tlw di~:::enting opinion abo I'Pii(•R upon srvrral dP<'i~ion;:; of this Court
that haw hrld ('Onstitutioually invalid variou,.; votrr Pligibility rrquiremellt ~: Du1111 v. Blumstei11, 405 U. S. 380 (lrngth of m<id(•nec n·quircmrnt.); Evans v. Comman, 3~)8 U. S. 419 (exclusion of re~ident military
per,.;omwl); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 (prop(l'rty or :statu,; requirPment); Harpel' v. Virginia Hoard of l?lectio11s. :~s:~
U. S. 663 (poll tax r<'quirPmen1). But thPr<' i~ in thi~ cao;p no attack
whatever upon :my of the votPr eligibilit~· rPquirPmcnts in :VIobilP. Nor
do tho cited cas<·~ eontain implieit. support for thP po::;ition of the di;;.,rnting opinion. The~· ,.:bnd ,;imp!~· for thr proposition that ·'if :L ehaliPnged
state sta tutf' grants t.hr right to vott> t.o somf' bona fide re,.;idput~ ol' n·quisit e age and citizf'nshp and deuif's the fmnrhi::;P to ot lwrs, the Court. mu,.:t
det<·rminc wlwthf'r tlw l'Xclu:;ions are neees:;ary to JH'OlllOtl' a eompf'lling
stain intpn•,.;t .." Kmmcr \'. ['nion Free School District. IJU/JI'a.• a.(, 527.
IL i» ditlicult to ]lf'n·<·ive :tn~· similarit~· lwtwpen thP rxrludecl p<'r,.:on's
right to f'qual p]p('(oral participation in the ei(('d ra,.;Ps, and thl' right
as,.:ertcd hy tlw dis::;Pnting opinion in the prPscnL (':t,.;(•, a.,.;idl' from t be fact
that they both in ,;omc way im·olvc voting

77-1844-0PINION
1\IOBILB v. l30LDEN

equal basis \vith other voters draws much of its significance
from tho political associations that its exercise reflects. but
it is an altogethe1· different matter to concluclf' that political
groups themselves have an independent constitutional claim
to r<>pn'sentation.~" And the Court's df'cisiotts hold squarf'ly
that they do not. Rce Cnited Jewish Organizations\'. Carey,
430 U. R. 144. 166-167; id., at 170-180 (concurring opinion);
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 lT. R. 149-150. 153-154. 156-157;
'White v. Regester, 412 F R. 755. 765-766.
ThP fact is that the Court has sternly set its facr against
the claim. however phrased, that the Constitution somehow
guarante<>s proportional r<>presrntation. In ·whitcomb v.
Chavis, 493 U. 8. 124. the trial court had found that a multimember state legislative district had invidiously deprived
Negroes and poor persons of rights guaranteed them by tho
Constitution. notwithstanding the abseuce of any eviuencc
whatever of discl'imination against them. Reversing the trial
court, this Court said:
"The District Court's holding. although on the facts of
implication~ of fhr di~~rnf ing opinf hrory of group rrpr<':<rnfntion could rationall~· br mhirwd. fndrPd,
crrtnin prrliminar~· 111'ncticnl qur~tion" inml!:'diatrl~ · come to mind: Can
on!~· mrmhrr,; of a minority of 11w voting population in a pari ieular llHini<'ipalit~· br mrmbrr~ of n "political group?" How lari!;P mu"i a '·group"
br to bt' a "political group?" Cau an~· "group" cnll it~rlf a '·polifieal
group?" If not, who i:< to ~n.~· which "gronp::<" nrr ·'polifieal group;:?"
Can a qualifird votrr lwlong fo morfl than OJH• ''politir<il group'?" Can
ihrrr bP mon• than ont• "politic<ll group" nmong whitr votrr:< (e. o.. Jri~h
Ameriran. If.alinn-Arnerican, Poli"'h-Amcrira.n, .T<·w,;, Cal holit·"' · Protf'stnnf~) '! Can ih<'n' be morP Ihan one "politiral group " among nonwhilo
voter:-~? Do the an~<wrr~ to an~· of the:-;r qur,;tion" drprnd 11pon th<• particular drmographir compo,;ifion of :1. givf'n cify? l'pou ill(' tofal ::;izc
of it.-; voting population'! Upon thr sizr of it:< gove-rning body'! Fpon its
form of govrrnmrnt? Upon ifs hi~<tory'! It~< gPographie locafion? The
faeL that <'\'Pn thr,;e preliminnr~· qur::;tion::; may hr larw·l~· un:tnt<\\'c•rable
"ngg<•sf:; "omr of ihr eon<·f'pfual aml pmrfieal fallaciP,.: in th<· t·on::<fitutional t.heOt·~· r,;pousl'd b~· thP di~~Pnt.ing opinion , putting fo onr ~id(l the
total absenec of ::;npport for tl111t fhcory in t.110 Cou~titution it.~!' Ir.
2 r.

It i" difficult to prrrrin• how t hr

ion'~

I

I
I
I

!
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this case limited to guaranteeing one racial group repretientation, is not easily contained. It is expressive of the
more general propositio11 that any group with distinctive
interests must be represented in legislative halls if it is
numerous enough to command at least 011e seat and repretients a majority living in an area sufficiently compact to
constitute a single-member district. This approach
would make it difficult to reject claims of Democrats, Republicans, or members of any political orgaHization in
Marion County who live in what would be safe districts
in a single-member district system but who in one year or
another, or year after year, are submerged in a one-sided
multi-member district vote. There are also union oriented workers, the university community. religious or
ethnic groups occupying identifiable areas of our hetervgeneous cities and urban areas. Indeed, it would be
difficult for a great many, if not most, multi-member districts to survive analysis under the District Court's view
unless combined with some voting arra.ngemen t such as
proportional representation or cumulative voting aimed
at providing representation for minority parties or in tcrtsts. At the very least, affirmance of the District Court
would spawn endless litigatiou conceruing the multimember district systems now widely employed iu this
oountry." Wh·itcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 156- 157 (footnotes omitted).
·

v

For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re: No. 77-1844, City of Mobile v. Bolden

I

have read the Court opinion in this case.

I do not

believe that it should cause problems for Fullilove. The Court's
first

constitutional

demonstrate

holding

is

a violation of the

that

intent must

be

Fifteenth Amendment.

shown

to

Fullilove

will not deal with the Fifteenth Amendment.
The Court reiterates that intent must also be shown to
establish a viol at ion of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

Of course,

this is not new. In his dissent in Fullilove Justice Stewart may
well contend that the legislative history of the set-aside does
not

demonstrate

intentional

discrimination

against

minority

2.

contractors. The response would not be to challenge use of the
"intent"

standard;

rather

you

could

conclude

that,

given

the

deferrence that must be afforded Congress because of its powers
under the enforcement clauses of the post-Civil War Amendments,
there

is

enough

evidence

for

this

Court

to

accept

Congress'

judgment that intentional discrimination existed.
Finally,

the

Court

in Mobile

rejects

the

claim that

there is any right to proportional representation guarenteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. This is perfectly consistent with your
view

in

Bakke

that

the

University

could

not

set

aside

a

percentage of seats simply on the basis of racial preference.

I

see nothing in the Mobile opinion that is inconsistent with your
view

in Fullilove

that

percentages may

be

used

to

redress

a

proven constitutional violation.
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MR. Jus·rtCJO MAitSHALL, with whom MR. JusTICE BREN- {
joins, dissenting.
~
The American ideal of political equality, conceived in the ,- •
earliest days of our colonial existence and fostered by the ~~ :
/ egalitarian language of the _D~cla:atim~- of ~ndependence, ~could not forever tolerate the himtat1on of the nght to vote td
white propertied males. Our Constitution has been amended
_ :\
-six times in the tnovement toward a democracy for more than
7
the few/ and this Court has interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to provide tha.t "a citizen has a constitutionally
protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis
with other citizens it1 the jurisdiction," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330, 336 ( 1972) . The Courtjs decision today is in a
different spirit. The Court concludes that, in the absence of ~~~
proof of intentional discrimination by the State, the right to
~
vote provides the politically powerless with nothing more than
• Lii""'
the right to cast meaningless ballots.
'"
~.,- _J.,.,

J

·r;(
LIAA

NAN*

#

r' .. -_

*MR. Jus•rrcE BRENNAN joins all of this opinion hut the Recond
J graph of Part IV.
l U, S. Const., Amdts. 15, 17, 19, 23; 24, 26,

,'

pa~~ ~
~

,
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The District Court in both of these cases found that the
challenged multimember districting schemes unconstitutionally
diluted the Negro vote. These factual findings were upheld
by the Court of Appeals. and the majority does not question
them. Instead, the Court holds that districting schemes do
not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is proved that
they were enacted or maintained for the purpose of minimizing or canceling out the voting potential of a racial minority.
The Court requires plaintiffs in vote-dilution cases to meet
the stringent burden of establishing discriminatory intent
within the meaning of Washington '. Da.vis, 426 U. S. 229
(1976); rillage of Arhngton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977); and Personnel
Admimstrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979). In
my view. our vote-dilution decisions require only a showing of
discriminatory Impact to justify the invalidation of a multimember districting scheme, and, because they are premised
on the fundamental interest in voting protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. the discriminatory-impact standard
adopted by them is unaffected by Washington v. Davis, supra,
and its progeny. Furthermore, an intent reqUirement is
inconsistent with the protection against denial or abridgement
of the vote on account of race embodied in the Fifteenth
Amendment and in ~ 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U. S. C. ~ 1973.2 If, however, proof of discriminatory intent
is now to be necessary to support a vote-dilution claim, 1
would impose upon the plaintiffs a standard of proof less rigi,d
than that provided by Penwnnel Administrator of Mass. v.
Feeney, b'Upra.

I
The Court does not dispute the proposition that multimem%I agree w1th the Court, see ante, at 3-5, that th<> prolnb1tion on denial
or infrmgement or the right to vote contained m § 2 of the Votmg Right~
Act, 42 U. S. C § 19i:3 , contami:l the sa.mt> ~t.a ndard at-: the Fifteenth
Amendment . 1 d1.~agret> with the majority's construc110n or that Amendment, however. See Part II, t1tfra.

77-1844 & 78-357-DISSENT

MOBILE v. BOLDEN

3

ber districting can have the effect of submerging electoral
minorities and overrepresenting electoral majorities. 3 It is
for this reason that we developed a strong preference for
a The Court does not quarrel with the generalization that. in many instances an I.'IPctoral minority will far!.' worsl.' undl.'r multimrmber districting
than under smgll.'-member districting. Multimf'mber di~triCting greatly
enhances tho opportunity of the majority political factiOn to elect all
representatives of the district. In cont.ra<;t, if thr multimember district is
divided into several single-mE-mber districts, an electoral minonty will have
J a better chanee to elect a candidate of its choicf', or at lea:;! to exPrt greater
political inflwmrp H iR obvions that thl.' grratrr thf' dr~rf'e to which
the electoral minority i:; homogenf'ous and m:;ular ami the greater the
degree that. bloe votmg occur" along ma.jority-minority luw~, the greater
will be the ext('nt to wl1ich t11e minority's voting powPr l::i diluted by multimember distncting SPe E. Banfield and J Wilson, C1ty Politics 91-96,
303-308 (19()3) , H. Dixon, D<'mocratic Repre:;Pntahon 12, 476-484, 503527 (1968) , Bonapfel, Minority Challengrs t.o At-Large ElectiOns : The
Dilution Problem, 10 Ga.. L. Rev. 353, 358-360 (1976) ; DerfnPr, Racial
Discrimmatwn and the Right. to Vote, 26 Vane!. L. Rev. 523, 553-555
(1973) ; Comment, ElfectivP Represrnt.ation and Multlffil'mber Districts,
68 MJCh. L. Rf'v. 1577, 1577-1579 (1970). Recent empirical studies have
documented the vahdity of t.hii' generalizati011. See Berry and Dye, The
Discriminntory Effrets of At-Large Election~. 7 Fla. St . U. L. Rev. 85,
113-122 (1979), ,Jones, The Impact. of Local ElectiOn Sy~tems on Black
PolitJCal Rl.'pn•;;enta.tion, 11 Urb. Aff. Q. 345 (1976) ; Karnig, Black
Resources and City Council Hepresentation, 41 J . Pol. 1:34 (1979) ;
Karnig, Black Representation on Cit.y Councik Thf' Impact of District
Election.- and Socwrconomic Factors, 12 Urb. Aff. Q. 223 (1976) ; Sloan,
"Good GovernmPnt" and the Politic...; of HaeC:', 17 Soc. Prob. 1lil (1969);
The Impact of 'Yiw1icipal Reformi:;m : A Symposium, 59 Soc. SCI. Q. U7
(1978) .
J The electoral schPmes in thrsr ca»ei> involve majority-vote, numberedpost , <IJld f'taggered-tenn reqmrements. See Bolden v City of M ob~le, 423
F. Snpp. 384, a8f)-:387 (SD Ala. 197fi); Williams v. Brown. 428 F. Supp.
1123, 1126-1127 (SD Ala. 1976). Tllf'~e f'lecloral rule,; rxacerbate t.he votedilutiw effect,; ol multimember di:;trirtmg . A rrquirement that a. candidate mu~t. wm by a majority of the vote forces a mmority candidate who
wins a plurality of vote:; in the grneral PlPCtion to engage m <1. nm-otr
election with 'h1s nrarest. com)wtitor. If the compl'titor 1,; a member of the
dominant polit1cal faction, t!H-' minonty candidate f't~md.s little chance of
willlling Ill Lhe -.;{'C'Ond elect.iou. A reqmrcment. tha.t euch canlhdate must
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single-member districting in court-ordered reapportionment
plans. See ante, at 9, n. 10. Furthermore, and more important for present purposes, we decided a series of vote-dilution
cases under the Fourteenth Amendment tha.t were desig.ned to
protect electoral minorities from pre,cisely the combination of
electoral laws and historical and social factors found in the
present cases.4 In my view, the treatment of these cases. in
run for a partirulnr '· place" or "post" crt>ates head-to-head contt>sts tl1at
minority c:mdidntt>.~ cannot. surv1vc. When a number of poHitions <Jn a
governmentaJ body are to be chosen in the ·arne election, members of a
minority w11l mcrt>as-e the likelihood of election of a favoritr ('andidnte by
vot.ing onl~· for him. If thr remamdrr of the elr<'toratP spht;; 1ts votes
among the othc>r cand1d.nte.~. the minorit~·'s candidate might well IX' elected
by the minority '~ .;~ingle-,dJOt. votmg." If the term.~ of ofJicp holder:-1 are
staggered, the opportunity for ::;mgle-shot votmg i,: d.ecrt>a,;ed Se-e City of
Rome ' UnttPd States, P. S. (1980) : Zimmer \, JJcKedhen,
485 F . 2d 1297 , 1:~05 (CAi'i 197:3) (en bane), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U. S 636 (1916)
(per curiam) , Bonapfrl, supra,, Derfncr, supra.
4 The Court. not(•s that. a.t-large elections were mRtitutt>d in cities as a
reform nwa"un· to eonrct corruption and ineffic!'enr.v in munic1p;d government, and suggc>"t" 1hat it ''may be a ra~h nR~mnpt10n '' to apply vote-dilution concept,.: to n muniripal gove-rnment. dected 111 that fa.~luon . See
/ ante, at 13, and n 15 To tlw contnu~·, lo<'nl ~overnment~ are not PXPmpt.
from tlw con~titutwnal r€'qmrement. to adopt reprrHentational cllstnrt_ing
ensuring tlmt the votE>:; of each citizen will haV<' equal weight. Avery v.
Midland ('ounty. :mo tr. 8. 474 (1968) . Indped, in BePr v. United States,
425 U. S 130, 142, n 14 (1976) , and Abate v. Mundt . 40:3 r . S. 182, 184,
n. 2 (1971), we w:;.~umed that our vote-dilution doct rinr appllrd to local
govemment:s.
Furthermore, though municipalitiP;;; mu;;t be accorded ,.:ome di~eretion
in arranging the1r affa1r::;, ::;ee Abate v; Mwl(lt , supra. thert> i:-; all the more
reason to Rcrutmize assertion~ that mtmic1pnl, rather than State, multimember distnctmg dilut<'" thr votP of an electoral minonty :
"In st~~t£>widt> dedJOlL", 1t is pos::;ible. that ~~ largr mmority group in one
multi-member di::;trict will be unable to elect an~· legL~lator,.:, while> in
another multt-mE'mber di"t.rict when" tlw ,.:Hml' group IR n ~hght majority,
they will elect t.he entire slate of ·Jegislator::;. Thus, the muH.i-member
electoral syt>tem ma,y hinder a group m one ch::,1:nct but provt> an advan. ·tage in anut her. In at-large electwns m cit.ie::; thil'l J::> not po""'iblc. Thero

I
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toda.y's decision is fanciful. Although we have held that multimember districts are not unconstitutional per se, see ante, at
9, there is simply no basis for the Court's conclusion that under
our prior cases proof of discriminatory intent is a necessary
condition for the invalidation of multimember districting.

A
In Fortson v Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), the first votedilution case to reach this Court, we stated explicitly that such
a claim could rest on either discriminatory purpose or effect:
"It m1ght well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multimember constituency apportionment scheme. under the
circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of ramal or political
elements of the voting population.'' /d., at 489 (emphasis added ) .
is no W:.t) to balance out the discrimination against a particular minority
group becausf' the entire city i~ one huge elechon distnct. The minonty's
loss is ab~olute ." Berr? and DyC', supra n. 3, at 87.
That at-large election~ werC' mstituted as part. of a " rl'fonn " movement
in no way amE'horate>< the;:;c harsh effects. Moreover, m some instances
the efficiL'ncy and hrC'adth of perspPrttvC' ~uppo"edly rr:,;ultmg from a
reform struci\li'C' of 111\llliCi]Jal government, are aeln<'ved at a lugh cost.
In a whitC'-maJorit y r1ty m which sPvere rarwl bloe votmg I" conunon,
the citywide view allegedly inrulrated in e1ty rommi::;~ionrr,. by a.t.-large
elections need not. extend bryond the white community, and the efficiency
of the commission form of government can be achit•ved <~imply by tgnoring·
the concern~ of t lw powerless minont.) .
It would be a mistake, then, to conclude that. munictpal at-large elections provide nn inlwrcntly su11erior rC'presentational schf'mr. See also n.
3, supra ; Chapman'· Meter, 372 F . Supp. a71, 388--:392 (~D 1974) (threejudge <'oUI't.) (Bright, J ., dis::;enting), rev'd, 420 ll. S 1 (19i5) It. goegwithout :::aying thttt a municipality ha...; the frf'edom to Ul':sign 1ts own
governance "ystem. When that system IS subjected to con~titutwnal at~
tack, howcvrr, thr que~it.IOn is whether it wa~ enactt•d or maintained w1th
a discriminatory pnrpo"e or has a d1scrimmatory efirct , not whether it
comports with mw or another of the comprting 11otion" :tho\tL ''goo<t
'ovenunent,''
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We reiterated these words in Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. ·S,
73 ( 1966) , interpreted them as the correct test .to apply . to
vote-dilution · claims, and described the standard as one
involving "invidio~s effect/'. id., at 88.,, We then .held that
the plaintiffs had failed to meet their borde'n of proof:
"[T]he demonstration that a particular multi-member
scheme effects ,an invidious result must appear from evidence in ,the record. . . . -That demonstration was not
made here. In · relying on conjecture as to the effects of
multi-member districting rather than demonstrated fact,
the court acted in a manner more appropriate to the body
l'esponsible for drawing up the districting plan. Specula~
tions do not supply evidence that the rnulti-niember . dis~
tricting was designed to have or had the ir1vidious effect
necessary to a judgment of the unconstitutionality of the
districting.'' Td., at 88-89 (emphasis 'added) (footnote
omitted).

It could not be plainer that the Court in Burns considered
discriminatory effect a sufficient condition for invalidating a
multimember districting plan.
In Whitcomb v. ·Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971), we again
repeated and applied the Fortson standard, id., at 143, 144,
but determined that the Negro community's lack of success
at the polls was the result of partisan politics, not racial vote
dilution . ld., at 150-155.- The Court stressed that both the
Democratic and Republican parties had nominated Negroes,
and several had been elected.· Negro candidates lost only
when their entire party slate went down to defeat. 1d., at 150,
nn. 29- 30 ; 152-153. In addition, the Court was impressed
that there was 110 finding that officials had been unresponsive
to Negro co.11cerns. · ld., at 152, n. 32, -J5,5.r.

.J
-

5 As the majority notes, see ante, at 10, we indicatrd iu Whitcomb v.
Chavis, '40:~ U. S. l:Z4, 149 (1971), that. mnlt.im<·mbPJ' di~tl'iet~ wero
unconstitutional ii' they were ''conceived or operatNl a;; pttrpo~rful drvices
to further racial or erono,~ic Cl\:><'ri1nhu1thw." The Cm.Trt m Whitcomb diq

T
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More recently, in White v. Regester, 412 ll. S. 755 (1973),
we invalidated the challenged multimember districting plans
because their characteristics, when combined with historical
and social factors, had the discriminatory effect of denying
the plaintiff ~egroes and Mexican-Americans equal access to
the political process. Id., at 766-770. We stated that
"it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion
to its voting potential. The plaintiffs' burden IS to produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to nomination and election w!:'re not equa.lly
open to participation by the group in question-that its
members had less opportunity than did other residents m
the district to participate in the politwal processes and to
elect legislators of their choice." I d., at 766.
We held that the three-judge District Court had properly
applied this standard in invalidating the multunember districting schemes in the Texas counties of Dallas and Bexar.
The District Court had determined that the characteristics of
the challenged electoral systems-multimember districts, a
majority-vote requirement for nomination in a primary elecnot, however, suggel't that. discriminatory plli'JJ<'H:' wa:- ,, m·l·essar) condition for tlw invalidation of rnult.inwmlwr districting. Our deci:>ion in
Whitcomb . id .. at. 143, aeknowlt>dgrd the contmning validity of the discriminatory impact. test. adopted in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 t:. S. 433, 439
(1965), nnd restnt('d it. m; requirmg plaintiff:; to prove that ''mult.J-member
districts uneon:;tJtutionally operate to dilute or ranee! thP votmg strength
of racinl or pohtical elements." Whitcomb ' . Chavis, ~;upra, at. 144.
(emphasis nddPd) .
Abate v. Mundt, 403 . S. 182 ( 1971), decided the same day a.:; Whitcomb, providl'S further endence that Whitcomb did not alter the discriminatory-effects stnnclard drveloped in enrlier cases. In Abate, supra, a.t
184, n . 2, wP rejPct('d the argunwnt thnt a multJmembPr districting scheme
had a vote-dilutiw effeet, berau~t> '' [pjetitioners . . havt> not showt\
that these multimember distncts, by them:;('lV'e~, operate to impair the
voting strength of particular racwl or political elrmeut,., . , • , ,;ee Burns •
Ricbard$on, 384 C. S. 73, 88 (19Gti) ...
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tion, and a rule mandating that a candidate running for a
position in a multimember district must run for a specified
"place" on the ticket-though "neither in themselves improper
nor invidious,'' reduced the electoral in'fluence of Negroes and
Mexican-Americans. I d., at 766. 6 · The District Court identified a number of social and historical factors that, when combined with the Texas electoral structure, resulted in vote dilution : ( 1) a history of official racial discrimination m Texas,
including discrimination inhibiting the registration, casting of
ballots, and political participation of Negroes; (2) proof that
minorities were sti1l suffering the effects of past discrimination;
(3) a history of gross underrepreseutatio11 of minority interests; ( 4) proof of offiCiaJ insensitivity to the needs of minority
· citizens, whose votes · were not needed by those in power;
( 5) the receut use of racial campaign tactics; and ( 6) a cul. tural and language barrier inhibiting the participation of
Mexican-Americans. !d., at 766-770. Based "on the totality
of the circumstances,'' we affirmed the District Court's conclusion that the ust' of multimember districts excluded the plaintiffs "from effective participation in political" ·life." I d., at
769,1

I

e See n. 3, supra
White ' . Re(tester, 412

n R 755 (1973)' make, dear tlw di~tinction
betw<•rn thr c·onc·rpb of vote dilution and proportional repref,'<'ntation.
We have !wid that, 111 order to prove an allegat.Ion of vot(' dilutwn, the
plaintiffs mu~t ,.:how more than ::;imply that they ha.ve brrn unable to
elect camhdatr~ of thPir choice. Sre Wh1te ,·:Regester, supra. at 765-766;
Whitcomb ' · ('havis. -l03 U. S. 124, 149-150. 153 (Hl71) . The Co~ti
tut.ion, thrn•fore, dor,.: not. contain an~· requirement of proporttonnl repre~
sentation. Cf. l '11ited Jewish Organizations v. C'are.lf, 430 r . S. 144
(1977) ; Gaffney\ , C'umrnings, 412 P . S. 735 (1973). When all that. is
proved Is mere lack of succes;;; at the polls, the Court will not presume that
member::; of a political minority ha.ve suffered an 1mpermi~sible dilution of'
political pOW('f. Rather, it, is a~:;umed that the::;!' J>Pr,.;on~ have mrans.
availahln to them through which ther can haY!' somr effr<'t. on governmental deci~ionmaking . For example, many of the,.;c• per:;ons might. be-o
long to a vanrty of other politiCal, socia.l, and economic group:; that have·
T
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It is apparent that a showing of discriminatory intent in
the creation or maintenance of multimember districts is as
unnecessary after White as it was under our earlier votedilution decisions. Under this line of cases, an electoral districting plan is invalid if it has the effect of affording an electoral minority "less opportunity than ... other residents in
the district to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice," id., at 766. It is also apparent
that the Court in White considered equal access to the political
some impact, on officials. In the absence of eviclrnre to the contrary, it
can be a~snmed that official:; will not be improperly inf!urnced by ~ uch
factor:> as th<' racr or place of residence of persou~ sePking govrrmnental
action. Furthermore, politica.! fact1ons out of office often :serve as watchdogs on the performance of the government, bind t.ogether into coalitions
having enhanced influence, and have the 1•espectu,bility nece:;sary to affect
public policy.
Uncon::;t.itut.ional vote dilution occurs only when a discrete political
minority whose voting :'trength is diminished by a districting scheme
provei:l tlmt historical and sochtl factors render it largely incapable of
effectively utilizing alterna.tive avenues of influencing public policy. See
/ n. 19, infra. In these circumstances, the only means of breaking down
the barriers encasing the political arena is to structure the electoral districting so that. the minority ha:; a fair opportunity to elect candidates of
its choice.
The t•eRt for unconst.itutional vote dilution, then, looks only t.o the
discriminatory effects of the combination of an elE'ctoral stn10ture and
historical and social factors. At t.he same time, it requirrs ·electoral mi~
norities t.o prove far more than mere lack of succe::;s at the polll:l.
We have also spoken of dilution of voting power in cases arising under
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1971 et seq. Under § 5 of
/ that Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, a state or local government covered by the
Act may not enact new electoral procedures having the purpose or efi'ect
of denying or abridging the right t.o vot·e on arcount. of mce or color,
We luwe interpreted this provision as prohibiting any retrogression in
Negro voting power. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976) .
In some eases, we have labeled such retrogrrssion a ''dilut.ion" of the
minority vote . See, e. g., City of Rome v. United States, U . S. (1980) , Vote dilution under § 5, then, involves a stand:trd diffrrent from
that applied in ca::;e:; such as White v. Regester, supra, In whirh diminution
of the vote violating the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments is alleged,.

"

77-1844
10

& '78-357-DISSENT

MOBILE v. BOLDEN

process as meaning more than m~rely allowing the .minority
the opportunity to vote. White stands for the propositiot1
that an electoral sy~tem may not relegate an electoral minority
to political impotence by diminishing the importance of its
vote. The Court~s holding requiring proof of discriminatory
purpose in the pre's ent cases is, then, ,squarely contrary td
White and its predecessors.s

B
The Court fails to apply the discriminatory effect standard
of White Y. Regester because that approach conflicts with
what the C'ourt takes to be a elementary principle of law.
' / " [ 0] nly if there is purposeful discrimination,' ' announces the
Court, "can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
/ of the Fourteenth Amendment.'' Ante, at 10. That proposi·
tion is plainly overbroad. It fails to distinguish between two
distinct hnes of equal protection decisions~ those mvolving
suspect classificatiOns, and those involving fundamental rights.
We have long recognized that under the Equal Protection
Clause classifications based on race are ~'constitutionally sus..;
pect," Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 ( 1954), and are
subject to the " most rigid scrutiny," Korernats'U \'. United.
States, 323 U. R. 214, 216 (1944), regardless of whether they
infringe on an independently protected constitutional right.
Cf. Regents of the Universtty of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978). l"nder Washington v. Davis, 426 tT. S. 229
( 1976) , a showing of discriminatory purpose is necessary to
impose strict scrutiny on facia.lly neutral classifications having
a racially discriminatory inipact. Perhaps because the plain.;
tiffs in t.he present cases are Negro, the Court assumes that
8 The Court ':, holding b also inconsi~tent with our ~tatrm('nt in Dallas
f)ounty v. Reese. 421 U.S. 477, 480 (1975) (per cunam), that multimem·

her districting v10lntr" thr Equal Protection Clau~<' if it, "m fact, operate:.~.
impermi:s:sibly to dilutl' the voting strength of an idrntifiable rlC'ment of
the voting population ," See t1l:so Chapman v. Me1er, 420 U. S. 1, lf

(1975).
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their vote-dilution claims are premised on the suspect-classification branch of our equal protection cases, and that under
Washington v. Davis, supra, they are required to prove discriminatory intent. That assumption fails to recognize that
our vote-dilution decisions are rooted in a different strand of
equal protection jurisprudence.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, if a classification
"impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
~ rfcb/tected by the Constitution, .. . strict judicial scrutiny''
is required, Sa11 Antonio J nd. School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1,17 (H)73), regardless of whether thf' infringement was
inteutwnal 1' As l will explain, our cases recognize a funda·
menta1 right to equal electoral participation that encompasses
protection against vote dilution. Proof of discriminatory pur~
pose IS, therefore, not required to support a claim of vote
dilutwn/ 0 The Court's erroneous collclusion to the contrary

I

Se~> , hapim 1. Thompson. :394 U. S. Gl
(HlH9) (right to tr:wel);
Reyuolds v. Sim.s. :~i7 lT. S. 5:3:3 (Hl64) (nght to \'Ote), 'Douglas v.
Califomia, :372 t'. S. ;~53 (196:n; and Griffiu v.lllmms, :351 U.S. 12 (1956)
9

(right. to fau aerr~,., to eriminal procf'«S) . Undrr thP r\1bne of' th<> funda.mental nght. of pnvacy, we have recogm~ed t.hat. mdividuab ha.ve freedom
from unju<"tifi<'d governnwntal mterferenre W1t.l1 ]lt'r<"onal dPrJ,;wn~< involving marria.ge, Zablocf.:1 "· Uedhail, 4a-l F. S. :~i-! (Hl7~). Lovwg '·Virgina, 388 ('. S . I (HHi7) ; prorreatwn, ~l.:inner \', Oklahoma, :316 U. S.
535 (Hl42) , contmN'JliJOn, Cru'e11 v. Population Services lnte1'110tional, 431
U. S. 678 (19ii ); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 ,tJ. S. 438 (1972) ; Gliswold v.
Connecticut, :381 U. S. 481 (1965); abortion, Roe v. Wade , 410 U . S. 113
(197:3) ; fmmly rrlation::;hip~. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158
(1944) ; and child rearing and C'ducation. Prince " · Society of Sisters, 268

U. S. 510 (1925) ; 'Meyer'· Nebras~·a. 2(i2 U.S. 390 (192:3) .
Moore"· East C'levrfand, -1-:n U.S. 815 (1977) .

Sec abo

:J.O As thr prr:-:rnt. Ca:'('S mustmte, a requiremrnt of proof of chscriminat.ory int{'nt ~<>riou,;l~· j<•opardlzr:; the free rxerri;;e of the fundamental right
t.o vote. Although the right. to vote b incti~tingui,;hahlP for pre~ent pnrposr.- from thP othpr fnndamrnt.nl right" our ra,;e,; hav<> rrrognizf'rl, ~e~
n. 9, supra, surc>ly the Court dors not mtrnd to rNtnirP proof of discrimmatory purpo;.;e in tho,;(• ea~e~ . The Court fail :; to arti('u)atr why the right
·to vote ,;honlrl receive "uch $in.,.ula.r trratnwnf,, Furtlwrmorr, the Court
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is the result of a failure to recognize the central distincti0n
between White v. Regester, 412 U. S.. 755 (1973), and Washington v. Davis, $Upra: the former involved an infringement
of a constitutionally protected right, while the latter dealt with
a claim of racially discriminatory di.stribution of an interest
to which no citizen has a constitutional entitlement. 11
Nearly a century ago, the. Court recognized the elementary
propositio11 upon which our structure of civil rights is based :
"[T]he political franchise of voting is . . . a fundamental
refuses to rrcogmzp thr cli~ntilit.y of rpquiring 11roof of discriminatory
m fnndamrntal right" ca,-r:>. For rxnmplr, 11 would make no
sens<• to rrqlllrr ~u<'h a ~howmg whrn thr qur~t 1011 1" whrther a ~tate
statutr r<'gulatmg ahortwn violnte~ the right of prr~onal ('hOH'<' recognized
in Roe' · Wade. -llO t r. 8. 11;{ (J973). The onl~· logwal inquiry L" whethrr,
/ regardlr~~ of the lrgn·daturp '~ motl\:f', thr ,;tatutc ha~ lhP effrct of mfrmgmg
that. right.. Sec, f. g., Planned Parenthood \', Danforth, 4-2& F S. 52
{1976) .
11 .Judge Wwlom of the Court of Appeal,; brlow recogmzf•d th1s distinction in a companion ease, Ree Nevett " · S1des, ·571 F 2cl 209, 231-234
{CA5 197~) {opPciall~· roncurrmg opinion). See alr.:o Commrnt, Proof of
Racially D1"cnmmatory Pnrpo~e Under tlw Equal Protrrtion Clause:
Washington v. Davts, Arli1tgton He ights, Mt. Ifealthy, and Williamsburgh,
12 Hnrv C. H.-C. L. L Hev . 725, 758, n 175 (1977); Note, Rac1al Vole
Dilution in l\lult·lllll'mher Di~tnrts : The Con~titutional Standard After
W ashi11gto11 ' Dul 'tS, 7() ::\Jirh. L. Rev . 604;· 7:!2-726 ( 1978), Comment.,
Con~titut ion a! Ch:dlrng<•,.; to ( irrrymandrr,.;, 45 U. CIH. L. Rev 845, 869877 (1078) .
WasTnngton v. Davis, 426 U . 229 (1976), involvrd allrged rac1al discrimination in publir rmployment. By describmg mtrrr.~ts such as pubhc
employment a,; rom;tit.ubonal gratuities, I do not , of course, mean t.o
suggest thaf, their drprivation i;; immune from con.-;htutional scru.tiny.
Indeed, our dew;ions have refrrrrd to tho importance of employment,
see Ilam7Jton Y. Jlott• Sun Wong , 426 U. S. 88, 116 {1~76), Meyer v.
Nebraska , 262 r 8\. :390, 399 (192a) ; 'l'ruax ' . Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41
(1915) , and W<' havr explicit.!~· rPcognizrd that. in ~orne circum~tances public
employment fall" w1thm the ra.t<'gori<'" or libl'rty and property protected'
by tJ1e Fifth and Fourt<'Pnth Amrndmrnts, He<', e. (f., Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U. S. 1:34 (1974) : Pdry ' Si11dermmm, 408 U S. 59:~ (1972) . The'
Court ha.~ not held, however, that a Clh&eJI has a eonst1tutJonal nght to•
public employment.
purpo~<'
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political right, because preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). We reiterated that theme
in our landmark decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533,
561-562 ( 1964), and stated that, because "the right of suffrage
is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society[,] ..•
any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized." Ibid. We
realized that "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise/' ld., at 555. Accordingly, we recognized that the
Equal Protection Clause protects "[t]he right of a citizen
to equal representation and to have his vote weighted equally
with those of all other citizens." ld., at 576. See also Wesberry v. Sa·nders, 376 U. S. 1, 17 (1964); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368, 379-380 (1963).12
Reynolds \'. Sims and its progeny 13 focused solely on the
discriminatory effects of malapportionmen t. They recognize
that, when population figures forrthe representational districts
of a legislature are not similar, the votes of citizens in larger
12 We have not, however, held that the Fourteenth Amendment. contains an absolutl' right to vote. As we explained in Dww \. Blum.stein,
405 u. s. :330 (1972) :
"In drci~ion after deci::~ion, this Court has made clear tlmt. a. citizen has
a constitutionally protected right to participate in elrctions on an equal
basis with other citizrns in the jurisdiction. [Citing cases.] This 'equal
right to vote' ... is not. absolutf> ; t,he States have the power t,o impose
voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the franchise in other
ways. . . . But as a general maUer, 'before that right [to vote] can be
restricted, the purpose of the restriction and the assl:'rtedly overriding
interests served by it must. meet close constitutional scruti11y.'" Jd., at
336 (quoting Evans v. Cornman. 3D8 U.S. 41D , 426,422 (1970)) .
13 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474 (1968), applied the equal~
representation standard of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 5:33 ( 1!:164), to,
local governments. See also, e. g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407 (1D77);
Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U. S. 259 (1977) ; Hadley
v. Junior Collegl:' Dist ., 397 U. S. 50 (1970),
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districts do not carry as much weight in the legislature as do
votes cast by citizens in smaller districts. The equal protection problem attacked by the "one person, one vote" principle
is, then, one of vote dilution: under Reynolds, each citizen
must have an "equally effective voice'' in the election of representatives. Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 565. In the present
--~e!l~~!t'!, the alleged vote dilution, though caused by the combined
effects of the electoral structure and social and historical factors rather than by unequal population distribution, is analytically the same con dept: the mij ustified abridgement of a fundamental right. 14 1t follows, then, that a showing of discriminatory intent is .iust as unnecessary under the vote-dilution
approach adopted in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965),
and applied m White v. Regester, 412 U. S. /55 ( 1973). as it
is under our reapportionment cases. 1"
Hln attl"rnptmg to limtt Reynold~ v. Sims to its faeb, s<'e unte, at 20--21,
the ma.]ont,v ronfu::;E'~ tlw nature of the con~titutwnal nght recognized in
that dcr1~10n wtth the tnE'aHH 1Jy whtrlt that ngltt tall be violated.
R eynolds held that undPr tlte Equal Protection Clam'P <'aeh citizen must
be accordcd an (',;~cnttally equal voicc in the PIPction of representatives.
The Court detormmed tltat lliH'qtta1 population dtstnbutwn in a multidistrict representational Helwme was otw readily a::;certamaulc means by
which tim: nght wa" abridged. The Court certainly di<1 uot sugge::;t, however, that viOlation~ of the nght to d'fective polihral partiCJpalwn matten•d on!~ tf tlw~ WPr<' cauHrd by malapportionnwut. Tlw majority's
a.,.;ertwn to 1h<· eonn·nr~· m tl11" ca,.,<· apparently would requirc it to read
Reyuold~ a::- rero~lllzm~ fair apportionmrnt as an l'tl<l in it:srlf, ratlwr than
as simply n meanH to protect again~>t votf' dilution
15 Proof of di:;rriminator~· purpose has been equally unn<·crs&'lry in our
decisiom~ assessing wlwther various imprdunents to electoral participation
are incon~1stcnt w1th the fundamental intere~>L in voting [n the seminal
case, Ilarper Y V1rguua Board of Elections, 38:3 U S . ()63 (1966), we
invalidatrcl a $1.'50 poll tax imposf'd a~ a precondition to votmg. Relying
on our deci:,;1on two year, earlicr 111 Re!Jiwlds v. Sims. 377 F . S. 53;3 (1964),
see Harper, su.pra. at 667-668, 670, we determmt>d that '·tlw right to vote
is too prccwu,, too fundamental t.o be so burdrncd or eonditioned," id.,
at 670. We analyzed the right to vok under thc fmruhar ~tandard that,
"where fundamental rtght;; and liberttl's art> 11~,;t>rted nndt>r tlw Equal
Protection Clause, elas~Jficatwm, wlu('h might. invadt' or re~train thell)
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Indeed, our vote-dilution cases have explicitly acknowledged
that they are premised on the infringement of a fundamental
right, not on the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of
racial discrimination. Our first vote-dilution decision, Fortson v. Dorsey, supra., involved a 1962 Georgia reapportionment statute that allocated that 54 seats of the Georgia
Senate among the State's 159 counties. Thirty-three of the
must be closely exnmined and carefully confined." Ibid In urcord with
Harper, we have npplied heightem•d ;;crutiny in as.~essmg the 1mpos1tion
of filing fprs, e. y .. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); limitatiOns on
who rna~· partH'lpate in elertiom mvolving specmlized governmental ('lltities,
e. g., Kmml:'r' Cnion Frl:'e School District, a95 ll. S. 621 (1969), durational re~Idl'ncy rrqmremrnt:', e. y., Dunu ,., Blumsteut, 405 F. S. 330
(1972); wrollmPut tinw limitatiOn~ for voting in par1~ pnmary elrct10ns,
e. g., Kusper v. Pont1kes. 414 U . S. 51 (197:3), and reHtnrtJOn:< on,.facce;;:s
to the ballot, e g., Illinais State Board of Electious v Sol'lahst Workers
Party, 440 U. S. 17:3 (1979) .
To be sure, we havf' approved ~omr limitation:> on the r1gh1 to vote.
Compare, e. g.. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Luke Ba~iu !-Vater Storage
District. 410 U.S. 7W (1973), with Kramer v. Union Pree Sehoul District
No. 15, supm.. We have never, however, reqmred a ;;bowing of discriminatory pnrposf' to l'Upport a elaim of infringement of thiR fundamental
intere~t . To thr ron1 mry, the Court. has a<·eeptcd at. face value the
purpo:-;e::o arti<~ulat.<·d for a qnalificat.ion of tlu" right, and ha.-< mvalidated
such a limitatJOIJ under t.l1r Equal Protection Clausr onl~' If it:; purposes
either larked sufficirut. substantiality when compared to the individual
intere"ts affe0t•cd or could have been achieved by less restrictive means.
See, e. g., Dunn v Blumstein, supra, at 335, 337, 343-360.
The approach u.doptrd in tllis line of cases has been synthesized with
the one per:-;on, one vote doctrine of RetJnolds v. Sims, :377 U.S. 533 (1964),
in the following fa"hion : "It has been established in n•ceut year;; that the
Equal Protection Clau~e confer~ t.he Hnb:>tantJv<' nght. to partiCipate on
tm equal ba<;Js w1th other qualified votf'r;; whrrever the State haH adopted
an electoral procr,.;H for drte1mimng who will represent any !'egmcnt of the
State's population.'' Sa.n Antonio Ind. School D1st . v. Rodriguez. 411
U.S. 1, 59, n. 2 (S'l'EWAit'l', .1 ., concurring) (citing Reynolds v. Stms, supra;

Kramer v. Union Free School District No. J:j, supr·a., Duun v. Blumstein,
supra) . It. is 11lmn that. this standard rrqlllre,; no :-howing of discmnina~
tory purpose' to tngger "trict ,;;crutiny of state interference with the right

to vow.
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[l

senatorial districts were made up of from one to eight counties
each, and were single-member districts. The remaining 21
districts were allotted among the seven most populous counties, with each county containing at least two districts and
electing all of 1ts senators by countywide vote. The plaintiffs, who were registered voters residing in two of the-multidistrict counties, 11' at-gued that the apportionm~nt plan on its
face violated the Equal Protection Clause because countywide
voting in the seven multidistrict counties denied their residents
a vote equal to that of voters residing in single-member constituencirs. tz We were unconvinced that the plan oprrated
/ to dilute any Georgian 's vote, and therefore upheld the facial
validity of the scheme. We cautioned, however, that the
Equal ProtectiOn Clause would not tolerate a multimember
districtmg plan that "designedly or otherwise, . . operate [ d]
to minimize or cancel out the votmg strength of racial -or
polthcal elements of thr voting pttation." !d., at 439 (emphasis added ).
The approach to vote dilution adopted in Fortson plainly
consisted of a fuHdamenta.l-rights analysis. If the Court had
believed that the equal protection problem with alleged vote
dilution was one of racial discrimination and not abridgement
of the right to vote, it would not have accorded standing to
the plaiutifl's, who were simply registered voters of Georgia
alleging that the state apportionment plan, as a theoretical
matter, diluted their voting strength because of where they
lived. To the contrary, we did not question their standing,
and held against them solely because we found unpersuasive
their claim on the merits. · ·The Court did not reach this result
by inadvertence; rather, we explicitly recognized that we had'
10 See Dorsey v. Purtsun, 228 F. Supp. 259, 261 (ND Ga . HJ64) (threejudge court), rw'l:l,
t". S'. 43:~ (1965) .
17 SpPcifically, the plamtiff~ contended that countywide voting in the
multidi;;trrct. conntie>< could, a;; a ma.tter of mathematic~, result m the•
nullification of the unanimous choice of the voter:l of one district. Fortson•
v. Dorsey; rr R
437. (1965)!.

am

1

am.
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adopted a fundamental-rights approach when we stated that
the Equal Protection Clause protected the voting strength of
political as well as racial groups.
Until today, this Court had never deviated from this principle. We reiterated that our vote-dilution doctrine protects
political groups in addition to racial groups in Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966), where we allowed a general
class of qualified voters to assert such a vote-dilution claim.
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 ( 1971), we again explicitly recognized that political groups could raise such claims,
id., at 143. 144. In White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 735 ( 1973), ·
the pla.intifl"s were Negroes and Mexican-Americans, and
accordingly the Court had no reason to discuss whether uonminority plaintiffs could assert claims of vote dilution. ~ In
a companiou case to White, however, we again recognized that
"political elements" were protected against vote dilution.
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 751 ( 1973). Two years
later, in Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U. S. 477 (1975) (per
curiam). we accorded standing to urban dwellers alleging vote
dilution as to the election of the county commission and stated
that multimember districting is unconstitutional if it "in fact
operates impermissibly to dilute the voting strength of an
identifiable element of the voting population." I d., at 480
(emphasis added). And in United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, 430 l'". , . 144 ( 1977), the plurality opinion of MR.
JusTICE ·wHrrE stated that districtiug plans were subject to
attack if they diluted the vote of "racial or politwal groups."
Id., at 167 (emphasis in original).19
1

ts The ~mne is true of our most recent case discu:ssing vote dilution,
Wise v. Lipscomb, 4:37 P. S. 535 (1978).
10 In contra:st to a racial group, however, a political group will bear a
rather substantwl burden of showing that it. is ::;uffici<•ntly di,;crete to :;uffer
vote dilution . See Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U. S. 477 (1975) (per
curiam) (allowing city dwellers to attack a countywide multimember
district) . See grnerally Comment, Effectiv<.' Representation and ~Iulti
member District:;, 68 Mich . L. "Rev. 1577, 15!)4-1596 (HHO) .
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Our vote-dilution decisions, then, involve the fundamentalinterest branch, rather than the antidiscrimination branch, of
our jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause. They
recognize a substantive constitutional right to participate on
an equal basis in the electoral process that cannot be denied
or diminished for any reason, racial or otherwise, lacking quite
substantial justification. They are premised on a rationale
wholly apart from that underlying Washington v. Davis, 426
U. S. 229 ( 1976). That decision involved application of a
dift'erent equal protection principle, the prohibition on ·racial
discrimination in thf' governmental distribution of interests
to which citizens have no constitutional cntitlement. 20 ·w hateve!' may be the merits of applying motivational analysis to
the aHocation of constitutionally gratuitous benefits, that
approach is completely misplaced where, as hf're, it is applied
to th<' distnbutwn of a constitutionally protectecl interest.21
20 Thr di~putt> in Waslungton Y. Davis. 42() U.S. 229 (197()), concerned
allegrd racial <hsrrimmation in publir rmployment, an interest to which
no on!.' ha~ a constitutional right. set' n. 11, supra . In that dt'cision,
the Com1. held only that. " the invidious quality ol a law claimed to be
racially d?.Scl'llllttuttor.tf must ultima trly be t meed to a rariall~· di~crimina
tory p11rpos<>.'' lrl.. n.t 240 (rmpha,.;i~ added) . Tlw Court·~ deci1>ions
followmg Waslunyton \'. DaVls have al:so mvolwcl alleg!'d d1~crimma.tion
in tho allocation of intt'rr::;ts fallmg ,;hart of const1tutwnal right::>. Personnd Adm'r u} .Ua8sachusetts v. PcenPy, 442 U.S. 25() (1979) (all!'ged
srx tl!,;c·rimmalton in public rmploymt'nt) ; Village of Arlmgton lleights v.
Metmpolitan Houst~ng Development Corp .. 429 1'. S. 252 (1977) (allrged
rari:tl cli::;crimm:ttion in zoning) . A..~ rxplained in Peeney, supra. ''l w Ihen
f:OmP other indt>pPndPnt right. is not nt stakP ... anti wheu thert' is no
'rt'ason to inkr antipathy,' .. it it< prt'~umrcl that 'rwn improvident
d('Cistons will c•ventually he rrctified by tlw drmocratir proce>;~ '" /d., at
272 (quotmg Vance v. B1·adley. 440 U.S. !)3, 97 (1979)).
21 Prof!'Si:ior EI~· haH recognizPd this dii:itJnetwn :
"The dang(•r I SP(' 1s . .. t.hnt. tlw Court., in its nPwfound t'nthui:iiasm for
mot h·a t ion analy::>l~, will i-!Crk to export it to fidel,; wht'r<' it hm; no bu~uWHR ,
It tlwrefore cannot bt' t'mpha:-:tz!'d too ,;t .rongl~· that analy:-;1~ of motivation
i;; uppropria.tr onlr to elaims ol improper t!iscriminatwn 111 the di:-;trihutwn
of good,.: thu l arc1 tonstit utwually grut.uitous (that J><, lx·netlt.-; to which.
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Washington v. Davis, then, in no way alters the discriminatory impact test developed in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433
(1965), and applied in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973),
to evaluate claims of dilution of the fundamental right to
vote. In my view, that test is now, and always has been,
the proper method of safeguarding against inequitable distribution of political influence.
The majority's response is that my approach amounts to
nothing less than a constitutional requirement of proportional
representation for groups. See ante, at 18-23. That assertion amounts to nothing more than a red herring : I explicitly
reject the uotwn that the Constitution contains any such
requirement. See n. 7, supra. The constitutional protection
against votP dilution found in our prior cases does not extend
to those situatiOns iu which a group has merely failed to elect
represen tativcs in proportion to its share of the population.
To prove unconstitutiona] vote dilution, the group is also
required to carry the far more onerous burden of demonstrating that it has been effectively fenced out of the political
process. See ibid. Typical of the majority's mischaracteriz~;ttion of my position is its assertion that I would provide protection against vote dilutwn for "every 'political group,' or at

GDJ -

I

peopiP nre nol rntJlled ns a mnltpr of subtihmtivr con~tHutional right.) ... .
Howevrr, u•here what is denied /.~ something to u•luch the complainant
has a substatllive constitutional right-either becau,.;e it , i:; granted by the
terms of the Con,-titution, or brrauS(' it is e:s.-'rntial to thr rffectJve functioning of :t d!'nH>eratic government-the reasons it u·as denied are in·elevant. It ma) IH'como import•mt m eourt what justlfiratwno: cou11sel for
t.he state can articulate in ;.;upport of it:; drnial or nonprovision, but the
reasons that. actually inRpirrd the denial never can : To have a right to
something i~ to haw a claim on it irrrHpectivr of why Jt JS denied. It
would be a t r:t11;edy of the first order wrrr thr Court to expand its burgeon~
ing awarcnes..,; of thP rf'lt>vanC'C of motin1tion into the thoroughly mishtkrn
notion that a drnwl of a constitutional ~does not count as such unless
it wil.S intentional." Ely, 'fhe Crntrality and Limits of 1\lotivatton Analysis, 15 San Diego L. Rrv. 1155, llfi0-1 Hil (1978) (emphasi,.; tn anginal)
(footnoteR omitterl ).
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least every such gi'Oup that is in the minority." Ante, at 18.
The vote-dilution doctrine can logically apply only to groups
whose ekctoral discreteness and insularity allow dominant
political factions to ignore them. Sec nn. 7 and 19, supra.
In short, thr distinction between a requirement of proportional
representation and the discriminatory effect test I espouse is
by no means a difficult one, and it is hard for me to understand why the Court insists on ignoring it.
The plaintiffs m No. 77-1844 proved that no Negro had ever
been elected to the Mobile City Commission, despite the fact
that Negrors eonstitute about one-third of the rlectorate, and
that thr persistence of srver<' racial bloc voting ma<k it highly
unlikely that any .:. regro could he ekcted at-large in the
foreseeablr future. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp.
384. 387-:3RD n·m Ala. 1976). Contrary to the Court's COD•
tention, see ante, at 18-H). however, I do not find unconstitutional vote dilution in this case simply becausr of that showing. The plaintiffs convinced the District Court that Mobile
Negroes wrre unable to use altemativc avenues of political
influence. They showed that Mobile Negroes still suffered
pervasive present rffrcts of massive historical official and private d1scnmination. and that the city commission had been
quite uuresponsive to the needs of the minority community.
The City of Mobile has been guilty of such pervasive racial
discrimination in hiring employees that extensive in tervention by the Federal District Court has been required. Id., at
389, 400. Xegroes are grossly underrepresented on city boards
and committees. I d., at 389-390. The city's distribution
of public services is racially discriminatory. 1d., at 390-391.
City officials and police were largely unmoved by Negro complaints about police brutality and "mock lynchings.'';( The
District Court concluded tha.t "[t]his sluggish and timid
response is another· manifestation of the low priority given to
the needs of the black citizens and of the rcommissioners']
political fear of a white backlash vote when blac"k citizens._

.LeO.) +-
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11eeds are at stake."\ .fd., tti 392. See also the dissenting
opinion of my Brother WHITE .• an..te.
A requirement qf proportional representation would indeed
transform this Court into a "super-legislature," ante, a.t 19,
and would create the risk that some groups would receive an
undeserved windfall of political influence. In contrast, the
protection against vo ~ dilution recognized by our prior cases
serves as a minim&Uyintrusive guarantee of political survival
for a discrete political minority that is effectively locked
out of governmental decisionnuiking processes. So understood. the doctriue hardly "'create[s] substantive constitutional rights iu the name of guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws,' " ante, at 19. quoting San Antonio Ind. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). Rather, the doctrine is a simple reflection of the basic principle that the Equa:l
'Protection Clause protects "I t]he right of a citizen to equal
representation aud to have his vote weightfld equa.lly with
those of all other citizens;'' ReynOlds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533,
576 (1964). ~
1

/

22 Thr forrgoing disposes of any contention that, merely by citing Wright
v. Rockefeller, 376 U S. 52 (1964), thr Court in Washington v. Davis,
426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976), and Village of Arlington He1:ghts v. Metropplitan Hotu.-ing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977), in.tended to
bring votr-dilution cases within the discriminatory-purpose requirement.
Wright v. Roc/cefeller, s'Upra, was a racial gerrymander case, and the
plaintiffs had alleged only that thry were the victims of an intentional
scheme to draw d1stricting linr~ discriminatorily. In focusing solely on
w4ether the plaintiffs had provrd intentional discrimination, the Court in
Wright v. Rockefelle1' was mrrely limiting the scope of its inquiry to the
issue raisrd by thr pl~.intiffs. If W1'ight v. Rockefelle1' had been brought
after thi~ Court had decided our vote-dilutiOn decisions, the plaintiffs
perhaps would have recognized that., in addition, to a claim of intentional
racial gerrymandering, they could n.llcge an equally sufficient cause of
action under the Equal Protection Clause-that the districting line:s had.
the effect of diluting their vote.
Wright v. Rockefeller, then, treated proof of discriminatory purpose af!
a sufficient condition to trigger :strict scrut.iny of a districting schrme, but
had no occa,;ion to consider whether such proof was necles:;;ary to"'{{ ttai~

..-:;;;;;>
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II
Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides:
"The r1ght of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."
Today the Court gives short shrift to the argument that proof
of discriminatory intent is not a necessary condition to relief
under this Amendment. See ante, at 5-8. I have examined
this issue in another context and reached the contrary result.
Beer '\. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 146-149, and nn. 3-5
(H)76) (dissenting opinion). I contmue to believe that "a
showing of purpose or of effect is alone sufficient to demonstrate unconstitutionality," id., at 149, n. 5, and wish to explicate further why 1 find this standard appropriate for
Fifteenth Ame11dment claims. First, however, it is necessary
to address the majonty's apparent suggestion that the Fifteenth Amendment protects against only denial, and not
dilution, of the vote. 23
_
that ~ Its CJta.tions in Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arlington
~hts, supra, were uSt?ful to show the relevancy, but not the nece::;sity,
of ev1drnrc of di::;cnminatory mtent,. The,.;e citations are in no way
incon::;i,.,tent with my view that proof of di:;criminatory purpo:;e is not a
nece::;sary eoncht10u to the mvalidation of multimember dbtricts that dilute
the vote of racial or political Plement<>.
In addit10n, any argument that., merely by citing Wright v. Rockefeller,
the Court in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights intended to apply
the di::;crinunatory-intent. rcq11irement to vote-dilution claims is premi~ecf
on two unpalatable assumptions. First, because the discussion of Wright
v. Rockefeller WHR unnrcessary to the resolut.ion of the i;;::;ues in both of those
decisions, the argument assumes that the Court, m both cases decided
import.ant, IS~Hr:-~ in bnt>f dicta. Second, the argument. assumes tha,t, theCourt twice mtrnded covertly to ovl:'rrule the discriminatory-effect::; test
applied in White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (197a), without even citing
White. Neither wssumption IS tenable.
23
Tlw maJority ~tates that "lh]avmg found that Negroes in Mobile
•register a.nd vl!>1te withom.1t hmdramct'/ the Distri<'L Cottrt and ConrL :of'
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A
The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer an absolute right
to vote. See ante, at 5. By providi11g that the right to vote
cannot be discriminatorily "denied or abridged," however, the
Amendment assuredly strikes down the diminution as well M
the outright denial of the exercise of the franchise. An interpretation holding that the Amendment t·eaches only complete
abrogation of the vote would render the Amendment essenI tially useless, since it is no difficult task to imagine schemes in
which the Negro's marking of the ballot is a meanipgle~
exercise.
The Court has loug understood that the nght to vote encom ..
passes protectiOn against vote dilution. "[T]he right to have
one's vote counted" is of the same importance as "the right to
put a ballot in a box." United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S.
383, 386 (1915) . See United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299
(1941); Swafford v. 1'empleton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley
v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S.
651 ( 1884). The right to vote is protected against the diluting effect of ballot-box stuffing. United States v. Saylor, 322
U. S. 385 ( 1944); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 ( 1880).
Indeed, this Court has explicitly recognized that the Fifteenth
Amendment protects against vote dilution. In Terry v.
Adams, 345 F. S. 461 ( 1953). and Smith v. Altwright, 321 U. S.
649 ( 1944), the ~ egro plain tiffs did uot question their access
to the ballot for general elections. Instead they argued, and
the Court recognized, that the value of their votes had been
diluted by their exclusion from participation in primary elections and in the slating of candidates by political parties.
rrhe Court's struggles with the concept of "state action" in
those decisions were necessarily premised on the understanding
that vote dilution was a claim cognizable under the Fifteenth
Amendment.
Appeals wen• in error in belif'ving that th<> appellant, invaded th<> protection of that Amendmenl in the present ra.-;e." Anti', a.t f'.
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'Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), recognized that
an allegation of vote dilution resulting from the drawing of
district lines stated a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment.
The plaintiffs in that case argued that congressional districting in New York violated the Fifteenth Amendment because
district lines had been drawn in a racially discriminatory
fashion. Each plaintiff had access to the ballot; their complaint was that because of intentional discrimination they
resided in a district with population characteristics that had
the effect of diluting the weight of their votes. The Court
treated this claim as cognizable under the Fifteenth Amendment. More recently, in United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). we again treated an allegation of
vote dilution arising from a redistricting scheme as stating a
claim under the Fifteenth Amelldment. See id., at 155, 161162, 165-168 (opinion of WHITE, J.). I11deed. in that case
MR. JusTICE STEWART found no Fifteenth Amendment violation iu part because the plaintiffs had failed to prove "that the
redistricting scheme was employed ... to minimize or cancel
out the voting strength of a minority class or interest; or
otherwise to impair or burden the opportunity of affected persons to participate in the political process.'' 1d., at 179
(STEWART, J .. joined by PowELL, J .. concurring in the judgment) (citing. e. y., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973);
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 ( 1964)) . See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960) .
It is plain, then, that the Fifteenth Amendment shares the
concept of vote dilutiou developed in such Fourteenth Amendment decisions as Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), and
Fortson v. Dorsey, supra. In fact, under the Court's unified
view of the protections of the right to vote accorded by disparate portions of the Constitution, the concept of vote dilution is a core principle of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth
Amendments as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth :
" The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits a. State from.
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denying or abridging a Negro's right to vote. The Nineteenth Amendment does the same for women. If a State
in a statewide election weighted the male vote more
heavily than the female vote or the white vote more
heavily than the Negro vote. none could successfully contend that that discrimination was allowable. See Terry
v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461. . . . Once the geographical unit
for which a representative is to be chosen is designated,
all who participate in the election are to have an equal
vote-whatever their race, whatever their sex. whatever
their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever
their home may be in the geographical unit. This is
required by the Equal Protection C'lause of the Four..
teenth Amendme11t.
" •.. The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincolu's Gettysburg Address,
to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and ~inetcenth Amendments ean mean only one thing-one person, one vote."
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368. 379, 381 (HJ63) .
The majority's suggestion that the Fifteenth Amendment
reaches only outright denial of the ballot is wholly mconsistent
not only with our prior decisions, but also with the gloss the
majority would place upon the Fourteenth Amendment's pro•
/ tectiou against vote dilution. As I explained in Part I, supra,
I strongly disagree with the Court's conclusion that our Fourteenth Amendment vote-dilution decisions have been based
upon the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of racial dis..
crimination. Be that as it may. the Court at least does not
dispute that the Fourteenth Amendment's language-that
"[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws"-protects against dilution,
as well as outright denial, of the right to vote on racial
J grounds, even though the Amendment does not mention any
right to vote and speaks only of the denial, and not the
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diminution, of rights. Yet, when the Court construes the
language of the Fifteenth Amendment-which explicitly
acknowledges the right to vote and prohibits its denial or
abridgement on account of race-it seemingly would accord
protection against only the absolute abrogation of the ballot.
An inteq)retation of the Fifteenth Amendment limiting its
prohibitions to the outright denia1 of the ballot would convert
the words of the Amendment into language illusory in symbol
and hollow in substance. Surely today's decision should not
be read as endorsing that interpretatiou.2 ~

B
'l'he ma.iority concludes that our prior decisions rstablish
the principl«:> that proof of discriminatory intent is a necessary
element of a Fifteeuth Amendment claim.u' In contrast, I
continue to adhNe to my conclusion in Beer v. l ' mied States,
425 U. S. 130. 148. n. 4 (1976) (dissenting opiuion). that
"[t]he Court's decisions relating to the relevance of purposeand/or-effect analysis in testing the constitubo11ahty of legislative enactments are somewhat less than a seamless web."
As I there explained. at various times the Court's decisions
have seemed to adopt three inconsistent approaches : ( 1) that
purpose alone is the test for unconstitutionality; (2) that
effect alone is the test; and (3) that purpose or effect. either
24 The Court could have deeidecl thi:; case advcr~ ely to the plaintiffs
simply by relying on thii> intrrprctation. That it ha" not. di~po.-<rd ol' the
case in thi£; fa,;hion su~gri'tR that its d<•cision i~ basrd upon itf: conclusion
/ that proof of di"criminatory intent i:> nece:::sary io Hllpport a claim
under t.h<> Fifteent.h Amen,dmcnt.
25 The Court dors not attempt to support this proposition by relying on
the hi;.; tory i'urronndmg the adoption of the FiftrPnt h Anl('nchnrnL I
agree that we• should resolvr the i~snr of the rPicvnnc~· of pmof of discriminator~· purpo,;e and cffrct by examining our prior dee1~10n.~ and by
considering thr appropriatenes~ of alternative ~tandnrd~ in ltght of contemporary circnm,;tancr,.:. Tha.t was, of eoursr, the approach Ui<t'd in
Washingtou \ Da11is. 426 U. S 229 (197H) , to <·v;tlunk th<Ll· i~;.,·uc witlt
regard to Fourteenth Amendmellt racial di:Ocrimiuatwn rlalm"'.
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11lone or in combination, is sufficient to show unconstitutionality. Ibid. In my view, our Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence on the 11ecessity of proof of discriminatory purpose is
no less unsettled than was our approach to the importance of
such proof in Fourteenth Amendment racial discrimination
eases prior to }V.ashington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976).
What is called for in the present cases is a fresh consideration-similar to our inquiry in Washington v. Davis, supra,
with regard to Fourteenth Amendment discrimination claimsof whether proof of discriminatory purpose is necessary to
establish a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. I will first
justify my conclusioll that our Fifteenth Amemiment precedents do not control the outcome of this issue, and then turn
to an examiuation of how the question should be resolved.

1
/

The Court cites Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 374
(1915) ; Gomilliou v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Wright
v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 ( 1964); Lassiter v. !v"orthampton
Co'Unty Bd: of Elections, 360 U. S. 45 (1959); and Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939). as holding that proof of discriminatory purpose is uecessary to support a Fifteenth
Amendment claim. To me, these decisions indica.te confusion,
not resolution of this issue. A.s the majority suggests, ante,
/ at 5-6, the Court in Guinn v. United States, supra, did examine
the purpose of a "grandfather clause" in the course of invalidating it. Yet 24 years later, in Lane v. Wilson, supra, 307
U. S., at 277·, the Court strucR down a more sophisticated
exclusionary scheme because it "operated unfairly" against
Negroes. In accord-with the prevailing doctrine of the time,
see Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455. and n. 7 (1931),
the Court in La:ne seemingly di~ not question the motives
of public officials.
In upholding the use of a literacy test for voters in Lassiter
v. Northampton Co'unty Bd. of Elections, supra, the Court
&pparently concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove

..
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either discriminatory purpose or effect. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra, can be read as turning on proof of discriminatory
motive, but the Court also stressed that the challenged redrawing of municipal bounda.ries had the "essential inevitable
effect" of removing Negro voters from the city, id., at 341, and
that "the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry
and geography is to despoil colored citizens, and only colored
citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights," id., at 347.
Finally, in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), the
plaintiffs alleged only purposeful discriminatory redistricting,
and therefore the Court had no reason to consider whether
proof of discriminatory effect would satisfy the Fifteenth
Amenclmeut . 2 ~,

The maJority ignores cases suggesting that discnminatory
purpose is not necessary to support a Fifteenth Amendment
claim. In Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953), a case in
which no majonty opinion was issued, three Justices approvingly discussed two decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 27 holding "that no election
machinery could be sustained if its purpose or effect was to
deny Negroes on account of their race an effective voice in
the governmental affairs of their country, state, or community.''' ld., at 466 (opinion of Black, J., joined by Douglas
and Burton . JJ. ) (emphasis added). More recently, in rejecting a First Amendment cha.llenge to a federal statute providing criminal penalties for knowing destruction of a Selective
Service registration certificate, the Court in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 (1968), stated that "[i]t is a
familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court wiU
not strike down an otherwise constitutional sta.tute on the
basis of an alle~ed illicit legislative motive." The Court in
O'Brien, id., at a85, interpreted Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra,
2u See n 2:l, supra .
27 Riel! v. Elmorl!, 165 F . 2d 387 (CA4 1947). cert. denied, 333 U. S,
875 (1948) , and Baskm v. Brown, 174 F . 2d 391 (CA4 1949)
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as turning on the discriminatory effect, and not the alleged
discriminatory purpose, of the challenged redrawing of munici~
pal boundaries. Three ye11rs l;1ter, in Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U. S. 217, 224-225 (1!}71), the Court relied on O'Brien
to support its refusal to iqquire whether a city had closed its
swimming pools to avoid racial integration. As in O'Brien,
the Court in Palmer, supra, at 225, interpreted Gomillion v.
Lightfoot as focusing "on the actual effect" of the municipal
boundary change, and not upon what motivated the city to
redraw its borders. See also Wright v. City of Emporia, 407
U.S. 451, 461-462 (1972).
In holding that racial discrimination claims under the Equal
Protection Clause must be supported by proof of discrimina~
tory intent. the Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229
(1976) , signaled some movement away from the doctrine that
such proof is irrelevant to constitutional adjudication. AI~
though the Court, id., at 242-244, and n. 11, attempted
mightily to distinguish Palmer v. Thompson, supra, its decision
was in fact based upon a judgment that, in light of modern
circumstances, the Equal Protection Clause's ban on racial
discrimination in the distribution of constitutional gratuities
should be interpreted as prohibiting only intentional official
discrimination .~ 8

These vacillations in our approach to the relevance of
discriminatory purpose belie the Court's determination that
our prior decisions require such proof to support Fifteenth
Amendment claims. To the contrary, the Court today is in
the s11me unsettled position with regard to the Fifteenth
Amendment as it was four years ago in Washington v. Davis,
supra, regarding the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on
racial discrimination. The absence of old answers mandates
a new inquiry.
2
The Court in W a.<;hington v. Dav·is required a showing of
'2s See nn . 20-21, supm, and accompanying text.
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discriminatory purpose to support r~cial discrimination claims
largely because it feared that a standard based solely on disproportionate impact would unduly interfere with the farranging governmental distribution , of constitutional gratuities.20 Underlying the Court's decision was a determination
that, since the Constitution does not entitle any person to such
governmeutal benefits, courts should accord -discretion to those
officials who decide how the government shall allocate its
scarce resources. If the plaintiff proved only that governmental distribution of constitutional gratuities had a disproportionate effect on a racial minority, the Court was willing
to presume that the officials who approved the allocation
scheme either had made an honest error or had foreseen that
the decision would have a discriminatory impact and had
found persuasive, -legitimate reasons for imposing it nonetheless. These assumptions about the good faith of officials
allowed the Court to conclude that, standing alone, a showing
that a governmental policy had a racially discriminatory
impact did not indicate that the affected minority had suffered
the stigma. frustration. and unjust treatment prohibited
under the suspect classification branch of our equal protection
jurisprudence.
Such .iudicial deference to official decisionmaking has no
place under the Fifteenth Amendment. Section 1 of that
Amendment differs from the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on racial discrimination in two crucial respects : it
explicitly recognizes the right to vote free of hindrances
20

The Couri ::;tutt"d :
"A rule that a sta.tute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absrnt comp£>1hug ju:;tifica.tion, if in practicP it benefits or burdens
one race more than another would be far reaching and would rui::;p serious·
que~tion.~ about. nnd 1wrha.p~ invalidate, a whole range of tax, wclfuref
public service. regulatory, uml liccn:;ing :;t.atut<.'.-; that may be morP burdensome to the poor and to thP average black than to the more affluent
white." WWJMuytu/1 Y. D:av~ 426 u.s· 229, 24R- (191fi.).
See n . ZO, ~~~ p ~:u ..
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related to race, and it sweeps no further. In my view, these
distinctions justify the conclusion that proof of racially discriminatory impact should be sufficient to support a claim
under the Fifteenth Amendment. The right to vote is of such
fundamental importance in the constitutional scheme that the
Fifteenth Amendment's command that it shall not be
"abridged" on account of race must be interpreted as providing that the votes of citizens of all races shall be of substantially equal weight. Furthermore, a disproportionate-impact
test under the Fifteenth Amendment would not lead to constant judicial intrusion into the process of official decisionmaking. Rather. the standard would reach only those decisions
having a discriminatory effect upon the minority's vote. The
Fifteenth Amendment cannot tolerate that kind of decision,
even if made in good faith, because the Amendment grants
ra:eial ·minoritie~; tl1e full enjoyment of the right to vote, not
sim})ly protection against the unfairness of intentional vote
dilution along racial lines.30
In addition. it is beyond dispute that a standard based
solely upo11 the motives of officia1 decisionmakers creates
significant problems of proof for plaintiffs and {orces the
inquiring court to uudertake an unguided, tortuous look into
the minds of officials in the hope of guessing why certain policies were adopted and others rejected. See Palmer v. Thompson, supra, at 224-225; United States v. O'Brien, supra, at
383-385; cf. Keyes v. School District No . .1, 413 U.S. 189,224,
227 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). An approach based on motivation creates the risk
that officials will be able to adopt policies that are the products
of discriminatory intent so long as they sufficiently mask their
ao Even if a municipal policy il:l shown to dilute the right to vote, however, the policy will not. be struck down 11' the city shows that it serves
highly important local interests and IS closely tailored to effectuate only
-those interests. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 F. S. 330 (1972) . Cf. Abatev. Mundt.. 40a 1· S. JH:.! (1971),

77-1844 & 78-357-DISSENT
32

MOBILE v. BOLDEN

motives through the use of subtlety and illusion. Washington v. Davis is premised on the notion that this risk is insufficient to overcome the deference the judiciary must accord to
governmental decisions about the distribution of constitutional
gratuities. That risk 'becomes intolerable, however, when the
precious right to vote protected by the Fifteenth Amendment
is concerned.
I continue to believe, then, that under the Fifteenth Amendment an "I e] valuation of the purpose of a legislative enactment is just too ambiguous a task to be the sole tool of
constitutional analysis. . . . [A] demonstration of effect ordinarily should suffice. If, of course. purpose may conclusively
be shown, tt too should be sufficient to demonstrate a statute's
unconstitutionality." Beer Y. "Cn.Ued State&, 425 C. ~ . 130,
149, n. 5 (1976) (MARSHALL, J .. dissenting). The Court's
refusal in this case even to consider this approach bespeaks an
indifference to the plight of minorities who, through no fault
of their ow11. have suffered diminution of the right preservative of all other rights. ~ 1
31 In my Vt('IV, tlH' Hiauclarcl of WhitP "· Regpster, 412 r . S. 755 (1973),
sec n. 7, supra, and accompanying tcxi, iR the ]lrop<'r tr,.;t mHlcr both t.he
Fourteenih and Fiftr(•nth Amrnclmeni:-; for drtrrmining wlwi IH•r a di,.;trict~
ing scheme ha" tlw uneon~titutional effect of dllntmg tlw );pgro ,·otr. li j,;:
pla.in that the D1~triri . Court in both of the cnRe~ hrforr us made the
"inten~>ely lora] ap]Jrai~al" JH'ces.~nry under White. supra. ai 769, ru1d
"'""tly deotded tlHtl tbe M"l"'"'' oleotoml ~·l>t'me< lot· the "•bile oily
commistiion and count~· school board violntrd the White standard. As
I earlier note with rrsprct to ~o. 77-1144, ~re ~
trict Court rlrtcrminrd : (1) that ::\lobile Nrgrors ~t11l :'.uffrrrd pervasivo
present effects of ma,~;ivc hi"toricnJ official nnd priva tP d1srrimination;
(2) that. thr eity eommi~sion ani! rouni~· ,.,r.hool lJoard had bren quite
unre:>ponRiv<' fo t'he nPrdl'l of thr minont~· rommumt~·; (:3) tlwt no Nrgro
had ewr bP('IJ pfectrd Lo ritlwr hod~·. drspif<> the fart f hai N'Pgrors con-stitute abom mw-i hird of t1Je rlertorate : (4) tlmi fhe JWr,.;i,;t rnre of "evrm
racial bloc voting marl<' it highly unlikrl~· that any Nrgro could IX' Plerted
-at-large to eithf'r body in the forescPablp futnre ; and (5) that no state
policy favorc·d ai -largo rlcction,.;, and the Ioral pref<'rrncp for that ,.;rh<'mc
was outweighed by the fact that the uncon"tiiutional vote dilution f'ould

l
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III
1f it is assumed that proof of discriminatory intent is necesto support the vote-dilution claims in these cases, the
question becomes what evidence will satisfy this requirement. 32
The Court assumes, without any analysis. that these cases are
appropriate for the application of the rigid test developed in
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279
(1979), requiring that "the decisionmaker . . . selected o.r
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because
not merely' 'i'? spite of.," its adverse effects upon an iden...
tlfiable group .' In my v1ew, the Feeney standard creates a
~~~ S e... '3..
burden of proof far too extreme to apply in vote-dilution ·~t:
This Court has acknowledged that the evidentiary inqmry
involving discriminatory intent ·must necessarily vary depending upon the factual context. See Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Authority, 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (STE\'ENS, J .. concurring). One useful evidentiary tool, long recognized by the
~ary

o!,'

I

be corrected only h~· the impo,;ition of singlP-mcmhcr di,;t.rict~. Bolden v.
City of Mobile. 423 F. Supp. :384 (SD Ala. 1976) ; Brown v. Mool'e, 428
F. Supp. 1123 (SD Ala. 1976) . The Court, of Appeab affimH.'d the:>e
findings in all rp;.pret~ . Bolden v. City of Mobile. 571 F'. 2d 2:31{ (CA5
1978) ; Brotclt ' . .lfovre. Xo . 77- 158:3 (CA5 .June 2, Hl7R) . See also the
dissenting opimOTI of m~ Brother WHr'l'E, ante.
82 Thr ~tatutp~ providing for a.t-Jarge rlrction of th<' m<>mbcr~ of ihe
two governmental bodirs involved in these ca.<,Ps, see n . .g&,'lsupra, have
been in effect ::;inee the day::; when Mobilr Negroes wrrr totally disenfranchised b~' the Alabama Con,;titut.ion of 1901. Th<> District Court in
both cases found, thereforr, thnt the at-la.rge ~chrmcs could not have been
adopted for d1scriminntory purpose::<. Bolden "· rity of Mobile, 423 F.
Supp. 384, 386, :397 (SD Aht. 1976) ; Bmwn Y. Moore. 428 .F. Supp. 1123,
1126-1127, 1138 (SD Ala.. 19i6) . Tl1e i::;::;uc 1s, t.hen, whether officwl:> have
maintained these electoral s~·stems for discriminatory purpose,:. Cf.
Village of Arlington Ilezghts v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp .,
429 U . S. 252 , 257-258, 268-271, nnd n. 17 (1977) .
88 A~ the di:.::senting opinion of my Brothrr WHITE demonstratl'::;, how,.,
€ver, the faet:,; of tlws<' easr~ compel a findmg or uncon:.:tJtutional vote
tdilution f'vPn nndrr tlw mnjorit 'H standarcl.

7
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common law, is the presumption that "[elvery man must 'be
taken to contemplate the probable consequences of the act he
does." Townsend v. Wathetn, 103 Eng. Rep. 579, 580-5Sl
(K. B. 1808). The Court ilil Feeney, supra, at 27'9, and n.. 25.
acknowledged that proof of foreseeability of discriminatory
consequences could raise a "strong inference that the adverse
effects were desired," but refused to treat this presumption as
conclusive in cases alleging discriminatory distribution of constitutional gratuities.
I would apply the common-law foreseeability presumption
to the present cases. 'T he plaintiffs surely proved that maintenance of the challenged multimember clistricting would have
the foreseeable effect of perpetuating the submerged electoral
influence of Negroes, and that this discriminatory effect could
be corrected by implementation of a single-member districting
plan.H1 Because the fon'seeahle disproportionate impact was
so severe, the burden of proof should have shifted to the
defendants, and they should have been required to show that
they refused to modify the districting schemes in spite of, not
because of, their severe discriminatory effect. See Feeney,
supra, at 284 (MARSHALL, J .. dissenting). Reallocation of the
burden of proof iR especially appropriate in these cases, where
the challenged state action infringes on the exercise of a fundamental right. The defendants would carry their burden
of proof ouly if they showed that they considered submergence
of the Negro vote a detriment, not a benefit. of the ni.ultimember systems, that they accorded minority citizens the same
respect given to whites, and that they nevertheless decided to
maintain the systems for legitimate reasons. Cf. Mt. Healthy
City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)-;
34 Inde('d, the Di:strirt Comt in the present cas& conrlnded that the
evidence ,;npporwct the plaintiff:;' po8ition that uncom<tJt utional vote dilution was tl1e natural and fon•secable con:<equence of the maintenance of the
challenged mult'imembcr di~tricting. Brown v. Moor'f', 428 F Supp. 1123,
1138 (SD Ala. Hl76) ; Bolden v. C£ty of Mobile, 423 F . Supp. 384, 397. 398 (SD Ala. 1976}.
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Village of Arl·ington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,
429 U. S. 252, 270, n. 21 (1977).
This approach recognizes that
"[f] requen tly the most probative evidence of intent will
be objective evidence of what actQally happened rather
than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of
the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have
intended the natural consequences of his deeds. This is
particularly true in the case of governmental action which
is frequently the product of compromise, of collective
decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation.'' Washington
v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 253 (STEVENS, J., concurring).
Furthermore, if proof of discriminatory purpose is to be
required in these cases, this standard would comport with my
view that the degree to which the government must justify a
decision depends upon the importance of interests infringed
by it. See San Antonio Ind. School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U. S. ·1, 70 (MAR~HALL, J .. dissenting) .
The Court also fails to recognize that the maintenance of
multimember districts in the 'face of foreseeable discriminatory consequences strongly suggests that officials are blinded
by "racially selective sympathy and indifference.'' 3 5 Like
outright racial hostility, selective racial indifference reflects ·a
belief that the concerns of the minority are not worthy of the
same degree of attention paid to problems perceived by whites.
When an interest as fundamental as voting is diminished along
racial lines. a requirement that discriminatory purpose must be
proved should be satisfied by a showing that official action was
produced by this type of pervasive bias. In the present cases,
the plaintiffs presented strong evidence of such bias : they
8 " Bref<t, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword. In Dcfen~c of the
Antidiscrimmat10n Principle, 90 Harv. L. Hev. 1, 7 (1976) . See also
Note, Racial Vote Dilution in Multimember Districts : The Constitutional
Standard After Washin(}lton v. Davis, 76 ~fich , L. Hev. o94, 716-71!}
.. (1978).
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showed that Mobile officials historically discrimina.ted against
Negroes, that there are pervasive present effects of this past
discrimination. and that officials have not been responsive to
the needs of the minority community. H takes only the
smallest of inferential leaps to conclude that the decisions to
maintain multimember districting having obvious discriminatory effects represent, at the very leas.t. selective racial sympathy and indifference resulting in the frustration of minority
desires, the stigmatization of the minority as second-class
citizens,:::;hJ the perpetuation of inhumanity. 06
/

3n The Court, ante, at 1R, n. 21, indicates that on remand the lower
courts are to exHmim-' the evidence in thet>r cases undrr the discriminatory
intent ;;tandard of Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U : S.
256 ( 1979) , and may conclude that this trst is mrt by proof of the
refusal of ~lobilr 's ;;tate-legi ·lative delegation to stimulatr the passage
of legislation clwngmg 1\Iobile's city governmpnt into a mayor-council
system in wluch council member::; are rlectrd from single-membrr districts.
The Court. holds, then, only that the Dist nct Court and' the Court of
Appeals in Pnch of the prrsent cases evaluated the evidence under an
improper legal :-;t:mdard , and not that the evidence fails to support a claim
under Feeney , supra. When the lower courts Pxamine these cases under
the Feeneu standard, they should, of cour~, recognizE' thr relevancy of the
plaintiffs' rv1dencr that. votr dilution was a forp:-;prablr and natural consequencP of thr maintenance of the challenged multimembrr dist.ricting,
and that offic1ab have apparently rxhibitPcl ::;el<·ctive racwl sympt.hy and
indifference. ('f. Dayton Bd . of Educ. v. Brinkmm1 . - U. S. (1-979) ;
Columbus Bd. of Educ . v. Pentck, - U.S. (1979) .
Finally, it is important not to confuse the differing viPws the Court and
I have on the elements of proving unconstitutional vot<' dilut1on. · The
Court holds that proof of intentional discrimination, as drfinrcl in Feeney,
supra. is necessar~· to ><upport. ~urh a claim. ThP Court finds this requirement consistrnt with thE' statrment in White v. Z~egest er. 412 U. S. 755, 796
(1973), that unconstitutional vote dilution docs not occur simply because a
minonty has not brrn able to elect. reprpsentatiVPI' in proportion to its
voting potPntial. The extra ncce~l'ary elemrnt, according to the Court, is
a showmg of discriminatory mtPnt . In th<• Court.'s viPw, the evidence
presented in Whit e going beyond mere proof of underrrprcsentation of the
minority properly supported an inferencE' that. the multimember districting
scheme in que~tion was tamted w1t.h a discriminatory purpose
·
The Court's approach ~hould be sa tisfied, thrn, b proof th<LL an elec-
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IV
The American approach to government is premised on the
theory that, when citizens have the unfettered right to vote,
public officials will make decisions by the democratic accom·
modation of competing beliefs, not by deference to the man·
dates of the powerful. The American approach to civil rights
is premised on the complementary theory that the unfettered
right to vote is preservative of all other rights. The theoretical foundations for these approaches are shattered where, as
in the present cases. the right to vote is granted in form, but
denied in substance.
It is time to realize that manipulating doctrines and drawing
improper distinctions under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Atnendments. as well as under Congress' remedial legislation
enforcing those Amendments, make this Court an accessory
to the perpetuation of racial discrimination. The Court's
requirement of proof of intentional discrimin-ation, so inappro~
priate in today's cases, may represent an attempt to bury the
legitimate concerns of the minority beneath the soil of a doctrine almost as impermeable as it is specious. If so, the
superficial tranquility created by such measures can be but
short-lived. If this Court refuses to honor our long-recognized
principle that the Constitution "nullifies sophisticated as well

j

toral scheme enacted with a discriminatory purpose effected a retrcgression in the minority's voting power. Cf. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S.
130, 141 (1976) . The standard should also be satisfied by proof that a
scheme maintained for a discriminatory purpose has the effect of submerging minority electoral influence below the level it would have under a
reasonable alterpative scheme.
The Court does not address the question whether proof of discriminatory
effect is neces&lr)' to support a vote-dilution claim. It is clear from th&
above, however, that if the Court at some point creates such a requirement, it would be satisfied by proof of mere disproportionate impact. Such
a requirPment would be far less stringent. than the burden of proof required under thr rather rigid discriminator~· ·effects test I find in Whitt
v. Regester, 8U'Jlra.. S<•e n.. 7, s·up~ia,. and. accompanying test.

j_l
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. as simple-minded modes of discrimin&tion," Lane v:' Wilson,
307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939), it cannot expect the victims of dis1 crimination to respect political channels of seeking redress.
' I dissent.
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No. 77-1844
City of Mobile, Alabama, ct al.,
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On Appeal from the United
'
States Court of Appeals
L Bv.ld
for the Fifth Circuit.
.
W 11ey . o en et a1.
[March - , 1980]

MR. JusTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the city
of Mobile's commission form of government. Black citizens
in Mobile , who constitute a minority of that city's registered
voters, challenged the at-large nature of the elections for the
three positions of City Commissioner, contending that the
system "dilutes" their votes in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While I agree with the Court that no
violation of respondents' constitutional rights has been demonstrated, my analysis of the issue proceeds along somewhat
different lines.
In my view, there is a fundamental distinction between state
action that inhibits an individual's right to vote and state
action that affects the political strength of various groups
that compete for leadership in a democratically governed
community. That distinction divides so-called vote dilution
practices into two different categories "govern ed by entirely
different constitutional considerations," see Wn:ght v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 5 (Harlan, J. , concurring) .
In the first category are practices such as poll taxes or
literacy tests that de11y individuals access to the ballot. Districting practices that make an individual's vote in heavily
populated districts less significant than an individual's vote in
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a smaller district belong in the same category. See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533. 1 Practices in this category are tested by the strictest of constitutional standards, whether challenged under the Fifteenth
Amendment or under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
This case does not fit within the first category. The District Court found that black citizens in Mobile "register and
vote without hindrance"~ and there is no claim that any
individual's vote is worth less than any other's. Rather, this
case draws into question a politica1 structure that treats all
individuals as equals but adversely affects the political
strength of a racially identifiable group. A1though I am satisfied that such a structure may be challenged under the Fifteellth Amendment as well as under the Equal Protection
1 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court quoted Mr. Justice Douglas' statement that thr right to vote "include:; the right to have the vote counted
at full v:due without dilution or di::;rount ... ," 377 U. S., at 555, n. 29,
as well aH tiH' comment in Westb'U!'!J v. SandPrs, :376 U.S. 1, 14, that "one
man'::; vote in a eougrc.;:;ional election i::; to be worth a::; much a:;; another'::;."
377 U. S., at 559.
2 Thi::; finding di;,;tinguishes this cu::;r from White v. Regester, 412 U . S.
755. In White tlw Court held that, in order to r::;tabli::;h a. Fourteenth
Amendmrnt violation, a group alleging vote dilution mu::;t
" ... produce rvidence to :support finding~ that the political prore:,;:;r:; leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by
the group in que:stion-that it::; members had les::; opportunity than did
other re::;idcnt::; in the di::;trict to participate in the political proce::;se::; and
to !'!ret legi::;lator::; of their c1wice." 412 U. S., <Lt 766.
The Court affirmed a judgment in favor of black and Mexican-American
voters on the ba::;i:; of the Di:;t.rict Court'~ expre::>s finding~ that black
voter::; had been "'effectively !'xcludrd from participation in the Democratic Jlrimary selection proce:-;:;,'" id .. at 767, and that "' . . . cultural
incompatibility . . . conjoined with the poll lax and the mo~t re::;trirtive
voter r!'!!:i::;tra t ion proc!'dure::; in the nation ha[ d] oprrat!'d to t'fl'ectivcly
deny Mcxiean-Ameriram; arc!'S::> to the political proc!' ·~e::; in Texas even
longer than the Black:; were formally denied acce:;:; by the white primary.'"
ld., at 768.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 I believe that under
either provision it must be judged by a standard that allows
the political process to fuuctiou effectively.
My conclusion that the Fifteenth Amendment applies to a
case such as this rests on this Court's opinioll in Gomillion v.
Ughtfoot, 364 U. S. 339. That case established that the
Fifteenth Amendment does not simply guarantee the individual's right to vote; it also limits the States' power to draw
political boundaries. While Gomillion itself involved a situation in which the districting structure completely excluded
the members of one race from participatiou in the city's elections,4 I do 11ot believe that it stands for the proposition tha.t,
in order to prevail on a Fifteenth Amendment claim, a racial
group must prove that an electoral system has the effect of
8 Thus, I di:sagree with the ma.iority'i:i couclui:iion that the Fifteenth
Amendment a]Jplie:s only to practices that directly affect acces:s to the
ballot and hence is totally inapplicable to the case at bat'. Ante, at 8. I
ubo find it difficult to 111tder;;tand why, given this position, the majority
rea.chel:i out 1o decide that discriminatory purpo:sc must be demonstrated
in a. proper Fifteenth Amendment case. Ante, at 5-7.
'1 "The petitioner:; here complain that afllrmativc legi::;lative action deprives them of their vote:; and the con:;equent advautages that the ballot
affords . When a legi:>laturc thus :single:; out. a readily i~olated :segment of
a. racial minorit~' for ;,;pecial di:;criminatory treatment , it violate:> the
Fifteenth Amendment. In no case involving unequal weight in voting distribution that hns come before the Court did the decision sanction a differentiation on racial lines when•by approval wa:; given to unequivocal withdrawal of the vote solely from colored citizens.

"According to the allegations here made, the Alabama Legisla.1me has not
merely rrdrawn the Tu:;kegee city limits with incidental inconvenience to
the petitioner~ ; it is more accurate to say that it has tkprived the petitioner;; of the muuicipal franchise and consequent right::; and to 1hat end
it has incidentally changed the city':; boundaries. While in form thi:; i::;
merely an act redefining mete::; aud bound:;, if the allegatiom; are established, the inescapable human effect of thi::; e::;;;ay in geometry and geography is to de::;poil colored citizens, and onl~, colon•d citizen:;, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights." 364 U. S., at 34G, 347 .

..
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making its members' right to vote, in MR. JusTICE MAHSHALL's
words. "nothing more than the right to cast meaningless
ballots." Post, at 1. I agree with MR. JusTICE MARSHALL
that the protections afforded by the Fifteenth Amendment
need not and should not be so narrowly construed. I do not
agree, however, with his view that every "showing of discriminatory impact" on an historically and socially disadvantaged racial group, post, at 2, 9, n. 7, is sufficient to invalidate
a districting plan."
Neither Gmnillion nor, for that matter, any other case
decided by this Court establishes a constitutional right to
proportional representation for racial minorities.u What
Gmnillio 11 holds is that a sufficieu tly "uncouth" or irrational
racial gerrymander violates the Fifteenth Amendment. As
Mr. Justice Whittaker's concurrence in that case demonstrates, the same result is compelled by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 364 U. S., at
349. The fact that the "gerrymander" condemned in Gomillion was equally vulnerable under both Amendments indicates that the essential holding of that case is applicable, not
5 I ali:io di~agn·r with Mu . .Ju::;'!'ICE MAHHHALL to the extrnt that he
implie:; that the votes ca:;t in an at-large election by member~ of a racial
minorit~· can never be anything morr than "meaningle::;:; ballot::;." I have
no doubt that aualy::;e::; of prP::;idential, senatorialm1d other ::;tatewidP elections would drmonstrate that ethnic and racial minoritic::; have often had
n critical impact on tlw choice of candidate;; and the outcome of electiom;.
Ther<' is no reaHon to believe that the ::;ame Jlolitical force::; cmuwt operate
in smaller dPetion districtH regardlei:is of the dPpth of conviction or emotion that nia~· Heparate the parti::;am; of different points of virw.
6 And t hi::; i>< true rrgardlrr;r; of the apparrnt nred of a particular group
for proportional represPntat ion brcau::;e of its hi::;toricall~· di~advantagrd
position in the commuuity. See Cousins \'. City Council of City of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 852 (CA7 Hl72) (S'l'E\"ENI:l, .T., di:>Heuting), rert. druicd,
409 U.S. 89:3. Thi:; does not mran. of course, that a legi::;lnturr i~ con::;titutionally prohibited from nccording Home mra::;ure of proportional repre-.
sentntion to a minority group, ;;ec United J~wish Organizatious v. Carey,
430 U, S. 144.
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merely to gerrymanders directed against racial minorities,
but to those aimed at religious, ethnic, economic and political
groups as well. Whatever the proper standard for identifying
an unconstitutional gerrymander may be, I have long been
persuaded that it must apply equally to all forms of political
gerrymandering, including racial gerrymandering. See Cousins v. City Council of City of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 848-852
(CA7 1972) (STEVENS, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U. S.
893. 7
This conclusion follows, I believe, from the very nature of a
gerrymander. By definition, gerrymandering involves drawing district boundaries (or using multimember districts or atlarge elections) in order to maximize the voting strength of
those loyal to the dominaut political party and to minimize
the strength of those opposed to it.8 466 F. 2d, at 847. In
'Thi::; view iti con::;i::;tent with the Court's Fourteenth Amendment ca~;es,
in whirh it ha~ indicated that at.tach Oil apportionment ::;chemc~ on racial,
political, or economic ground::; should all br judgPd by the same conl:ltitutional standard. See, e. g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149 (di::;trict::; that are "conceived or operated a::; purpo::;(:'ful dPvic<'s to further
racial m· economic di,.;crimiuation" are profiioited by the Fourteenth
Amendment) ( empha;;i::; i:lUJlpliPd); Po1'tson v. Do1'sey. 379 U. S. 433,
439 (an UJ1portionmPnt ::;chrme would be invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment if it "operateldJ to minimize or cancel out the voting l:ltrength
of racial 01' political elements of the voting population") (emphasis
supplied).
s Gerrymander:; may also be used to prei:lervc the current balance of
power betwPen political parties, see, e. g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U. S. 735, or to preserve the safe district"' of incumbent:; , cf. Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52. In Gaffney the Court point,pd out that." . . . it
requirE's no special genius to recognize the political cm1&'qnencp,.; of drawing
& district line nlong one street rather tha.n a.not.her.
It i,.; not only obvious,
but abr;olutPly unavoidable, thnt t.he loca.tion and shapr of di::;tricts may
wdl detrrmine the political complPxion of the a.rra. Di:strict linrs are
rarely neutrnl phPnomPna . They C<\.ll well drt.e rmine what district will be
prrdominantly Democratic or predominantJy Rrpublican , or makr a clo::;c~
race likely. Redist.ricting may pit. incumbents again::;t one another or
III7lke very difficult the election of. the most expcriencrd Jrgi....;la.tor. Tlio
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seeking the desired result, legislators necessarily make judg~
ments about the probability that the members of certain identifiable groups, whether raciaL ethnic. economic or religious,
will vot<> in the same way. The success of the gerrymander
from the legislators' point of view, as well as its irnpact on the
disadvantaged group, depends on .the accuracy of those
predictions.
A prediction based on a racial characteristic is not necessarily more reliable than a prediction based on some other
group characteristic. Nor, since a legislator's ultimate purpose in making the prediction is political in character. is it
necessarily more invidious or benign than a prediction based
on other group characteristics.j) In the line-drawing process,
racial, religious, ethnic, and ecouomic gerrymanders are all
species of political gerrymanders.
From the standpoint of the groups of voters that arc affected by the line-drawing process. it is also important to
recognize that it is the group's interest in gaining or maintaining political power that is at stake. The mere fact that a
number of citizens share a common ethnic, racial. or religious
background does 11ot create the need for protection against
gerrymandering. It is ouly when their common interests are
strong enough to be manifested in political a!Ctio1J that the
need arises. For the political strength of a group is not a
function of its ethnic, racial, or religious composition; rather,
it is a function of numbers-specifically the number of persons
who will vote in the same way. In the long run there is no
reality is thnt districting inevitably ha,. and i · intended to have sub:stantial
politiral consrrt~IPtH'es." Id .. at 753.
9
Tim:;;, i.lrcrr iH littlr qualit-ative c!iffrrPnce hetwern the motivation of a
legi:<lator who .has. ta~en a ~>o:-;it.ion on the abortion. i"sn~ ~ho attrmrfio---G
gerrymander lu,.: d1stnct to mrlude or t>xcludo rertam rrhgwn~ gronp::; and
the motivation of a legi~:>lator who hw; taken a political J10~ition genrrally
thought to be offeuJ:<ive to a particular racial group who attrmpt,.: to
cnsnre t1w.t, that. group will remain a minority of the voter:; iu his district.

~

'
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more certainty that individual members of racial groups will
vote alike than that members of other identifiable groups will
do so. And surely there is no national interest in according
special constitutional protection to racial minorities if the
effect will be to make it especially desirable to define political
groups by racial characteristics. 10
My conclusion that the same standard should be applied
As Mr . .JusticP Douglas wrotl' in his dis.sont. in Wright v. Rockefeller:
"Hacial elPctorlll regiHtPr,.;, like religious ones, have no place in n o;ociety
that honor:; thr Lincoln tradition-'of the pcoplf', by the people, for the
people.' Here thr individual is important, not his race•, his erPcd, or hi:;
color. The principle of equality i:; at war with thc notion that District A
must be rcpre~cnted by a Ncgro. as it is with the notion that Di~trict B
muo;t bc rpprc,;cntrd by a Cauca,.;ian, District C by a .lew, Distriet D
by a Catholic, and ::;o on. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. :~68, :379. The
racial electoral r<•gister systPm weights votes along one racial line moreheavily than it doc,;; other votes. That system, b~· whatever name it is
called, i;; a divi;;ive force in a community, emphasizing differencc':-i bPtween
candidatrH and votPrs that are irrPlcvant in the con:;titutional ~c·uo:P. Of
cour,;e race, likP religion, pla.y" an important role iu thP choirc,.; which
individual voter~ make from among various candidates. But govPrnmeut,
ha:; no bu,;ine~s designing electoral districts along racial or religious lines.
10

"When racial or rPligious lines nrc drawn Ly the State, the multiracial,
multireligiom; eommunitie:- that our Constitution seek~ to weld together
as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion
rather than to political i::;::;ue,; are genera ted; communities scek not the
best repre~entative but the best racial or religious parti:;an. Since that.
system is Nt war with the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here."·
376
52, 66-67.

n. s.

See also my di::;::it•nt in Cousius, supra:
"In my opinion au interpretation of the Constitutiou whieh affordcd 0110
kind of political protection to black,; and another kind to rnpmiJer:> of
otlH'r identifiable groups would it:;elf be invidiou,.;. HPspcet for the citizenry in thc black communit~r compPl~ acceptance of the fact that in the
long run therc i~ no more rPrtainty that the,;p individual::; will vote alike
than will individual membPr~ of any ot.her cthnir, economic. or social
grom;p. The probability of parallel voting fiuc:twte::; as the bleud of

,,
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whenever a group challenges a district boundary or an atlarge system of elections on the ground that its political power
has been adversely affected thereby leads me also to conclude
that the standard cannot condemn every adverse impact on
one or more political groups without spawning more dilution
litigation than the judiciary can manage. Difficult as the
issues engendered by Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186. may have
been, nothing comparable to the mathematical yardstick used
in apportionment cases is available to identify the difference
between permissible and impermissible adverse impacts on the
voting strength of political groups.
In its prior cases the Court ·has phrased the standard as
whether the distri<cting practices in question "uncoustitutionally operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength of racial
or political elements." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124,
144. In Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297 (CA5 1973),
the Fifth Circuit attempted to outline the types of proof that
would satisfy this rather amorphous standard. ·Today, the
Court rejects the Zimmer analysis, holding that the primary,
if not the sole, focus of the inquiry must be on the intent of
the political body responsible for making the districting detiSIOlL While I agree with the Court that the proper standard
must distinguish between routine political decisions and deeisions motivated solely by an intent to discriminate against
a.n identifiable group, I do not believe that it is appropriate to
focus on the subjective intent of the decisionmakers.
The proper standard, I believe, is suggested by three chara.cteristics of the gerrymander condemned in Gomillion;
political isHuPs affpcting the outcome of an election change~ from time to
time to emphaHiZ(' one issue, or a few, rather than othPrs, as dominant.
The facts that a polit.icnl group has it:,: own history, hn:,: :,:uff('red its own
sperinl inju ~tices, and ha:; it>~ own cong('rie~ of ~:<pecial political intpre::-;t;;;, do
not make one :mch group different from nn~' otlwr in the Pyes of the law.
The m('mbers of ('HCh go to the polls with ('qual dignity and with an
equal right to be protected from invidiou::> discrimination ." 466 :F. 2d,
at 852.

l. .
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(I) the 28-sided configuration was, in the Court's word,
"uncouth," that is to say, it was manifestly not the product
of a routine or a traditional political decision; (2) it had a
significant adverse impact on a minority group; and (3) it was
unsupported by any neutral justification and thus was either
totally irrational or entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the
political strength of the minority. These characteristics suggest that a proper test should focus 011 the objective effects of
the political decision rather than the subjective motivation of
the decision maker. \ In this case, if the commission form of
. government in Mobile were extraordinary, or if it were noth~ '~ ing more than a vestige of history, with no greater justification than the grotesque figure in Gomillion, it would surely
violate the Constitution. · Th~clusion would follow simply
· -~c, 71 from its adverse impact on black voters plus the absence of any
legitimate justification for the system, without reference to
the subjective intent of the political body that has refused to
alter it.
Conversely, I am also persuaded that a political decision
that affects group voting rights may be valid even if it can be
proved that irrational or invidious factors have played some
part in its enactment or retention. 11 The standard for testing
the acceptability of such a decision must take into account
the fact that the responsibility for drawing political boundaries is generally committed to the legislative process and that
the process inevitably involves a series of compromises among
different group interests. If the process is to work, it must
reflect an awareness of group interests and it must tolerate
some attempts to advantage or to disadvantage particular
11 "It i~ unreali~tic, on the one hand, to requirt> the victim of alleged
discrimination to uncovPr the actual ~ubjective intrnt of the deri::<ionmaker
or, conversely. to invalidate otherwi~<" legitimate action simply becau~c an
improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant i11 the decit'ionaJ
process. A law cou~cripting clerics ~hould not. be invalidatrd lwcau:;e a.n
athei~t voted for it." Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 253 (S'J'EV~ms,
J., dissenting) .

..
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segments of the voting populace. Indeed, the same "group
interest" may simultaneously support and oppose a particular
boundary change. 12 The standard cannot, therefore, be so
strict that any evidence of a purpose to disadvantage a bloc
epf voters will justify a finding of "invidious discrimination";
CDtherwise, the facts of political life would deny legislatures
the right to perform the districting function. Accordingly,
a political decision that is supported by valid and articulable
justifications cannot be invalid simply because some participants in the decisionmaking process were motivated by a
]pUrpose to disadvantage a minority group.
The decision to n~ tain the commission form of govemment
in Mobile, Ala., is such a decision. I am persuaded that some
support for its retention comes, directly or indirectly, from
membc•rs of the white majority who are motivated by a desire to make it more difficult for members of the black
minority to serve in positions of responsibility in city governlinent. I deplore that motivation and wish that neither it nor
u,ny other irrational prejudice played any part in our political
processes. But I do not believe otherwise legitimate political
choices can be invalidated simply because an irratio11al or
invidious purpose played some part in the decisionmaking
process.
As th e Court points out, Mobile's basic election system is
the same as that followed by literally thousands of municipalities and other governmental units throughout the Nation.
12
For examplE', if 55 % of 1he voten; in an area comprbing two diHt ricts
belong to group A, their interest s in electing two repre;;r ut a t i ve~ would be
best served by evenly dividing tlw voters in two di~trirt ~, but thc1r interests in making ~ure llwt the~· elert at lrast one rPprPHrnt atJve would
be sPrvNl b~· conrrntratiug a larger majority in on<• di~tri C'L Sec C'ousius
v. City Co uncil of Chicago , supra. 466 F. 2d, at 855, n. :30 (S'I'EVJ;N S, J .,
dii:il:ienting) . SPe alo;o W1ight v. Rockefeller, :376 U . S. 52, when' the maintenance of racially ~eparate congrei:i~;ional district;; was clwllengPd by ouc
group of blacks a.nd supported by anot.her group having tlw dominan t
lJowcr in the black-controlled di::~trict.
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Ante, at 3. 19 The fact that these at-1arge systems characteristically place one or more minority groups at a significant
disadvantage in the struggle for political power cannot invalidate all such systems. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S.
124, 156--160. Nor can it be the Iaw that such systems arc
valid when there is no evidence that they were instituted or
maintained for discriminatory reasons, but that they may be
selectively co11demned on the basis of the subjective motivation of some of their supporters. A contrary view "would
spawn endless litigation conceming thl::' multimember districts
now widely employed in this Country." 'id., at 157. and would
entangle the judiciary iu a voracious political thicket. 11
I empha~izc I hi;; point hecau~e in 111~' opinion therr i~ a "ignificunt
differem·<· bPtwPrn a ;.;tafPwide lPgi::::lative plan that ·'bapprn~" to usc
multimember ch~trict.,; on!~· in thosP area,; where the·~· di~advanlagP dJRcrete minorit~· group:; and I hP u.,;p of a genPrally acceptable' municipal
form of govPrnnwnt that involve~ the elPction of commi~sionrrs b~· the
votPrs at larg<'. While it i;; manifest that tlwrp i::; a sub~t<mtial 11rutral
jn~tifira tion for a mnniripalit~·';; r'hoire of a connni:s.,;ion form of gov<•rnment, it i:-< b~· no mean;; obvious that an occa"ional multimember di:;t rirt
in a. StatP which typirall~ · u:;p::; singlr memb<•r districto: can be adrquatel~·
explainrd on urut ral grounds. 1\"othing in the Court's opimou in White v.
Regeste1·. 41:2 U. R. 755, dP:;cJ·iuP~ any purported Jlf'ut ral explanation for
tlw multinwmber di~trict~ in Bf'xar and Dalla,; CountiPs. In thi~ connect ion, it ~hould be rrmemlwn•d that Kilgadin v.1-lill. ;~8G U. S. l:.W, did 110~
uphold thr con:-<titutionalit~· of a "crazy quilt" of ~ ingle-member and
multimPmb<'r di,;trirts; rather, in that cmw thi::~ Court merr!~· uphPld the
findiug,; b~· thr Di:>trirt Court that the plaintiff~ had failed to prove their
allegation;: that tht' uistricting plan con:;titutecl ::~ uch a crazy quilt.
H Rrjection of Mr ..Ju;;tice Frankfurter';,; view:; in
thr "prcific rontrover::~y prr;:f'nted b~· Bake1· \'. Carr, :3()9 U. S. 18(), dor" not refute the
basic wi~dom of hi::; call for judicially manageable Htandards in thi::~ area :
"Disregard of inherent limit:-< in the effrctive exercisr of th(• Court';; 'jnchcial Powpr' not only pre~ageH the futility of judicial intervention in i he
essential!.'· political C'onflict of forces by which the rrlation LPtwf'<'n population and rPprr:-<entation lw~ time out of mind bl•en nnd now i::; drtermiued.
It ma~· well impair the Court'" position a" the ultimate organ of 'the
suprcmr Law of the Land' in that va;:t rauge of !Pgal problem:<, oft<'n
strongly entangled iu popular feding, on which thi~ Court mu::;t pronounce.
13
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In sum, I believe we must accept the choice to retain Mobile's commission form of government as constitutionally
permissible even though that choice may well be the product
of mixed motivation, some of which is invidious. For these
reasons I concur in the Court's judgment of reversal,

The Court';; aut hority~po~seli~ed of neither the pursr nor the sword.ultimately rest ~:; on sustained public confidence in it~ moral sanction. Such
ifeQ)ing must be uouri~:;hed by the Court's complete detachmrnt, in fact and
in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political force~:; in political settlement~." 369
U. S., at 267 (Frankfurter, J ., dis:;enting).
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._,N:Sftington, ~. <11· 2!1?'1-~
CHAMBERS 01'"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

April
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Re: No. 77-1844 - City of Mobile v. Bolden
Dear Potter:
I have finally decided not to write and thus to add
to the many pages already submitted for this case. Therefore, please note at the end of your opinion: "Mr. Justice
Blackmun concurs in the result."

.

Sincerely,

---

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc: The Conference
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